No. 30 October-December 1959

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

TEACHERS AND TEXTBOOKS

HISTORY—GEOGRAPHY—PHILOSOPHY—ETHNOGRAPHY

AN ANALYSIS OF NEW SOVIET TEXTBOOKS

GUSTAV WETTER ON CO-EXISTENCE

ACADEMIC VISITORS REPORT

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No. 30 October-December 1959

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BLOKNOT EKONOMISTA

Conversations with the Planners

Herbert S. Levine

THIS is a report of a trip I took to the Soviet Union during May and early June 1959. Since my general impressions do not differ much from those reported previously by other visitors, I will limit myself to observations of an economic nature. My visit was undertaken as part of my research for a doctoral dissertation on the Soviet Industrial Supply System. The things I was most interested in were: supply planning and organisation and the possibilities of the use of mathematical methods, i.e., input-output (I—O) and linear programming (LP) in economics. Richard Judy, an economist from Harvard, who was in Moscow on the student exchange programme, accompanied me on many of my interviews.

The diary format is the easiest to follow, and I have taken the easy way, even though in so doing there may be some loss of clarity and coherence. What follows are excerpts from the diary I kept and from the notes and tapes I recorded. (I used a portable tape recorder in my room in the evenings to record details of interviews while the impressions were still fresh.)

MOSCOW, 12 May

Interview with A., a high official of the Moscow City *Sovnarkhoz,* and his assistants.

I asked about the construction of the annual supply plan. A. began by describing the *Mosgorsovnarkhoz* and in particular the supply department. He said that there were fifteen *snabsbyt* departments and he listed them. Then he proceeded to the construction of the supply plan. He said that Gosplan of the Union plans the distribution of 700 items. (HSL: Some published sources now give a figure of about 1,200 for the number of centrally allocated items. But Gosplan (see below) gave a figure of 800.) The plan is constructed as follows: It is supposed to start at the enterprise on the basis of the output targets from the yearly breakdowns of the Seven Year Plan, with the appropriate correction for accumulated experience made by the enterprise itself. But at one point it seemed that A. said at times the *sovnarkhoz* starts the process itself, without 'disturbing' the enterprise. In any case, with tentative output targets and a set of input norms, the material requirements are constructed. Between 5 and 10 July the *sovnarkhoz* must send its output and supply plan up to the gosplan of the republic. In July and August the gosplan of the republic makes corrections in these plans and the *sovnarkhozy* try to defend their estimates. He said the pressure is on during these two months. The gosplan of the republic is supposed to achieve a balance between planned sources and needs before sending the plans up. Starting in 1960, Gosplan SSSR will, during the month of June, send a preliminary list of *supply* limits for about 50 key products to the gosplan of the republic, informing them of the approximate amount of each item they can expect to receive. This will aid the republican gosplan in its setting up of balances on the republican level and in its dealings with its *sovnarkhozy.* The gosplan of the republic is to send its balanced output and supply plans to Gosplan SSSR by 1 September. Then Gosplan SSSR has the two months of September and October to work out overall balances for these centrally allocated products and at the end of October allotments come down to the gosplan of the republic. They are broken down by *sovnarkhoz,* then the *sovnarkhoz* breaks them down by enterprise. Then the process of specification begins. The enterprise makes out a list of specified needs within the limits of its allotment, sends the list up to the *sovnarkhoz,* the *sovnarkhoz* combines the lists of its enterprises and sends a combined specified list up to the gosplan of the republic. Again lists are combined and sent up to Gosplan SSSR. There they are sent to the Main Administrations for Inter-Republic Deliveries, which assign specific output plans directly to

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producing enterprises and designate inter-firm supply relationships. (It thus seems clear that these Main Administrations for Inter-Republican Deliveries, which grew out of the old *glavsbyty* of the ministries, still perform many of the functions of the old *glavsbyty*.) The final step is the signing of contracts, either directly between enterprises or between *sovnarkhozy*, in which actual details of delivery are set out.

Some random points from the interview: It came out that the plans for both 1958 and 1959 were quite late. This, they said, was because of the newness of the system and that now as they get more used to the new set-up, they hope to have the plans completed on time. One noteworthy feature of the discussion was the increased importance of the gosplan of the republic. It now occupies one of the central positions in the economic hierarchy. At one point I asked why the new Seven Year Plan was so much more operational than the five year plans formerly were. After some argument that the five year plans were also operational, one of them said that they had taken much more pains with the SYP than with long-term plans in the past; it was worked out in much more detail and thus the yearly breakdowns mean more than they did in the past. One big improvement of the new system is to be found in the local sales stores, where small quantity purchases of needed inputs can be made. Now each store is specialised by type of product and all firms within the area can buy from it. Formerly each ministry had its own set of sales and supply stores, which led to an enormous amount of duplication.

At the end of the interview we asked whether they had any questions to put to us. A. said they were very interested in Western inventory policy and he wanted first of all to know what the inventory-output ratio in the American steel industry was last year. We said that off-hand we did not know, but that we would be happy to look it up and give him the figure (unfortunately I had left the fat *Statistical Abstract* in my hotel room). They seemed to lose interest when we weren't able to supply this information and after a few desultory questions the meeting broke up. The moral here is to come armed with data even if it is inconvenient to do so. The next day I returned to A.'s office and left a copy of the Economic Report of the President as a gift for him. (Picture postcards of New York were my main stock of gifts, but not for such men as A.—he only got an Economic Report of the President!)

13 May

Talk with B.: He has written several articles about linear programming in the West and about the use of LP in the Soviet Union. I asked him what they were doing in this field. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he was only an amateur in this subject, he was now reading literature, mostly Western literature, rather than actively working on problems. He said that the use of mathematical methods in economics in the Soviet Union was a relatively new thing, that people were just becoming interested in it and so far little was actually being done with it in practice. I mentioned one of the articles he had written and he said that the modern machine building plant described in the article which uses LP to solve belt production and scheduling problems is still quite a rarity in the Soviet Union. But he felt that mathematical methods had a great future in Soviet economics and he smiled a little at this point and said an even greater future than these methods have in a capitalist economy. There are always a number of variants of a plan from which to choose; this is true within the firm, within the industry, and even within the economy as a whole. They would like to have a mathematical method by which they could choose the optimal variant.

I asked him whether modern algebra was being taught to economics students. He said yes, but there was a slightly negative tone in his reply. He said that linear algebra was being taught, but that the mathematical training of economics students was still quite weak and he emphasised that the connection between economics and mathematics was still very tenuous. I asked him if students in economics faculties were interested in taking mathematics and again he shrugged his shoulders in a negative manner and said, no, not really. The professors, the instructors, first have to learn these techniques and then perhaps the students will

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become interested in them. Instructors are now studying these methods in order to educate the public, in order to point out the importance and the possibilities for use of these methods. In connection with this he strongly urged that while I was in Leningrad I try to see Kantorovich or some of his co-workers. A number of times he indicated that Kantorovich wrote his first book on LP in 1939 and that he is a great man and that at first the importance of LP was not perceived by Soviet economists. But now it is realised and economists like himself are trying to educate the public to its importance. When this is done, Soviet students will become more interested and then perhaps a stronger connection between economics and mathematics will be forged. He is planning to write a book on the use of mathematical methods in economics in the West.

A footnote on some effects of the reorganisation of industry. B. spoke of the Economics Institute of the Fish Industry, located in Moscow. Now this Institute is being moved 'closer to production'. Where is that, I asked. To the shore of sea, to the shore of Baltic, he answered.

15 May

The Great Confrontation: On the Russian side: Academician Nemchinov and other prominent Soviet economists; on the American side: Galbraith, Reynolds, Montias, Judy, Harmstone and Winters (of the Embassy) and I. The place: Otdelenie Ekonomicheskikh Nauk Akademii Nauk; the time: 2.00 p.m.

Dick Judy and I arrived at 2.00. There were only a few people there and so we had a short conversation with C. before the others arrived. We asked him what use would be made or was being made of I—O methodology. He said that they were not thinking of using the Leontief method in the narrow sense, but that they would adapt I—O to Soviet needs. He then began to talk about the history of the use of balances in the Soviet Union—very similar to what was contained in the paper he wrote for the meetings of the International Statistical Institute in 1958. At this point, Academician Nemchinov and the rest of the Americans came in. C. explained deferentially to Nemchinov that we were talking about the so-called method of I—O in Soviet planning. Nemchinov immediately launched into a discourse on what he considered to be the history of the development of I—O. He spoke for what seemed to be almost fifteen minutes. He repeated this now oft-heard Soviet claim that Prof. Leontief really developed his I—O methods from his early experience in Russia. He talked about Leontief's review article of the national economic balance for the year 1923-24 in the December 1925 issue of *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*. He contended Leontief began well, at first he worked with Marxist concepts, for example he dealt only with material production. But then when he left Russia he came under the influence of bourgeois economists and especially under the deleterious influence of Evans and Hoffenberg. He began to retreat from Marxist concepts and he even began to lump things together which should not be lumped together, like wages, profits and rents. All this, Nemchinov stated, would be included in the forthcoming book entitled *The Application of Mathematical Methods in Economics*, which he is editing.

I asked Nemchinov how mathematical methods are going to be used in Soviet economics. He described some of the LP work they were doing. He gave two examples. One concerned the shipment of coal. The problem is to achieve an optimal distribution of coal to coal-consuming *sovnarkhozy* from existing and projected coal mines. The other concerned the location of motor parks within the Moscow City *Sovnarkhoz*. It was connected with the large amount of construction that is now going on in Moscow. Given construction sites and railroad depots, you want an optimum solution to the amount of building materials which should be shipped to each depot and to the location of the truck parks within the city for the trucks which will carry the materials from depot to construction site. Both these problems are essentially transportation problems. Montias asked whether they knew of the work of Koopmans in this field. Nemchinov said they did, but that they were using the methods of Kantorovich, which had precedence. Then, almost anticipating the question, why are they so late in developing

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and using mathematical methods, Nemchinov pointed out that in order to use these methods you have to have computers and that it is only recently that they have had computers on a large scale. Now they have to perfect methods for the use of computers and have to organise their data in a way that can best be utilised by computers. This, he said, is the stage they are in now. The people working on rockets and some other people are already using computers in their work; we economists are a little behind.

After this session on mathematical methods, Galbraith asked some questions about prices: whether there was going to be a change in the system of price setting and specifically whether there was going to be any more decentralisation in the construction of prices. Nemchinov said that there had been some changes already. For example he pointed to the changes in the method of constructing prices in agriculture. He also said that subsidies are being eliminated, that there are fewer firms now that are operating at a loss. He said that when a firm draws up its materials plan, it chooses the materials it will use on the basis of cost and if the *sovnarkhoz* changes this plan it also, if necessary, has to change the financial plan of the firm. As for decentralisation in price setting, some powers have now been given to regional organs in the setting of prices. The question was asked, would the enterprises be given more power over their own prices. Nemchinov answered that in the past, in the twenties and thirties, prices were freer, but due to the war and the cold war prices had to be controlled. They are now thinking in terms of changing the system of price setting, but they are not at all thinking of having a system where the market sets price. But perhaps some of the large firms, e.g., Magnitogorsk, will be given the right to set their own prices. Prices for new products, he added, are now set by agreement between the producer and user. These prices are held for two years, then are re-examined by central organs, are confirmed, and become established prices.

In the middle of this discussion, when it appeared that Nemchinov saw politically-inspired criticism in some of the questions, Galbraith tried to reassure him that we were all here to study economic problems, not to score points in the cold war. He said that he himself was faced with the problem of price setting during the war and he wanted now to see how they were handling these problems. It was a worth-while gesture, for it seemed that Nemchinov was extremely sensitive to any political implication which might be drawn from what was being said.

Reynolds asked a series of questions on labour. He said he was impressed with the method of labour balances in planning the allocation of labour. But even though you may have an overall balance it is most likely that you will get regional imbalances. How is this problem handled, how do you get workers to move from surplus areas to deficit areas? One way of doing this, we were told, was to pay a wage differential, e.g., in the Far North wages are often double what they are in the West Central regions, and in the Urals they are 20 per cent greater. The others there, however, did not want to make too much of this method, arguing that the differentials are not that great. They all agreed that the development in the outlying regions of well-rounded and high levels of living were more important factors. Another question which was asked concerned incentive piece-work wages, whether the rate was proportional or progressive. The answer was that up to a certain point it is straight piece-work (up to about 30 per cent overfulfilment), but after that it became progressive. It was also pointed out that on the average the norm was being exceeded by 50 per cent and that a reform in the rates is now being undertaken. The question was asked whether there was any pressure by the workers to keep these norms particularly low so that workers would overfulfil them and thus increase their actual wage payments. At first the answer was no, this sort of contradiction does not exist in the Soviet Union. But then one economist, almost with a twinkle in his eye, said, if a reform is being undertaken then it is a fairly good indication that a problem along these lines existed.

They asked us a number of questions both during the time when we were asking questions and afterwards. One was, what is the attitude

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of American economists towards the use of mathematics in economics. The contradictory replies given by Galbraith and me, I think, well illustrated the state of mind of the profession.

Talk with C.: C. stayed on after the meeting ended and Dick, Mike Montias and I talked with him for almost an hour or more. The main thing of interest was what he had to say about the statistical difficulties which stand in the way of I—O work. He said that in the past they could not use the data which came in on the material balances for I—O purposes, because the breakdowns on the distribution side were by ministries and the outputs of the ministries were so heterogeneous that no technical input-output relations could be derived. And now that the distribution is broken down by republics, the situation is even worse. I said that material balances certainly are not the only source of data, why didn't they use the data from the forms which the enterprises fill out monthly in which they report, in physical terms, the inputs per unit of output for all the products they produce? He replied that they do not get that data. I said, then get it. He laughed and answered, it takes money to get it and process it. One of our problems is to convince the higher-ups that this is a worthwhile project so that we can get the budgetary allocations necessary to work up the required data. We told him that this was a problem we understood.

18 May

Audience in front of the Metropole: When I returned to the Hotel Metropole this evening at about 11.30 p.m. there were large crowds, as usual, around the foreign cars parked out front. But this time I noticed that Mr. Palmer of the Harvard Library was at the centre of one of these groups. I decided to eavesdrop for a while and before I knew it, I too became the centre of a crowd numbering at times about fifty, and for more than two hours I held court. Almost immediately they asked me what I did and when they found out I was an economist, the questions on economics came flying. One young man (they were mostly young people) said that he had heard that there were three million unemployed in the United States, is this correct? The last published figure I had seen before leaving home was $4\frac{1}{2}$ million and I told him that his information was incorrect, the figure was closer to $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions. A murmur went through the crowd and I could almost feel that my credibility rating had gone up ten points. They asked how did unemployed people live? When I gave them the average monthly unemployment compensation figure ($140) and converted it into rubles (1,400) I could see bewilderment on their faces. This is not quite what they had been told about capitalist America. Later, in discussing Americans' attitude towards socialism, I tried to detail the social progress we have made (as with sex, it's the word, not the deed we fear), and tried to show how out-of-date their information about America truly is. One of the most interesting questions was asked me by an intense fellow who wanted to know why the standard of living in West Germany was so much higher than in East Germany. At first I spoke about foreign aid and the success West Germany has had in her export industries, but he interrupted me, saying that East Germany also has export industries. I think I satisfied him, though, when I said that the capitalist system is often a better instrument for raising the standards of living of the people than is the socialist system, and then proceeded to argue that the combination of private enterprise and a high level of profits can be very effective in raising the standard of living of a nation. Another high point was when a fairly well inebriated worker demanded to be heard and said that the important thing is for the people to own the means of production and the fruits of their labour. Before I could answer, a young Russian stared him straight in the eye and shot back, do you own the fruits of your labour?

Leningrad, 20 May

Interview with D: Dick and I tried to get to see Kantorovich. We were told that he was out at his *dacha,* but if we wanted we could see his assistant who works at the Mathematics Institute. We went there and spent a most profitable three hours conversing with D. D. is a young mathematician, speaks English

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well and reads it fluently. He appeared to be extremely well read in the Western literature on the use of mathematics in economics; he had a stack of American books on his desk. He was very pleasant and easy to talk to. We asked him what use was being made of mathematical methods in economics. First of all, he said, they (at the Mathematics Institute in Leningrad) were almost exclusively concerned with LP rather than I—O or econometrics, for they felt it showed much more promise than the others. In the beginning LP would be applied to problems of the basic units: the firm and the farm. As an example of the former he cited an experiment performed in a Leningrad railroad car manufacturing plant in 1949. This was a sheet metal stamping problem in which the Kantorovich method was applied and a saving of 10 per cent in waste metal was achieved. And as an example of the latter, he said that this summer, they are going to conduct a crop rotation experiment using LP at some *sovkhozy* in the Leningrad area. He said that the Leningrad *Sovnarkhoz* was very interested in the use of LP, mainly along the lines of transportation problems, which now, under a regional system of industrial organisation, had become much more amenable to solution. In response to a question on computers and the availability of computer time to economists, he said that they now get adequate computer time. The Institute already has one computer and within the next year it will get at least one and perhaps two more. These will be either an M-20 or a BESM-2 or both. They are two new high-powered machines, but are not yet in mass production. The Strela and Ural machines (lower-powered machines, the Ural performs 100 operations a second) are in mass production. He also said that the University will get a new machine in the autumn. He said they are not making a special computer for economic purposes. They have conducted experiments and feel that the universal machine is sufficient for economics problems.

D. spoke about the large translation programme they have. Already such works as: Charnes, Cooper and Henderson on the Simplex Method, Kuhn and Tucker (*Linear Inequalities and Related Systems*), and Vajda's little book, have been translated and they are now thinking of translating Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow (he called it, 'a truly fundamental work'), Richard Bellman (*Dynamic Programming*) and Gass's new book on LP. In addition to this, D. himself does a lot of abstracting of Western publications. We asked him about the mathematics training and capabilities of economics students. He proceeded to describe the new programme that Leningrad University is undertaking to train economists in mathematical methods. He said that next year a new department in the Faculty of Economics will be created. This will be a *kafedra* of Mathematical Economics. Furthermore, about 25-30 of the best students finishing the five-year course in the Economics Faculty this year will stay a sixth year to learn LP, other mathematical methods, and computer technology. After they finish this additional year, some will go to work in Novosibirsk and others in the Leningrad *Sovnarkhoz*. Dick asked if the members of the Economics Faculty were enthusiastic about the new *kafedra*. D. replied that for the most part they were, but some of the older economists, who for one reason or another are fairly conservative, were not particularly keen. From what he had to say, we felt D. believes that not enough training in mathematical methods is being given to economics students and that what is given is often very low level. However, training is not being limited to students. A seminar for instructors and professors has been organised and the Leningrad Centre for Scientific-Technical Education (*Dom Nauchno-tekhnicheskoi Propagandy*) has organised a cycle of lectures for engineers, specialists, and other practical workers in industry, to familiarise them with LP and the utilisation in general of mathematical methods in solving technical economic problems. He stressed the fact that the use of some of these techniques can easily be learned by engineers, that one does not have to be a high-powered mathematician to solve a given problem by applying the simplex method. The Centre and the Mathematics Institute itself serve yet another function; engineers from local enterprise often come to them with technical problems and they apply mathematical methods in solving them. This is clearly

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the same function that is being performed in the United States by the Operations Research people. D. spoke enthusiastically of expanding such work.

21 May

A Seminar: This morning Dick and I attended a three-hour seminar given by D. for members of the economics faculty of the University and for some engineers from local enterprises. This was one of three seminars he was giving to introduce people to the glories of LP and the Kantorovich method of 'solving multipliers', and to build up interest for a full seminar course he intends to give on the subject next year. There were about 20 students there, ranging in age between 25-40. They were attentive, lively, and inquisitive—asked questions when there was something they didn't understand and argued when there were things with which they disagreed. In fact, at the end of the session, one of them asked whether D. really thought this stuff could be applied in real problems; D. replied that it is being used in the United States and has already been used in several cases in the USSR. The seminar itself was simple and designed to whet the students' appetites. He set up a problem of three machines and two outputs. The three machines have different capacities and the problem is to set up a production schedule so as to maximise output. A series of problems with increasing complexities was set forth, only the most simple actually being solved. It was indicated how Kantorovich's method of 'solving multipliers' (derived by using computers) would simplify and in fact make possible the solutions. At the end there was a short section on some basic mathematical theory.

Interview with Dean of Economics Faculty: In the afternoon we had an interview with the Dean of the Faculty of Economics. We talked about mathematical methods in economics and about mathematics training of economists—nothing different from what D. had told us. The Dean spoke glowingly of the future of mathematical economics — 'We are now going from the era of the adding machine (he should have said abacus) to that of the electronic computer!' He mentioned some of the topics which will be covered in the new *kafedra* of Mathematical Economics and also in the extra sixth year. They include: linear algebra, linear programming, theory of games, dynamic programming, theory of probability, mathematical statistics and computer technology. Also elective courses will be offered and he gave as examples cybernetics and price formation. In addition, the students will take the usual courses in the history of the Party, Marxist-Leninist theory, etc. He said that the decision to go ahead with LP and mathematical economics in general was made fairly recently. Earlier, computers were not available, but as they became available, pressure built up to make use of them as widely as possible. The University has a Ural computer and will get another machine this year. The Leningrad Sovnarkhoz is very interested in mathematical methods. It is setting up a computing centre, is training its own personnel and will also employ some of the graduates of the sixth year and the new *kafedra*.

A faculty member stated that instructors are preparing themselves to use mathematical methods in their courses. He teaches a course in political economy. When I asked him how he intended to use mathematics in this course, he replied that he would illustrate the law of the balanced, proportional development of the socialist economy with matrices.

22 May

Interview with E: He is a young man, about 35, very pleasant, an instructor in the *kafedra* of Branches of the Economy in the Faculty of Economics, Leningrad University. I told E. of my work on the supply system and there ensued a most fruitful session, wherein many of the questions which had been puzzling me were answered. Most of these were technical, but there were also several of some general interest. I asked him about the difference between the old system of supply and the new (post-reorganisation). He began with the local supply stores (*kontory*). Under the old system, there were 120 supply *kontory* in Leningrad, each one of which supplied a range of materials for those enterprises in the area subordinate

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to a given ministry. Now there are only 16 of these *kontory*. They are organised by type of product and they supply all the enterprises within the Leningrad economic region. He spoke of increased decentralisation. As an example he cited the fact that Gosplan SSSR is increasingly limiting its allocation of materials to those materials involved in inter-republican deliveries. This gives more power to the gosplany of the republics, which are regional organisations. I asked him what has happened to the priority principle if the planning of supply is now based primarily on a regional principle. Is it as important as it used to be? He contended that the priority principle does not play nearly as important a role as it did before. Now all firms are important. Another element of decentralisation, he claimed, is to be found in the increased powers enjoyed by the directors of enterprises. They have the right to sell the above-plan output of the enterprise and often are permitted to dispose of unneeded materials and equipment without notifying the *sovnarkhoz*. In connection with this, I asked him whether the operational reserves, which are to cover under-plan outputs, have in the past been sufficiently large to accomplish this. He replied that usually they were, but in the last few years there has been a sharp deficiency in ores and metals, because the growth in output of the machine-building industry has been outstripping that of the metallurgical base. He added that firms which have their contracts for input materials under-fulfilled can now often get the needed materials from the local supply *kontory* and when a firm finds that its materials needs are actually greater than those it had originally indicated in its *zaiavki* it can often buy the materials required from these supply *kontory*.

Another significant difference is the relationship between the long-term plan and the annual plan. He said that in the past there were two major deficiencies. One, each year the annual plan made the complete trip up and down the hierarchy. As a result, the plan was often late, i.e., the final output and supply plans were not received by the firm until January or February, so that the first months were spent working without a plan. Second, an enterprise never really knew what its plan would be in the ensuing years. It had to limit its own planning to the period of a year, rather than five or seven years. This is now changed. The planning process for the annual plan is now quicker: it starts at the enterprise, based on the detailed yearly sub-divisions of the Seven-Year Plan, and Gosplan of the Union controls a narrower range of target indicators. And due to the yearly breakdowns of the SYP (even down to the enterprise level), the enterprise knows what its plans are for the entire seven-year period and can more intelligently make certain decisions which are related not only to the current year but also to future years.

23 May

Visit to a Collective Farm Market: Dick and I visited a Collective Farm Market and almost landed in the hoose-gow for taking pictures of the 'negative side of life'. As a result of his vast experience in such matters, Dick was able to talk our way out of the market's militia office. In fact, after Dick was through berating him for violating Comrade Khrushchev's recently stated principle of allowing foreigners to go anywhere they pleased, he was relieved to see us go. On the way out, when we stopped to buy some *pirozhki*, a well-dressed, portly woman belligerently asked us why we were taking pictures of this Kolkhoz Market, why didn't we take pictures of a rich (*bogaty*) kolkhoz market? At this point the peasant woman who sold us the *pirozhki* shouted, 'But this *is* a rich market!'

26 May

Kiev University: One of the two Russian exchange students who spent the past year at Harvard was from the Department of Modern and Current History of Kiev University. I arranged an appointment with some men from this department and spent an enjoyable afternoon talking about America, the USSR, international tensions, student and professor exchanges, etc. At the end of the session, I asked them to convey my regards to the Russian exchange student's wife and mother. The next morning his mother appeared un-

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expectedly at my hotel. We conversed for a while and then she asked me if I wouldn't mind bringing a box of candy to her son at Harvard and she produced a two-pound box of chocolates. At least mothers are the same the world over.

27 May

Kiev Machine Tool Factory: This afternoon I had an interview with the chief engineer and five other officials of the Kiev Machine Tool factory. The interview lasted about 2½ hours and was followed by an hour's tour of the factory. The factory produces automatic and semi-automatic machine tools. One of the newest models it produced appeared to me to be quite impressive. It was a drilling machine which held six different drill bits and had a mechanism with a magnetic drum memory device which automatically changed the speed of the motor when the drill bit to be used was changed. Many of the machines used in the factory were from the United States—almost all of them, I was told, were acquired on the lend-lease programme. In the interview I concentrated on questions of supply. We began with the chief engineer taking a folder from the top of a pile on his desk and saying this is a calculation of one of our input norms which we are just now sending up to the *sovnarkhoz*. We discussed norms for a while and then I asked them about the relationship between the enterprise and the *sovnarkhoz*. They said they did not have too much difficulty, that differences were always worked out at the *sovnarkhoz level*. They do defend their estimates of norms before the *sovnarkhoz*, but, they contended, since norms are based on technical data there is never a significant difference of opinion on them. (An interview, such as this, is not adequate for deriving a true picture of these 'political' relationships.) The *sovnarkhoz* gives them a plan for the decrease of norms, for the economising of materials, and at times it tells the firm how to accomplish these decreases. Then when the proposed norms come up to it, the *sovnarkhoz* checks the aggregate norms; if some of these are too high it then goes back and checks the detailed norms. Sometimes these plans for the decrease in norms come from the Gosplan of the Ukrainian SSR and sometimes even from Gosplan SSSR. In general the plans for the economising of materials were based on the experiences of the leading firms within the Soviet Union and abroad (here, as numerous times elsewhere, they asserted that there were 'no commercial secrets in the Soviet Union'). . .

The most important difference between the present period and the previous one, is that the connections between the firm and the *sovnarkhoz* are closer than were the connections between the firm and the ministry. There is a special department within the Kiev Sovnarkhoz for machine building, which administers the approximately forty enterprises in the area connected with machine building. They said capable administrators are now located there rather than in Moscow. Another superiority of the new system is that there is more specialisation and co-operation. I must say, however, that I asked them about this specifically, they did not volunteer it themselves. They said that now they produce a smaller range of products and they are getting more semi-fabricated products from other firms. These co-operative relationships, they said, are set by the *sovnarkhoz*, not by the enterprise itself. I asked them in general how they feel the enterprise is working after the reorganisation. They said fine, but, they added, this enterprise always worked well. It worked well before the reorganisation and it is working well now. They said they planned to fulfil the Seven-Year Plan in 6½ years. When it came time for them to ask me questions, there was really only one they asked: how is it possible for a supply system to work in an unplanned, anarchic capitalist economy? I gave a lecture on the mechanics of the price system and Keynesian economics. If I had had two more years to lecture, perhaps I could have convinced them.

29 May

Kharkov Candy Factory: Today I had an interview with the Director and Party Secretary and a tour at the Kharkov Candy Factory, Oktiabr. First I toured the factory for almost two hours (broken up by a number of stops

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for candy tasting—quite good!), then discussed problems of supply for another hour. The factory is one of the five largest candy factories in the Soviet Union. It produces 240 different types of products, 27,000 tons of final output a year, and 1,000 tons unfinished output which it sends to other factories for further processing. It begins from the raw material: the cocoa bean, the fruit, etc., and works through the entire production procession. It makes its own packaging (beginning from flat, unprinted paper) and repairs its own machinery. The labour force numbers 1,500, 85 per cent women. They work two eight-hour shifts and are now switching to seven-hour shifts. They, like the Kiev Machine-Tool factory, find that the output of the seven-hour shift is higher than that of the eight-hour one. This, I was told, results from the introduction of better machinery, but also from the fact that the worker performs better with the increased rest afforded by the 7-hour day. An outstanding feature of this factory was the very active role of the party organisation. The Party Secretary, a woman in her fifties, very motherly (probably would have been a den mother or a social worker here) ran a very effective organisation. One indication of this was the fact that one-third of the labour force were actually members of the party. In the factory itself, every spare area on the staircases and in the halls was plastered with posters calling for the fulfilment of various aspects of the SYP, for the building of communism, etc. etc. She employed a full-time artist who did nothing but arrange these posters, copy massive pictures of Lenin and Stalin, illustrate the joining of the Ukraine and Russia in 1654 and the like, and paint the portraits of the leading workers of the plant (other factories and the parks in this city had to be content with mere photographs).

30 May

Visit to State Farm: I was fortunate enough to join a group of American farm experts in a visit to the Sovkhoz Ukrainka on the outskirts of Kharkov. This farm specialised in animal husbandry and was obviously a 'show farm'. (I have since found out that it has been shown to a number of other Americans.) The American specialists were quite impressed by the farm. They were especially impressed with how well the animals were kept, and also with some of the modern equipment that the farm had, in particular one very up-to-date feed drier. When I warned them that this was a show farm, they granted this, but said that at least it demonstrates the Russians know the technology and are capable of using it. Now their problem is to spread it to the other farms. I argued that this was not a simple matter. The usual things were noticeable: the absence of fences, equipment standing around uncovered. One thing surprised the Americans and that was the absence of silos. Feed was kept in large bunkers dug in the ground. This, they said, leads to heavy spoilage. The American experts were able to extract a great deal of technical information. One of the items of interest was that wages on most jobs varied between 800-1200 rubles per month. Another was that 23 per cent of the farm's gross income last year went for new construction and 7 per cent for capital repairs and the rest was divided: 50 per cent wages and salaries, and 20 per cent materials and amortisation (the 6 per cent tax which the farm pays on everything it sells was deducted before calculating gross income).

Moscow, 1 June

The Economic Research Institute of Gosplan: Dick and I went to the Economic Research Institute of Gosplan (NIEI Gosplana SSSR) to see if we could set up an interview with Prof. F. We were met by G., an extremely pleasant man who spoke English well and who turned out to be head of the section working on foreign economics and foreign economic literature. He said they had received my letter and review of F.'s book (which I had written for the *American Economic Review*) and had translated it for F. (didn't say what he thought of it). He said they had been expecting me. We went to F.'s offices and discovered that we had just caught him before he was leaving for an appointment. We decided to meet again the next day and to-day just set up an agenda. I said I was interested in the working out of the annual plan, primarily

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the supply plan, and in the possibility of the use of input-output in planning. F. immediately replied that they had no intention of using input-output. I was stunned. Quickly, however, we realised that he had taken offence at the term input-output. Dick tried to explain that we meant the use of mathematical methods and I explained that we use input-output in a generic sense and that what I meant was the possibility of the use of the method of *zatraty-vypusk* (a Russian term for I-O) in planning. He said all right we will discuss that, but he wanted to make it clear that they were not thinking of using the specific Leontief method of I-O. He went as far as to say that Leontief did not invent matrices, that matrices are just a mathematical method in the same way that adding 2 and 2 to get 4 is a mathematical method. After this, F. left and we continued the conversation with some other members of the Institute. We set up the agenda for to-morrow and then talked a bit about the use of mathematical methods. I asked whether they were thinking of starting with a bill of final goods and then deriving total outputs. They said no. I then cited the work of Belkin (*Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, 12), where he claimed that all that was necessary was for the government, the Council of Ministers, to give to Gosplan a set of targets for final outputs and then Gosplan, using mathematical methods, could construct a consistent set of targets for total outputs. I asked whether these ideas of Belkin's have found favour with Soviet economists. I received two answers. One said that so far the majority of Soviet economists have not accepted Belkin's ideas, that these are new ideas and much more work has to be done on them. He also said that Belkin was still a young man. Another replied that one of the important questions not answered by Belkin was how the Council of Ministers was to construct this vector of final outputs (HSL: this is a crucial point—raises many questions in the realm of dynamic programming and the limits on foresight). A third added that in any case, *zatrat i vypusk* will only be an auxiliary method. Material balances still remain as the basic method.

Before leaving I asked what work they specifically were now doing. H. is writing a book on the material-technical base of the Soviet Union, and K. has just completed an article on the use of 'direct and indirect cost coefficients' (full cost—*polny zatrat*) in the planning of investment, which will be published soon in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*.

2 June

Economic Research Institute of Gosplan: To-day I returned to the Economic Research Institute. Unfortunately Dick was not able to come along. I was taken to the Institute's library and shown around. They have a fairly good collection of foreign material, especially foreign technical material. They have two or three shelves of American books, many of them on the Soviet economy (in a quick glance I spied Bergson, *Soviet National Income and Product, 1937*, and Loucks, *Comparative Economic Systems*), and also a collection of the AER and JPE. G. said that they were very interested in articles by Americans on the Soviet economy, that they themselves translate many of these articles or they have the central translating bureau translate them. As an example, he said that recently they translated the 'excellent article' by Campbell on amortisation. He said they like to know about the authors of these articles and he asked if there is a Who's Who of American economists. I said there wasn't exactly a Who's Who, but the AEA did put out a Handbook with some biographical information which I promised to send him (and have). In talking with G. I found that the Economic Research Institute began in 1955. It has 250-300 workers, broken down into a number of departments. But the Institute has no special department on I-O or on the use of mathematical methods in economics. It has no computer. However, a number of people there are thinking about mathematical methods and are working on the application of these methods in their own specific work. I asked how many people were in Nemchinov's I-O group and was told about twenty.

We then went into H.'s office and were joined by Profs. K. and L. K. began a detailed description of the process of constructing the annual plan. Some of the points of perhaps

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more general interest which came up were as follows: He seemed to say that in some years Gosplan did not prepare control figures (this I always understood was the first step in the construction of the plan), but they found that the documentation which then accompanied the estimates as they came up the hierarchy was so huge that it was worth the effort to construct these preliminary control figures. Before the reorganisation the ministries had to have their plans up to Gosplan by 1 September, now the republican gosplany have to have them up by 1 August. He explained that this was done because the ministries were located in Moscow and could always be reached rapidly by Gosplan, but the republican gosplany are away in the republican capitals and are harder for Gosplan to reach and thus they have to have their plans in earlier. The planning process has been speeded up: the enterprises are to have their lists of specified needs up by the beginning or the middle of November. Gosplan works on the material balances during the entire year. The industrial departments of Gosplan work on the sources side of the material balances and the balancing departments (*svodnye otdely*) work on the distribution side. Then when the data come up from below, Gosplan is ready for the negotiations. Most of the disagreements, they said, concerned construction allocations, and L. added, 'everybody wants to expand'. They said that now they were working with 800 material balances.

When it was their turn, the major question they asked me concerned dynamic I-O. F. wanted to know how you could use so precise a method as I-O in order to determine what was going to happen ten or fifteen years from now. I replied that the problem of dynamic I-O models is now being worked on, but that most economists who use I-O use static models and I begged off any detailed discussion of dynamic models. (This question is related to the problem of planning from total outputs rather than final outputs.) By this time it was getting late, F. had already exceeded his targeted departure by one hour and we concluded the interview. F. gave me a copy of his book and said that he had enjoyed the discussion. I gave him a copy of the Economic Report of the President (he asked whether I could spare the 'ammunition') and said that we should have an exchange of workers. They should send somebody to Harvard and I would be delighted to come to work at Gosplan for a year. He smiled.

The Library

I spent quite a bit of time working in the Lenin Library in Moscow. I had no trouble at all getting a library card which entitled me to the luxury of a desk in the room reserved for academicians, doctors and professors. I found the dissertation collection most useful. All dissertations are kept at the Lenin Library and they are catalogued both by author and subject. The Library, by the way, opens at 9.00 a.m. and closes at 11.00 p.m., seven days a week. There also is a micro-film service. I did not look into this until near the end of my stay, when I had collected a long list of books I wanted micro-filmed. But I got them to agree to take my order (30 books). The cost is 20 kopeks a page.

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THE SORBONNE IN MOSCOW

Adventures of a Literary Traveller

R. Etiemble

IN 1957, during a brief stay in Moscow (travelling from Peking to Paris) I tried in vain to obtain entry to the new university buildings on the former Mount of Birds, now called Lenin Hill. Cluttered up as it was by bulldozers, this hill no longer quite deserved its name, except where there are still a few old houses like the one in which, in 1934, I ate sausages seasoned with mustard so strong that it not only shot up my nose but almost blew the top of my head off! After returning to France, and reading *La ligne de Force*—a fine book by Pierre Herbart although its casual tone limited its readership—I found an amusing page on the importance of the *propusk*—that is, the *permit*.

Now that I have lived in the buildings of the new university, and I remember my debt to the *vremenny propusk* or 'temporary permit' granted me for the duration of my stay, I can understand, if not the grumpiness of my reception in 1957, at least the strictness of the rules of entrance. Besides the administration offices, the lecture halls and studies, there are also the university living-rooms and restaurants. Once I had passed the gate and found that no one ever checked my *propusk*, either at the entry to the apartments or when I took my meals at the various restaurants, it seemed natural that the beneficiary of the advantages enjoyed in the interior ought, at least once, to give proof of his status as student or professor.

After having lived long in Chicago and known its Stevens Hotel, then said to be the largest in the world, I did not feel too bewildered in the Moscow building, whose size and splendour conforming to Stalin's notions astonished me less than they perhaps should have done. That was the fault of the Wrigley Building and the Chicago Tribune Tower. But how hard it was to find one's way in that labyrinth! For the first two or three days I always went astray before finding my room or the restaurant. Students consoled me by saying that even after having been there for months they still sometimes lost their way. Various critics have deplored the profusion of costly materials, and would rather have had all those rubles used for less pompous purposes. But my wanderings in the maze did enable me to read various notices: 'Lecture on Leonardo da Vinci' — Bravo! Admission free — bravo again. And look! in 'the building of the House of Culture' there is henceforth to be a school of dancing, where students will be initiated into the waltz, the foxtrot, the mazurka, the tango and *other dances*. I mused upon those 'other dances' and upon the times when we used to take three changes of collars to the ball in anticipation of the exertions of the charleston and the blackbottom. I have heard that Soviet youth eagerly dance the samba and the cha-cha-cha, and I can well understand them, for such is the sweetness of forbidden fruits. May they be free to indulge in the eccentricities of our own youth, and I wager that, in the pleasure of their maturity, they will come back as we do to the tango and the waltz, and will be nostalgic for the minuet.

THANKS to French and American grants which provided me with the Ariadne thread, there I was then, arriving in my student's room where I was welcome for the time being. I appreciated my good luck: a common anteroom with doors to the toilet and the shower, two rooms to myself—that was my whole domain. Comfortable furnishings, adapted to the tenant's needs; a divan that turns into a bed every night. On each floor, several rooms where one can make tea or do a little cooking; and, lastly, a *sanlist*—a notice-board showing the marks periodically given to each student, after inspection, for the condition of his room. Almost everyone scores 4 or 5, which are the two highest marks, and must be earned if the

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student is to keep his grant-in-aid. Whether they all deserve these marks, or the generosity of the inspectors automatically awards these marks without which a scholar could not remain, is another question.

Although these lodgings are in no way inferior to those at the disposal of our students in the University City, I learned that some of their occupants feel lost in them, and suffer from solitude to the point of committing suicide. I was assured that there was a proposal to build new university quarters which would include lodgings for two or three students together. Owing to the critical shortage of housing, the majority of Soviet citizens are accustomed, one might say conditioned, to a community life, and do not pass from the dormitory to solitary quarters without difficulty. Nobody, however, was a prisoner in his rooms and everyone could entertain his friends of either sex. There was no excessive puritanism there in the relations between boys and girls; and this could hardly be so without romances, one feels—but so much the better, for what life is worth living without romance? In any case, better romances of this kind than what happens in our boarding-schools for boys or girls.

I frequented both of the restaurants, one rightly called the students' restaurant, and the other known as the professors', although it is open to anyone with a *propusk* who can afford it. Table-cloths, waitresses, a more varied menu and alcoholic beverages distinguish the professors' refectory. Smoked fish in oil, beef Stroganoff and beer, could be bought for 11 roubles—say, 450 francs, in 1958—valuing the rouble not at its rate of exchange but its purchasing power; but nearly 1,000 francs at the tourists' rouble rate. Red caviare cost 7.50 roubles per portion. For a French bursary scholar, who is granted up to 1,700 roubles a month, the 600 a month he would spend there for his two meals a day would still leave him with plenty of money. The Russian student, who, as the case may be, draws between 400 and 600 roubles, had better frequent the students' restaurant, where one serves oneself. I was there several times. Not that the cooking was very refined: wholesome, yes, by Russian standards. You spend about 5 roubles (roughly 200 francs), or a little less than at our restaurants in the Latin Quarter and rather more than in our students' restaurants. A happy innovation is that bread is free and *ad libitum;* so that on glasses of tea, drunk with the highly nutritious black bread—sometimes a little sticky, but always appetising—one can subsist for almost nothing at the end of the month when roubles become scarce.

Few students benefit from the advantages offered in these new buildings. If I understood rightly, they are reserved for scholars fairly well advanced in their studies: one finds them occupied by aspirants (those reading for a doctorate, as we should say), although these are now accommodated in a special building. Some professors live in the University provisionally, while decent flats are put up for them in the neighbourhood. It still happens all too often that several students have to cram themselves into an exiguous apartment: but for some time now the government has been striving to accommodate not only academicians and university professors but other citizens as well. It is the housing shortage more than the inadequacy of salaries that seemed to worry my Soviet colleagues. One of them, who did not venture to invite me to his home because he had not yet secured a presentable one, owns a *Pobeda* (50 h.p., 10 litres for 100 kilometres and seats transformable into beds) and travels six or seven thousand kilometres around the Soviet Union every summer. He sleeps in his car, for one does not expect to find a hotel outside the towns.

A car is worth from 10 to 15 thousand roubles. Many young professors known to me earn some 2,000 roubles a month for lecturing 20 hours a week, so a motor-car costs them six or seven months' salary. These teachers enjoy a status comparable to that of our assistants in the faculties; the relation of their earnings to the price of cars is about the same. The holders of professorial chairs are paid up to 5,000 roubles. Members of the Academy of Sciences can combine their incomes as professors with their allocation of 6,000 roubles as academicians, and those who do so have a very good income. One at least, known to me

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by reputation, has a long car and chauffeur, and dons who publish books enjoy authors' rights which provide a far from negligible supplement. Books published by the Academy of Sciences easily attain sales of 5 or 10 thousand copies.

WHAT of the halls in which learning is dispensed? The new University of Moscow certainly displays the power of the Soviet Union today, and its scientific ambitions; but the old Faculty of Philology in the Mokhovaya Place, where I taught, seemed to me even more decrepit than the Faculty of Letters at the Sorbonne. Some of the lecture rooms, more like corridors, are so packed with students that the lecturer is pushed right to the wall. (I must admit that at the Sorbonne itself, this year, a good third of my pupils had either to stand, or sit on the floor or upon the platform round my desk. But my colleagues in the Faculty of Philology at least have the hope of soon being transferred to a new building, even though the dealers at the Halles aux Vins have for years held up the construction of the premises for the future Faculty of Sciences and thereby prevented our Faculty of Letters from moving into its promised Paris quarters, now occupied by the Faculty of Sciences.)

The lecture room placed at my disposal in Moscow was a spacious one. I gave twelve courses, dealing with *The French Novelists of the 18th century*, with the *Development of Materialism by Diderot*, and *The Influence of China upon the Birth of Reformist and Revolutionary ideas in 18th century Europe*. These were subjects I had suggested because I knew that without any concealment of what I think, I could discuss them without shocking my audience. The much-calumniated 18th century is almost the only period of literature about which there can be a peaceable dialogue between our two worlds. As I was the first French professor to teach in Moscow since the Revolution I felt, at the beginning of my first lecture, a disquietude verging upon stage-fright. To bungle my entry might be to compromise the exchange of professors between Paris and Moscow. But well before the end of my first hour, I could feel that my audience not only understood the meaning of what I was saying but approved of the discussion. This impression was confirmed from one lecture to another; and without ever having said anything but what I thought, I had the pleasure of learning that my two later courses were to be broadcast. That news seemed all the better to me because these were to be lectures on comparative literature—a discipline that had weathered some nasty squalls under Zhdanov. Had not Fadeev condemned it in *Pravda*? But today the comparativist is no longer in danger of being disgraced for cosmopolitanism.

Now that I know how students are recruited for the University of Moscow, I am less surprised at the quality of those in my audience. In view of the relatively few places available in the capital, the entrance examination to the University is a very stiff one. Out of 25 candidates for the study of French, only one is admitted on the average. The same severity, it seems, prevails at the other Institutes of the Faculty of Philology. The shortage of places, and the scarcity of teachers (ten for French language and five for French literature, and of these two are titular professors and the rest readers or assistants) partly explains the strict selection of students; but there is another reason. The Soviet student is a privileged person, without the usual military obligations. He is therefore required to have natural gifts and zeal.

SEVERAL of my colleagues having done me the honour of attending my lectures it became easy for me, and rather natural, to distinguish three age classes among the Soviet intellectuals: first, the oldest—those who were either brought up under the old régime or had commenced their studies under Lenin; then, the victims of the twenty years in which Stalin suppressed all intellectual life; and lastly, the young ones, quivering—as it seemed to me—with freedom to form themselves, since the death of the Personality. The oldest were talking pertinently about Charles Sorel, or about Racine or the art of the novel; the youngest were avidly discussing Sartre or Camus, Butor or Françoise Sagan. With the victims of Stalin conversation was sometimes more uneasy, the taboos more numerous. One could

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nevertheless talk about everything that was not strictly political, and then one discovered that, concerning love and friendship, or the parts played by sport or television, or about noise and so forth, the Soviet university man of equal culture feels exactly like his French colleague. It is all the more upsetting to note that this same colleague has over-simplified ideas on religion or politics. He will tell you, sincerely, what he has just read in, perhaps, *Culture and Life,* that Michel de Montaigne was 'one of the first materialist philosophers'. When you visit the churches of the Kremlin in his company, you find that he thinks no intelligent and honest man can have piety. He is so remote from religious feeling that he does not recognise himself as religious, although he believes that *Pravda is* verily the truth. To be a materialist or atheist it is not enough never to use the sacred words, or not to know the expression *v silakh* ('in glory' according to our iconography). Paradoxically then, there I was, calling up Pasteur, Duhem, Leprince-Ringuet—to demonstrate to those of my colleagues who had lived through Stalinism that one may be at the same time—at any rate today—both a Christian and a man of learning. My Muscovite then remembered that Pavlov himself was a believer.

But let us do the system this justice—that those who have been most obviously biased by Stalinist dogmatism can at least become excellent professors of languages. When we realise that they have never in their lives been to France and have had hardly any contact with French people, how can we not admire the courage, persistence and fidelity attested by the mastery that, in spite of everything, they have achieved? The Professor of French phonetics, who persuaded me to record a certain number of poems, had no difficulty in showing me how far from irreproachably I pronounce my own language.

In some domains, however, the Stalinist chauvinism was gravely prejudicial. Thus, Madame Podzneeva, who holds the chair in Chinese at Moscow, knew nothing of the French sinologues, or of the many works published in France during the last 15 years. This, however, is no longer the case; for the régime is no longer suffering from infantile nationalism, and Paris and Moscow have exchanged works on sinology.

To judge by the syllabus of Russian studies at the Faculty of Philology, I would even say that what certain Zhdanovites used to call 'formalism' is now happily held in honour. Here, in fact, are some of the courses offered to the students of Moscow in 1958-1959:

The accent as an element in the system of literary language in the present epoch. History of the syntax of literary language in the 19th century. The language and style of Dostoevsky. The language and style of Chekhov. Stylistics in the language of art. History of the formation and evolution of words in Russian. Historic syntax of Russian. Punctuation in the works of Turgenev. The syntactic system of Pushkin's poems. The language and style of critical realism from 1860 to 1870. Foreign words in the literary language (etymological history).

Parbleu! I know that if I had to teach history in Moscow, or philosophy, I should have been in a much less comfortable situation. I do not forget that although I did allow myself the luxury of criticising the Marxist interpretation of Diderot, that was easy for me since I only wanted to show the Soviet students that, in my opinion, Diderot was a materialist well before the time stated by Lukacs or Lefebvre —from the *Pensées philosophiques;* I knew very well that I should not have been invited to teach *my* philosophy in the section on philosophy. For my part, I deplore Catholic and Fascist no less than Stalinist dogmatism. I have perhaps good grounds for regretting that philosophy is not yet taught in the University of Moscow as I think it should be—Socratically. But by what right—apart from the privilege that every dogmatism arrogates to condemn every other—do those who never protest against the teaching dispensed under Franco, criticise that which is disseminated in Moscow?

HAVING known Russia in 1934 and had a glimpse of it in 1957, what do I make of the developments—discreet, no doubt, but perceptible and welcome—that I now see in that

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country? For twenty years I never ceased to battle against the Stalinists; nevertheless, they invited me there. Producing no more than a slight flutter, I could quote Gide during my lectures and could expound my views on the novel without raising the slightest scandal; moreover, the questions put to me afterwards proved that I had been understood. Here is one of them:

> 'Of the two forms of morality that you find in novels, one consists in arranging everything, either in the course of the book or at least in the epilogue, to make the moral explicit: the other depicts the world as it goes, and leaves the reader the trouble of drawing conclusions. Which do you prefer?'

To which I reply: The second, without doubt. But one must take account of the political circumstances. In the France of the 20th century, where the writer has perfect freedom, the novelist is able to make no concessions; but during the 18th and much of the 19th centuries it was often a requirement of prudence that the novel should end with the conversion of Manon or the punishment of the characters in the *Liaisons*. Another question was:

> 'What, in your opinion, would be the specific character of realism in novels of the 18th century as compared with those of the 19th?'

I reply: 'The question, being a good one, is not easy. If I restrict myself to examination of the greatest works, it seems to me that the novels of the 18th century are, as you say, "realist" in the portrayal of love; and that although money and politics play some part *(Le Paysan Parvenu)* this is not yet the dominant part. Whereas, in Stendhal, Balzac or Zola . . .' A listener pertinently concludes, 'In short, what you call realism does not correspond at all to what we call by that name.' Well said!

The development is perceptible, too, in the scientific reviews. It is high time that the Americans translated the leading Russian journals of physics and mathematics into their language. The *Vestnik drevnei Istorii*, a review of ancient history published by the Academy of Sciences, is full of review articles showing that the Soviet historians are informed about Western works. On reading their *Origin of the Philistines*, I saw with delight that they knew and approved of the work of my friend Jean Bérard,* upon *Philistins et Préhellènes*. In the first number of *Russkaia Literatura*, another publication of the Academy, an academician whom I esteem showed me an article by Berkovski on *Rusalka*, a lyrical folk-tragedy by Pushkin. In the same number, the first, I read the study by Grigoriev on Russian classical literature in Western Europe and the United States between 1945 and 1957. If I am not mistaken, here is another specimen of comparative literature! The final paragraph complacently emphasises the interest of studies that show 'the diffusion of, and the interest taken in Russian literature outside the frontiers' of the Union, and registers self-congratulation at the sight of so many works exerting this 'great influence'. That is a pity, for it invites wilful malcontents to deplore comparative literature, thus understood, as nationalistic. But if I remember the reviews written in the United States on the appearance of M. Guyard's little book on *la littérature comparée*, their complaints of chauvinism were no less justified. What civilization does not congratulate itself when it sees its writers being read abroad? What one hopes for is a comparativism that will not be a one-way affair; so that Soviet scholars will give no less generous study to the influence (by no means always bad) of Western literature upon their own. If one reads in the *Commentario* of January-March 1958, Michel Alpatov's irreproachable study of *The Classic Value of Rublev*, where some of the most beautiful qualities of that painter are compared, by means of photographs, with the forms of Greek classical art—how can one deny that this is true, good comparativism, devoid of any nationalistic prejudice; something that gives us an all the more favourable idea of Soviet scholarship.

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* Bérard and two of the other most distinguished masters of this discipline, Launey and Jannoray, all quite young, have died in motor accidents in the last few years.

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THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF COEXISTENCE

Are Lenin's Views still Valid?

Gustav A. Wetter, S.J.

Professor Wetter's article on the 'Soviet Concept of Coexistence' is the first in a series on problems of coexistence to be published in forthcoming issues of SURVEY. *The present essay does not set out to analyse day-to-day events on the diplomatic level, with their ups and downs, but is concerned solely with the basic ideological questions involved. (It was written before Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States, and before his* Foreign Affairs *article appeared.) It is Professor Wetter's thesis that the principle of peaceful coexistence does not necessarily follow from Leninist doctrine, and that all coexistence in this view is merely provisional—relating to the period between the emergence of the first socialist and the (inevitable) disappearance of the last non-socialist state. It would be difficult to reach any other conclusion on the basis of the Leninist scriptures. What may be argued is that (a) Soviet ideology has recently changed, that new views regarding peaceful coexistence have superseded the traditional Leninist conceptions, or that (b) the importance of ideology should not be overrated, that the Soviet leaders (despite protestations to the contrary) are guided by other motives and considerations as well, and that the wish to prevent a third world war with its terrible consequences is now their overriding concern. Future contributions in these pages will deal with the relevance of Professor Wetter's observations regarding the present international situation, and the question whether basic new developments have occurred which may render his conclusions of merely historical interest.*

AS he had already done at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev once again solemnly affirmed the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions of coexistence in his report to the 21st Congress:

> We act upon the principle that relations between states with different social systems must develop on the basis of peaceful coexistence. We and the rulers of the capitalist countries have different views, different world outlooks. We shall never change our views and have no illusions about our class opponents changing theirs. But this does not mean we should go to war over our divergent views. In each country it is the people themselves who shape their own destiny and choose their path of development. The Soviet Union has no intentions of forcing its path on anyone. We guide ourselves by Lenin's principle that revolutions cannot be exported.[1]

This reference to the teaching of Lenin is fundamental to the Soviet conception of coexistence. In his report to the 20th Congress, Khrushchev introduced the passage on co-existence with the following statement:

> The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy.[2]

The reference to Lenin's teaching was intended to substantiate the sincerity of the Soviet offer of coexistence. The argument is that since the Soviet government's policy is based on Leninism, it can do no other than pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence; if it were to abandon this policy it would be disloyal to the principles of Leninism.

The object of the present study is to examine this claim more closely. Is peaceful coexistence in fact a necessary corollary of Leninism? Does the reference to Lenin really afford an adequate guarantee of the sincerity of the Soviet offer? This is the problem we propose to explore. We are not concerned with the question as to whether or not the Soviet Union harbours aggressive intentions at the present moment. We do not intend to discuss whether the West should take up the Soviet offer and

[1] *Pravda,* 28 January 1959.

[2] N. S. Khrushchev, *Report of the Central Committee,* 20th Congress of the CPSU (London, 1956), p. 26.

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if so, in what way. These are matters for political decision on which the student of ideas is not competent to adjudicate. He must confine himself to analysing the conception which lies behind the Soviet slogan of 'coexistence'. But, by clarifying this problem, he may hope to perform a useful service to those who bear the burden and responsibility of making political decisions.

The crux of the problem is how far the principle of coexistence is reconcilable with the communist goal of world revolution. Does the policy of coexistence imply a renunciation of this goal? Or does it merely signify a refusal to pursue this goal by armed force? Does the Soviet conception of coexistence imply the abandonment of all attempts actively to expedite the Sovietisation of the world and the pursuit of a purely wait-and-see attitude? Does it mean that the communists are content to await the realisation of Socialism in countries that are still capitalistic as the result of an entirely objective process of evolution?

One of the best expositions of the Soviet conception of coexistence has been given by A. Leontiev in an article in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party.[3] Leontiev attacks those who claim that the Soviet principle of peaceful coexistence is merely a propaganda trick designed to camouflage the Soviet Union's fundamental aggressive intentions. He vehemently rejects this criticism and refers to a basic law in Lenin's doctrine, namely, the 'law of the unequal economic-political development of the capitalist countries in the age of imperialism'. This law is a part, or, to quote the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* of Rozental-Yudin, the 'crown' of Lenin's analysis of imperialism. According to Lenin, imperialism represents the final and highest stage in the development of capitalism, after which it will inevitably be superseded by socialism. Lenin regards the replacement of free competition by the power of monopolistic finance capital as the essence of imperialism, and this is bound up with the fact that in the age of imperialism the export of capital as well as of merchandise represents a characteristic feature of capitalism. In the pursuit of the greatest possible profit, capital penetrates those countries with the cheapest labour and the cheapest raw materials. In an age in which the process of dividing the world up among the great colonial powers has already been concluded, this tendency must inevitably become a source of conflict and lead to a struggle for a new partition of the world.

The law of the unequal development of capitalism in the age of imperialism implies that some capitalist countries will outstrip others and that out of the competition for world markets some will emerge stronger and others weaker. This will enable the militant proletariat to break through the chain of the capitalist countries at one point and thence gradually break up the whole imperialist front. In his article on 'The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution' which is regarded as one of the main sources for the law in question, Lenin wrote:

> The development of capitalism takes place in the various countries in extremely unequal fashion. This is inevitable with commodity production. The unavoidable conclusion is that socialism cannot triumph simultaneously in *all* countries. It will be victorious first of all in one or several countries whilst the others will remain for a certain time in the bourgeois or pre-bourgeois phase of development.[4]

If socialism is not accomplished simultaneously throughout the world but only gradually, in one country after another, it follows that there will be socialist and non-socialist countries existing alongside one another, i.e., co-existing, throughout a whole period of history.

IT is clear that Leninism implies the possibility and inevitability of the coexistence of socialist and non-socialist countries. The question is whether this period of inevitable coexistence is conceived as one of peace or of constant warlike conflict?

On the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory Leontiev believes that it can be proved that the idea of the military expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence is contrary to the innermost spirit of Marxism. Marxism teaches that

[3] A. Leontiev in *Kommunist* 1954, No. 13, pp. 43-58.

[4] V. I. Lenin; *Sochineniya* (4th ed.), vol. 23, p. 67.

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socialism will be accomplished as a result of the operation of objective social laws: it cannot be brought about deliberately. Hence 'the attempt to foist a particular form of government or social organisation on another country is completely foreign to scientific socialism'. Lenin and Stalin had already shown that the slogan 'The Revolution is for Export' was merely

> a pernicious absurdity which is attributed to the Soviet state by its bitterest enemies, the enemies of peace, for purely propaganda reasons. Only absolute idiots whose horizon is limited by police blinkers could hit on the idea that revolution can be transported from one country to another as if it were a piece of merchandise. . . . It is an axiom of Marxism-Leninism that every country will achieve the change from capitalism to socialism only when the objective and subjective conditions for the change are present. The replacement of the one system by the other is a matter for the masses of the people who ultimately decide the fate of their country for themselves. This is especially true of the change from capitalism to socialism.

Khrushchev also referred to the 'exporting' of the revolution in his Report to the 20th Congress:

> To this day the enemies of peace allege that the Soviet Union is out to overthrow capitalism in other countries by 'exporting' revolution. It goes without saying that among us Communists there are no supporters of capitalism. But this does not mean that we have interfered, or plan to interfere, in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism still exists. Romain Rolland was right when he said that 'freedom is not brought in from abroad in baggage trains like Bourbons'. It is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order.[5]

For the Soviet Union the need for a policy of coexistence arises from the fact that, according to Lenin, socialism cannot be accomplished simultaneously throughout the world. The peaceful nature of the period of coexistence follows from the principle laid down by Marx, according to which the socialist order will come about as the result of an objective historical law. Once its hour has struck, it would be useless to try to halt the realisation of socialism by police action, but it would be equally pointless to try to force socialism on a country not yet ripe for it.

PEACEFUL coexistence depends on reciprocity. From the Soviet point of view there is therefore the further question whether their offer of coexistence has any concrete prospect of being met by a similar attitude on the other side. Soviet ideologists have discovered a number of factors which give them reason to regard a policy of peaceful coexistence in the present situation as full of promise, especially in view of the extension of the 'socialist camp' which has taken place since the second World War. These factors are as follows:

> First of all, the power and strength of the Socialist states; secondly, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries and the ever-increasing sympathy for socialism of the workers in all countries; thirdly, the growth of the liberation movement against imperialism in the colonies and dependencies; fourthly, the intensification of the contradictions between the capitalist countries themselves.[6]

All these are factors which would make it considerably more difficult for the capitalist countries to launch a war against the socialist camp than was the case before the second world war, when the socialist camp consisted of one country only, the Soviet Union. But as the Soviet Union has stood for peace 'ever since its inception', the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet and the capitalist world has always existed.

Soviet ideologists see a certain threat to peaceful coexistence in the fact that the mere existence of socialist countries is in itself against the interests of capitalism. The socialist revolution has reduced the effective range of capital and placed capitalism in a serious dilemma. As a result, however, of the abovementioned factors, capitalism will find it increasingly difficult to escape the dilemma by warlike means. It follows that

[5] N. S. Khrushchev, *loc. cit.*, p. 27.

[6] A. M. Kovalev in *Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly. Filosofskie nauki*, 1958, 2, p. 5.

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> the stronger the capitalist world is, the greater the opportunity imperialism will have to launch a war and proceed against the socialist state or states, and the less will be the chance of peaceful coexistence between the two systems. Conversely, the weaker the capitalist system and the more intense the contradictions by which it is rent, and the stronger and the more compact the socialist camp, united in a determination to prevent the outbreak of a new war, the more likely will be the peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures.[7]

A FURTHER reason is often brought forward to substantiate the honest intentions of the socialist camp in regard to coexistence: the fact that the preservation of peace is entirely in the interest of the socialist camp. The economic prosperity of these states can only be safeguarded by peace, and the more prosperous they become the greater the attraction they will exert on the workers in capitalist countries.

> From the standpoint of the interests of socialism, of the workers of all countries and of the whole of the human race, the prospect of the final victory of socialism by peaceful means is incomparably more enticing than victory as the result of a bloody war which would involve the loss of millions of human lives and the destruction of the material and spiritual values that have been created by the peoples of the world. As champions of universal prosperity and eternal peace among the nations, the communists are striving with all their might to avoid the destruction of another war. War would also arrest the economic progress of socialism. Conversely it is easier in peacetime for socialism to develop its advantages vis-à-vis capitalism.[8]

It follows from this that the slogan of peaceful coexistence does not mean that communism has resigned itself to the prospect of living alongside the capitalist countries for all time. The communists believe beyond all doubt that some time or other capitalism will be superseded by socialism throughout the world. Coexistence refers only to the period of time between the rise of the first socialist and the disappearance of the last capitalist country.

> The peaceful coexistence of two contrary social systems, which forms the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the socialist states, does not imply the simple parallel development of capitalism and socialism, but the kind of development of which the final result will be the radical preponderance of the forces of socialism over the forces of capitalism.[9]

The word 'peaceful' in the phrase 'peaceful coexistence' is merely intended to indicate the fact that socialism will not expand throughout the world by warlike conflicts but 'in such a way that more and more countries will abandon the capitalist system and tread the path of socialism'.[10]

ANOTHER question is whether the peaceful character of coexistence is to be understood as meaning that the use of force is excluded not only in the international sphere, in order to help socialism to victory where it is not yet in power, but applies to the internal sphere as well, i.e., whether communism renounces the method of violent revolution and has decided to adopt a purely parliamentary method of attaining power.

At the 20th Congress Khrushchev disputed that Leninism preaches the use of force everywhere and in all circumstances, and propounded the theory that there may well be different paths to socialism in the different countries. Civil war and the use of force were not necessary in all cases: in certain countries it might even be possible to attain power by winning a parliamentary majority. Whether force was to be used or not depended not so much on the proletariat as on the measure of resistance put up by the exploiting classes.[11]

The authors of the textbook *The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy*, have shed a little further light on this concept of the peaceful changeover to socialism. The main point is that the peaceful transition to socialism also represents a form of revolution and class war.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[10] Leontiev, *loc. cit.*, p. 45.
[11] N. S. Khrushchev, *loc. cit.* p. 30.

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> It might appear at first sight that the peaceful transfer of power into the hands of the working class signifies a change which is brought about without revolution. But such an assumption would be quite wrong. The conquest of power by the working class is always a revolution, no matter whether it takes place peacefully or by way of an armed insurrection. The necessity of social revolution is a universal law of the change from capitalism to socialism.
>
> It would also be wrong to imagine that the peaceful transfer of power into the hands of the working class excludes the class war. Socialist reforms cannot be accomplished without the class war nor, therefore, without overcoming the resistance offered by the enemies of the proletariat. The peaceful transfer of power to the working class merely excludes such forms of class war and the organised use of force as armed insurrection and civil war. It is a change that takes place without the armed overthrow of the existing power. [12]

Since the various forms of peaceful transition to socialism still imply a genuine revolution, they are not possible unless the old government machine is destroyed.

> The liquidation of the old state apparatus and its replacement by a new machine is a universal law of the social revolution. This is one of the differences between the socialist and the bourgeois revolution.[13]

What we have learnt about the peaceful transition to socialism in general applies in particular to the parliamentary method: it too involves class war and revolution. Since the class war is involved, parliamentary activity has to be supplemented by extra-parliamentary agitation:

> In certain circumstances parliament, which arose as the instrument of the rule of the bourgeoisie and the consolidation of the capitalist system, can become the means of the transformation of society. A necessary pre-condition is a powerful extra-parliamentary mass movement led by the working class party, a wide development of the class war of the workers, the peasants, and the urban middle classes against monopolistic capital, against reaction and for peace and socialism. To carry out this task it is necessary to eliminate the divisions of the working class, to fight for its unity and concentrate the democratic and patriotic forces in a popular front.[14]

Since the parliamentary path to socialism is a form of revolution, the final victory of the proletariat is not possible without the destruction of the bourgeois government machine.

IN order to appreciate the Soviet theory of coexistence it may be useful to recall some of the basic ideas contained in the Leninist theory of strategy and tactics. For Leninism, strategy and tactics signify the science of the conduct of the class war of the proletariat. By strategy is meant

> the determination of the main direction of the class war of the proletariat, the formation of the political army, led by the proletariat, in the given stage of the revolution, the working out of a plan for using the reserves of the revolution and a plan of campaign for the uniting of the revolutionary forces around the proletariat and the guidance of its activities.[15]

Strategy does not undergo any fundamental changes during the whole period of a phase of the revolutionary struggle. Tactics is a part of strategy and completely subordinate to it. This subordination of tactics to strategy means that it may sometimes be necessary to forgo tactical in favour of strategic successes.

In determining the necessary tactical methods to be employed in the revolutionary struggle, it is important to bear in mind the basic distinction between periods of high and low tide. Periods of high tide are times when a definitely revolutionary situation prevails and direct action is possible. In recent times such periods have occurred above all in the years immediately following the two world wars. Soviet ideologists emphasise, however, that revolutionary situations need not inevitably be associated with wars.[16] In the periods of low tide the revolutionary situation abates and a certain

[12] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii* (Moscow, 1958), p. 530.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 533.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 531.
[15] *Politicheski Slovar*, ed. B. N. Ponomarev, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1958), p. 560.
[16] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 557.

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stabilisation takes place. At high tide the tactical methods of struggle are decidedly offensive in character: strikes, demonstrations, armed insurrections, the setting up of workers' councils. The forms of struggle in periods of low tide are quite different. They include work in trade unions, especially non-communist unions, and the issuing of attractive slogans which enable the communist party to get to the top of strong movements. Another especially important method is the exploitation of temporary confederates and fellow-travellers, but this demands, as Lenin observed, the art of 'wangling, climbing down and agreeing to compromise'.[17]

In this context the theory of compromise is particularly important. In Lenin's view there are three main justifications for compromise. The first is a concern for self-preservation. When the existence or non-existence of the power of the proletariat is at stake, it may be necessary to accept very costly compromises. The second is the exploitation or intensification of differences between non-communist groups and states, and, finally, the prospect of weakening or undermining the non-communist partner. The conclusion of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (1918), which imposed very severe conditions on Russia, may be cited as an example of a compromise designed to preserve existence itself. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 may be cited as an example of a compromise designed to intensify differences in the enemy camp, although possibly other considerations (self-preservation) may have played a part in this case. The foundation of the SED in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, and the co-operation of communist parties with other, even with bourgeois, parties in the early stages of development in the satellite countries may be cited as examples of compromise inspired by the hope of weakening or undermining the enemy.

With regard to the admissibility of compromise Soviet ideology does, however, stipulate that only such compromises are to be considered as serve the interests of the revolution; ideological compromises and compromises that restrict the Party's freedom of action are not permitted in any circumstances. Only such compromises are to be accepted as allow the Party to exploit the forces of some party or group and provide itself with a breathing space in which to gather its strength, regroup its ranks, and prepare for the decisive attack on the enemy. In absolute accord with this Leninist theory of compromise, Khrushchev, in his Report to the 20th Congress, explicitly rejected as a dangerous error the transfer of the principle of coexistence from the political and economic to the ideological field.

The parliamentary activity of the communist party is regarded as an especially important tactical measure in periods of low tide. The whole Soviet theory of strategy and tactics is based on the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. In the various stages of the class struggle the proletariat is bound to use other classes as allies, but it must always maintain the upper hand. The leadership of the proletariat in its alliance with other social groups is secured by the communist party seizing the key positions.[18] This applies in particular to the various forms of 'peaceful transition' to socialism.

> In all the forms of transition to socialism the necessary and decisive assumption is the political leadership of the working class, led by its most progressive section, and the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of the Marxist party. The change-over to socialism will be out of the question unless the working class, led by its most progressive section, takes over the leadership of society.[19]

From the Leninist point of view it is not necessary for the proletariat to represent a numerical majority of the population. It is sufficient if it succeeds (a) in winning over the appropriate confederates at every stage of the struggle (e.g., the poor peasants and semi-proletarian masses of the urban population), (b) in concentrating its forces at the crucial time and place, (c) splitting the enemy and de-

[17] Cf. for this whole section N. V. Tropkin, *Ob Osnovakh strategii i taktiki Leninizma* (Moscow, 1954).

[18] Cf. N. V. Tropkin, ***op. cit.*, p. 8.**

[19] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 533.

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stroying him piece by piece at different times.[20]

Lenin's theory of strategy and tactics is closely related to his analysis of imperialism. This means that, according to the Soviet view, in the age of imperialism one point in Marxist theory has lost its meaning, namely, the thesis that the preconditions of the socialist revolution can exist only in countries with highly developed capitalism. According to Tropkin, Leninism has proved that the proletariat triumphs above all in countries which represent weak links in the imperialist chain. The possibility of revolution depends not only on the economic development of a country but above all on the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat and the existence of its party.[21]

Such in its main outlines is the Soviet theory of coexistence. It centres in the assertion that the Soviet Union is committed to a policy of peaceful coexistence by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. We now have to examine whether this policy in fact follows necessarily from the premises of Marxism-Leninism or whether it is possible to reach a different conclusion from Lenin's theory. It is especially important to see whether Lenin himself gave any thought to the possibility that the proletariat of a country where socialism has already triumphed, should intervene in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in a country that is still capitalist. We may therefore divide our inquiries into two parts. First of all we shall deal with the theoretical aspects of the question and then examine some of the more detailed statements of Lenin and Leninist writers.

THE policy of peaceful coexistence, as we have described it, implies an attitude of calmly waiting and seeing until one country after another falls away from capitalism as the dry leaves fall from the trees in autumn, with the inevitability of a natural process, and without any need for violent intervention on the part of the socialist camp. It must be stated that this kind of waiting-and-seeing attitude is quite alien to the innermost character of Leninism. The decisive influence which Lenin had on the evolution of Russian Marxism was due precisely to his inability to wait and see, and to his attempt to speed up the revolutionary process by militant intervention. When Lenin began his work on the Russian Marxist movement, he soon found himself opposed to a group of Russian social democrats, the so-called Economists. This group believed that socialism would come about as the result of the elemental operation of the laws of social development. From the cast-iron laws of social development discovered by Marx the Economists concluded that the change-over to socialism would take place inevitably and automatically, as soon as the appropriate economic and social conditions existed. In economically backward Russia, where industrialisation and the development of capitalism had hardly started, the hour for socialism was still in the distant future. From this state of affairs the Economists drew the conclusion that the Russian proletariat should not waste its strength in a hopeless political struggle against absolutism. It should leave this struggle to the liberal bourgeoisie and confine itself to a purely economic struggle (hence their name) in order to extort economic concessions from the government and the capitalists, by strikes and similar methods.

In the conditions prevailing in Russia at the end of the last century this would have meant the prospect, far from attractive for a revolutionary, of having to wait possibly decades before the change-over to socialism could be put on the agenda. For Lenin, however, such a prospect was utterly unacceptable. As a Marxist he too held the view that socialism would be the inevitable result of historical development, but he believed that historical necessity does not rule out conscious revolutionary intervention. On the contrary, the revolution would be accomplished by the rising of the exploited working masses. Marx himself had already summoned the workers to revolt. In the West, however, social democracy had proceeded more on the evolutionary parliamentary way. Western social democrats held that socialism could be brought about by

[20] Cf. N. V. Tropkin, *op cit.*, p. 12.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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the attainment of a parliamentary majority. The social democratic parties in the West were therefore conceived as mass parties.

Lenin's view of the realisation of socialism by revolution was not a complete novelty within the Marxist movement. But the emphasis he put on the factor of 'consciousness' was new, as was also his conception of the Marxist party, which he regarded no longer as a mass organisation but as a comparatively small group of conspiratorial professional revolutionaries, subject to almost military discipline. The party was as it were the incarnate consciousness of the working class: it was its task to fill the working masses with socialist consciousness and lead them in the revolutionary struggle. In this shift of emphasis from the objective factor (degree of industrial development, numerical strength of the proletariat in comparison to the total population, etc.) to the subjective (degree of class consciousness, presence of a party as a closely knit, disciplined fighting unit in the Leninist sense, conscious revolutionary struggle), it is possible to see the basic character of the Leninist development of Marxism.

This applies in the first place to the transition to socialism inside a particular country. But there is no reason why it should not apply also to the victory of socialism on an international scale. It is true that in the article from which we have already quoted, Kovalev criticises the imperialist ideologists for deliberately obliterating the difference between the question of the victory of socialism in one country and the same question on a world-wide scale. But there seems to be no reason for positing a difference of this kind in the context with which we are at present concerned. We are not concerned with such questions as whether the socialist countries are interested in waging a new war or not, but with the fundamental question whether, in Lenin's view, the historical course of events can and should be expedited by violent intervention. As far as the victory of socialism in one country is concerned, Lenin's answer was clearly in the affirmative. But since Lenin repeatedly emphasised that the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat must never be considered in isolation but always in the context of the contradictions within the capitalist system throughout the world, the obvious thing is to assume the possibility of a similar expediting of socialist victory on a world-wide scale, provided that the necessary objective conditions are present. At certain times, intervention by force may not be expedient, but that is another matter. The point at issue here is not whether intervention by force is expedient but whether it is in principle admissible.

NOT only is the principle of speeding up the course of history by force not contrary to the basic character of Leninism; it can also be shown to be admissible if we take as our point of departure the 'law of the unequal development of the capitalist countries in the age of imperialism' which is, as we have seen, used as the main argument for the theory of peaceful coexistence. This law does not, as one might imagine at first glance, imply that, as a result of an objective process of growth, socialism will come to power first of all in the economically highly developed countries where capitalism is already mature enough to be superseded by socialism, and that one country after another will follow suit as soon as it is ripe. The law means that the chain of capitalist countries will be broken by the application of violence to a weak link, whence the whole front will be broken up.

It is true that Lenin does not refer explicitly to the chain of capitalist countries being broken at its weakest point. In his articles which are regarded as the main sources for the theory of coexistence,[22] Lenin simply speaks of socialism being victorious, to begin with, in one country or in a few countries. There is no doubt, however, that he had in mind the violent breaking of the chain in one way or another. In any case, present-day Leninism takes the law as implying the violent breaking of the chain of capitalist countries at one of its weak points. This is clear from the fact that the victory of the revolution in economically

[22] The articles in question are those already quoted: 'The military programme of the proletarian revolution' (1916), and 'On the Slogan of the United States of Europe' (1915), *Sochineniya*, vol. 21, p. 308.

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backward Russia is taken as confirming Lenin's theory.[23]

This theory that the revolution will be victorious to begin with at the weakest point in the chain of capitalist countries is stated quite explicitly, however, in the recently published text book on *The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy*:

> The revolution is accomplished first of all in those countries which represent the weakest link and the nodal point of the contradictions of world imperialism. These countries need not be among the most highly developed capitalist countries. Since the imperialist system as a whole is already ripe for the socialist revolution, the presence of less developed countries in this system does not constitute an obstacle to the change-over to socialism.
>
> Can it be said that the countries with the most highly developed capitalist system are to be regarded as the weak links, or are the weak links those where capitalism is less highly developed? Naturally, a certain development of capitalist conditions and the existence of a working class is a necessary condition for the socialist revolution. But it cannot be said that ripeness for revolution depends on the level of economic development of the various countries. Which country in the present historical period represents the weakest link in the imperialist chain depends on the whole of the internal and external conditions of development in each individual country, the intensity of social contradictions and the mutual relationship of class forces.[24]

It is clear from this that a thoroughly aggressive element is inherent in the 'law of the unequal economic and political development of capitalist countries in the age of imperialism'. From this law one can only deduce the fact that for a time capitalist and socialist countries will exist alongside one another. With the best will in the world it is impossible to find in this law a guarantee for the peaceful nature of the coexistence of the two systems.

IT may be objected, however, that the peaceful nature of coexistence should be derived not so much from this law as from the general theory of Marxism according to which the revolution cannot be exported but must evolve from the internal development of each country. Apart from the fact that Lenin is always referred to as the chief authority for the theory of peaceful coexistence, the reference to Marxism confronts us with another tremendous difficulty.

Marxism has often been criticised on the grounds that its historical dialectic must inevitably come to a standstill once the socialist classless society has been realised.

The same question also appears in another form. If the social conflict is resolved again and again at certain nodal points of social development by a revolutionary transformation of society, must not history come to a standstill if the socialist revolution is to be the last revolution? Or may we assume that even the socialist form of society will be brought to an end by a new revolution?

It is clear that Soviet theory tries to solve all these problems in such a way as to allow the dialectic to continue to operate in the socialist society, without the emergence of a new form of class struggle and without the dialectic leading to a new revolution. The dilemma is resolved by differentiating between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. By antagonistic contradictions Soviet ideology means 'contradictions which are based on the irreconcilable interests of mutually hostile classes, groups, or forces.' For antagonistic contradictions to exist two conditions have to be fulfilled: they must be not between individuals but between whole social groups, and they must be based on a conflict of interests. If one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the contradiction will be non-antagonistic. Non-antagonistic contradictions are defined as those 'which are not between hostile classes with directly opposed interests, but concern every-

[23] 'Lenin's statement that imperialism represents the eve of the socialist revolution has been completely confirmed in practice. The great October revolution wrenched Russia out of the chain of world imperialism. The result of the second world war was that a whole series of countries in Europe and Asia fell away from the system of world capitalism.' M. Rozental and P. Yudin, *Kratki filosofskii slovar*, 4th ed. (Moscow, 1955), p. 156.

[24] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 520.

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day matters of detail, not matters of principle'.[25]

Normally, antagonistic contradictions are resolved only by violence, i.e., by revolutionary class warfare in which one class is victorious over another, or by way of warlike struggles. Examples of antagonistic contradictions are the relationship between landowners and peasants or between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the imperialist West and the colonies; the differences between the individual imperialist states in their struggle for world markets are also antagonistic contradictions.[26]

The characteristic quality of non-antagonistic contradictions is that they need not inevitably lead to hostilities and that the struggle need not develop into an active conflict. An example of a non-antagonistic contradiction is the relationship between the working class and the peasantry in the Soviet Union, and between the progressive and the backward elements in Soviet society.[27] Such contradictions are resolved not by violence but by a gradual and systematic transformation of economic conditions under the leadership of the Party, which is able by reason of its knowledge of the laws of social development to discover incipient contradictions in good time and take measures to resolve them.

It is clear therefore that only the antagonistic contradictions are resolved by force. The question is, however, of what kind, antagonistic or non-antagonistic, are the contradictions between socialist and capitalist states? These unquestionably concern whole social groups and forces, and they are moreover based on a conflict of interests. We have already noted that Kovalev sees in this conflict of interests between the capitalist and socialist camps a factor which calls into question the possibility of peaceful co-existence.[28] All the conditions necessary for an antagonistic contradiction are fulfilled. And if the theory holds good they must be resolved by violence, by wars like those in which the antagonistic contradictions between imperialist states themselves are decided. In spite of this, however, the Soviet theorists maintain that these contradictions between capitalist and socialist states need not necessarily be resolved by war. This represents an evident break with the entire theory of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions.

In the study of co-existence from which we have already quoted more than once, Kovalev attempts to get over this difficulty by asserting that 'the ways of resolving the contradictions between states with opposite social systems are not identical in form with the resolving of differences between antagonistic classes, since the mutual relationship between classes is one thing and the relationship between states another' (p. 10). That states are not classes is obvious. But according to Soviet theory antagonistic contradictions can exist not only between classes but also between the various imperialist states. Kovalev does not base his theory on the principles of Marxism-Leninism but merely refers to an example from the history of the period following the second world war: in the years 1946-1949 the relationships between capitalist and socialist states were based on the principle of peaceful co-existence although the American imperialists unleashed the civil war in China during this same period. It is not quite clear how this example confirms the theory that antagonistic contradictions between states can be resolved differently from contradictions between classes. But even if the example were relevant it would be necessary to object, with Lenin, that 'owing to the enormous complexity of the phenomena of social life, it is always possible to collect any number of examples or isolated facts to confirm any theory or statement whatsoever'.[29]

IT should now have become clear that the theory of peaceful co-existence cannot merely not be regarded as a logical deduction from Marxist-Leninist teaching, but that it is on the contrary opposed to some of the basic tenets of that teaching. In solving the problem with which we are concerned we are, however, not dependent on purely speculative considerations. It is possible to produce absolutely concrete evidence from Lenin and other authoritative

[25] Rozental and Yudin, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[26] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 276.
[27] Rozental and Yudin, *op. cit.*, p. 15; *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 227.
[28] Kovalev, *loc. cit.*, p. 6.
[29] Lenin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 22, p. 178.

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Soviet sources to show that the idea of 'exporting' the revolution is not so far removed from Leninism or has not always been so far removed as is claimed today.

We have already seen that according to the Leninist theory of strategy and tactics it is not necessary for the proletariat to be in a majority in a given society in order to be victorious; victory is still possible if the proletariat succeeds in finding the right confederates. We have also seen that the peasants and semi-proletarian urban masses have been mentioned as potential allies. But would it be inconceivable, from the standpoint of Leninist theory, for the proletariat of a country that is already socialist, to appear as the ally of the proletariat in a country that is not yet socialist? Soviet theory not only does not exclude such a possibility: it has it very much in mind. According to Stalin the fact that the revolution will be victorious at different times in different countries creates a mutual dependence between the proletariats of the various countries. The victorious proletariat of one country has the greatest interest in socialism attaining power in other countries as soon as possible, in order to overcome capitalist encirclement and the danger of capitalist intervention. From this the text book on *Historical Materialism* edited by F. V. Konstantinov, draws the following conclusions:

> the workers of the country where socialism is in power must not regard their country as a self-contained unit isolated from other countries. On the contrary, they must be interested in expediting the victory of the proletariat in all countries.[30]

Conversely, according to Stalin, the fate of the revolution depends on the power and strength of the first socialist state:

> While it is true that the *final* victory of socialism in the first country to emancipate itself is impossible without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several countries, it is equally true that the unfolding of the world revolution will be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the help given by the first socialist country to the workers and labouring masses in all other countries.[31]

Since after the second world war there is no longer merely one socialist country but a whole socialist camp, it is, according to Kovalev, impossible to speak any longer of 'capitalist encirclement'. But it would be wrong to assume that the socialist camp is not to be allowed to render any help at all to the revolutionary movements in other countries.

According to *The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy* (1958), from which we have already quoted more than once:

> Since the imperialist front has been broken in one country and even more since it has been broken in several countries, a fundamental change has been taking place in the conditions making for socialist revolution in other countries. The existence of the land of socialism (and the existence of a world system of socialist countries) means a weakening of the capitalist system and contributes towards the strengthening of the liberation movement in other countries. It is easier for the revolutionary forces in the new countries which will be treading the path of socialism to maintain themselves in the struggle against the forces of reaction not only because the imperialist system has been weakened, but also because they can now rely on the help of the countries that are already socialist[32]

The important question is, however, what form can this help take? Must it only be moral support, sympathetic demonstrations or if need be economic and financial aid, or may the aid be given in a military form?

We have seen that Leontiev has described this kind of 'export' as a 'pernicious error' which would occur only to 'absolute idiots'. But Lenin took a different view. In his article 'On the Slogan of the United States of Europe', published in August 1915, he already dealt with the question of the nature of future developments if, as a result of the unequal development of the capitalist countries, socialism were to be victorious to begin with in one single country. At that time Lenin conceived the future expansion of socialism as follows:

The victorious proletariat of this single

[30] F. V. Konstantinov, *Istoricheskii materializm* (Moscow, 1950), p. 326.

[31] Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 6, p. 399 (Eng. ed., p. 418).

[32] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 521.

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> country would, after expropriating the capitalists and organising socialist production in their own house, rise up against the rest of the capitalist world, drawing to itself the oppressed classes of the other countries, and if necessary proceeding against the exploiting classes and their states with military force.[33]

Stalin quoted this passage in the introduction to his book *On the Road to October* in order to show the kind of help of which he was speaking. It is clear, therefore, that in Lenin's time and as late as 1924, when Stalin wrote the introduction to his book, the period of co-existence of the capitalist and socialist states was not conceived as one of peaceful co-existence. They both took the opportunity to make this quite clear. In his report to the 8th Party Congress Lenin said:

> The existence of the Soviet Republic alongside the imperialist states is unthinkable in the long run. In the end one or the other will be victorious. And until this end comes a series of most terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be unavoidable.[34]

Likewise Stalin:

> Most probably, in the course of development of the world revolution, side by side with the centres of imperialism in individual capitalist countries and with the system of these countries throughout the world, centres of socialism will be created in individual Soviet countries and a system of these throughout the world, and the struggle between these two systems will fill the history of the unfolding of the world revolution.[35]

Even in 1927, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin still saw the situation no differently:

> The October Revolution has ushered in a new era, the era of proletarian revolutions in the imperialist countries . . . it has ushered in the era of colonial revolutions which are being carried out in the oppressed countries of the world in alliance with the proletariat and under its leadership . . . the first Soviet revolution has not only inaugurated the era of political world revolutions, it has also expedited its further progress.[36]

This shows that Lenin and also Stalin did not think of the period preceding the triumph of socialism throughout the world as marked by the simple falling away of one country after another from capitalism. They conceived this interim period as one of extreme unrest, full of revolutions and colonial wars in which armed intervention by the land of 'victorious socialism' would be by no means debarred.

What is particularly important in this context is the fact that the passage in which Lenin explicitly envisaged the possibility of armed intervention in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of another country is taken from the article 'On the slogan of the United States of Europe', which is now regarded as one of the main sources for his theory of co-existence.

THAT such extremely aggressive-sounding declarations by Lenin and Stalin are not to be regarded as accidental *faux pas* to which no particular importance should be attached within the total complex of their doctrine is obvious from what has already been said about the basic character of Leninist ideology. The same conclusion will emerge, however, if we look at the Leninist theory of war It is anything but pacifistic. On the contrary, it is permeated through and through by a warlike and aggressive attitude to the bourgeois world. In his article on 'The military programme of the proletarian revolution,' Lenin attacked the slogan of 'Disarmament' which was issued by certain socialist circles during the first world war and declared that 'socialists cannot be against war of whatever kind without ceasing to be socialists,' because socialists can never be opposed to revolutionary wars and because, as supporters of class warfare, they cannot be against civil war and, finally, because once socialism has been victorious in one country intervention by capitalist countries has to be reckoned with.[37]

Konstantinov vehemently rejects any kind of pacifist attitude:

> The bourgeois pacifists call themselves enemies of any kind of war . . . the bolshe-

[33] Lenin, *Sochineniya,* vol. 21, p. 311.
[34] *Ibid.,* vol. 29, p. 133.
[35] Stalin, vol. 6, p. 400 (Eng. ed., p. 419).
[36] *Ibid.,* vol. 10, p. 243 (Eng. ed., p. 246).
[37] Lenin, *Sochineniya,* vol. 23. p. 65.

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> vists were never simple pacifists and enemies of all war, they never consider war from the sentimental point of view—they are in principle in favour of the use of force which must be used by the revolutionary classes and progressive forces of society against the reactionary classes and their political institutions, because it is impossible without force to free the people from these men of violence who have the instruments and organs of power in their hands.[38]

The Soviet doctrine of just and unjust wars is well-known. Stalin formulated it as follows in the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Short Course* (Eng. ed., p. 152):

> . . . there are two kinds of war:
>
> (a) just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave them or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the imperialist yoke; and
>
> (b) unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations.

This definition was also included in the new edition of the *Soviet Encyclopædia* and it is still in force today, although Stalin's *Short Course* was set aside at the 20th Congress. It is reproduced almost without alteration in *The Political Dictionary* (1958, p. 85):

> Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the assumption that there are two kinds of war: just wars which are not wars of aggression but wars of liberation, and unjust wars which are wars of conquest. The aim of the just war is defence against an attack from without, the liberation of the people from the slavery of capitalism, and the liberation of colonies and dependencies from imperialist oppression. Unjust wars are waged for the conquest and enslavement of foreign countries and foreign peoples.

This definition is commented on by Konstantinov as follows:

> Under present conditions unjust wars are the wars which the bourgeoisie wages against the proletariat and the communist movement. Unjust and reactionary wars are also those wars which the imperialist bourgeoisie wages against the peoples of colonial countries and dependencies, who are fighting for national liberation. Finally, those wars are unjust which break out between the imperialist countries themselves in their struggle for the markets of the world, for areas for the investment of capital. Just wars, wars of liberation, in particular wars waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, are progressive and revolutionary wars.

The civil wars of the proletariat must also be included among the just wars; in fact they occupy a position of special honour:

> The civil wars of the proletariat which marches at the head of the working masses against the bourgeoisie are the most just, most progressive, and most revolutionary wars.[39]

Lenin sings a real hymn of praise for the proletarian civil war as 'the only legitimate, holy war, not in the parson's sense, but in the human sense, the only holy war'.[40] The wars of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie are not merely described as just wars: it is even asserted that a socialist country cannot wage unjust wars at all, even when it is a question of intervening in the internal affairs of another country:

> Predatory wars and wars of aggression are fundamentally alien to the socialist state. Socialist states can only wage just, revolutionary wars, either in self-defence against imperialist aggression or in order to help oppressed classes and peoples in other countries who are fighting for liberation from capitalist slavery or the imperialist yoke.[41]

WITH the official proclamation of co-existence Soviet ideologists are now trying to suggest that the help that socialist countries may render the fighting working class in other countries should only be in the form of moral support and not bear a military character.

> The working class which has been victorious in one or a number of countries can give fraternal moral aid to the work-

[38] Konstantinov, *op. cit.*, p. 460.

[39] Konstantinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 400, 474.

[40] Lenin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 26, p. 362.

[41] *Konstantinov, op. cit.*, p. 477.

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> ers in other countries but it must not force the socialist revolution on them. Attempts to expedite the revolution from outside would be just as senseless as attempts to accelerate the growth of a plant by pulling it up at the top.

Glezerman, who wrote the chapter in *The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy* from which this passage is taken, even found a passage in Lenin which he uses to confirm his thesis:

> In his criticism of the followers of Bukharin and Trotsky, who proposed kindling the fire of socialist world revolution by proclaiming a revolutionary war against the capitalist countries, Lenin called their attitude 'strange and monstrous.' In an article with that title, Lenin write:
>
> 'Perhaps the authors believe that the interests of the international revolution require that it should be helped on and that the help can only consist in war, not in peace—such a theory would mean a complete break with Marxism which always rejected the idea of "helping on" revolutions, since they are conditioned by the intensity of the class conflicts which bring about revolutions'.[42]

If one reads the whole article, however, one sees that Lenin did not reject in principle the idea of intervening in the revolutionary struggle of another country, but merely because at the moment it seemed to him a sheer adventure which was bound to end in failure, first of all because Soviet Russia had no army at its disposal, and secondly because Germany was not yet ripe for revolution. His article was directed against the Moscow District Bureau of the Party, which on 24 February 1918 had expressed lack of confidence in the Central Committee because of the conclusion of the separate Peace of Brest-Litovsk, and declared that it would have been more in the interest of international revolution to risk the possibility of a decline of Soviet power. That Lenin did not reject the idea of a revolutionary war in principle is clear from the following passage in his article:

> The whole essence of my thesis and my reasons . . . is that I drew attention to the necessity of accepting the extraordinarily oppressive peace now, at this particular moment, whilst at the same time preparing for a revolutionary war.

In the same article he states quite explicitly that he would have had no scruples whatsoever against interfering in the affairs of another country:

> Perhaps the authors of the resolution believe that the revolution in Germany has already begun . . . that we must therefore use our forces to help the German workers and that we ourselves must go under —thereby saving the German revolution which has already entered its decisive stage and is exposed to violent shocks! We would divert some of the forces of the German counter-revolution and thereby by our own ruin save the German revolution. It is quite right that under such circumstances it would not only be 'expedient' (as the authors of the resolution put it) but also a real duty to face the possibility of defeat and of the destruction of Soviet power. But it is clear that these circumstances do not exist at present.

Lenin did not, therefore, reject the idea of military intervention in the affairs of another country. What he did reject was the attempt to establish socialism by force of arms in countries not yet ripe for it.

EVERYTHING that has been said so far has referred to Leninist theory. In conclusion we must see whether Leninist and Soviet practice corresponds to the theory. Since one of the main principles of Soviet ideology is the unity of theory and practice, it is only to be expected that Soviet practice will be in accordance with the theory. And in fact the support of revolution in foreign countries is regarded as one of the main tasks for which the Red Army was created. The decree of 15 January 1918 by which the Red Army was founded, defines the task as follows:

> The transfer of power to the working and exploited classes led to the necessity of creating a new army which would be the bulwark of Soviet power in the present and would serve to support future socialist revolutions in Europe.[43]

Only a few months later, when revolution

[42] *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii*, p. 557; the quotation from Lenin is to be found in vol. 27. p. 49.

[43] *Big Soviet Encyclopedia*, first ed., vol. 3, col. 395.

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broke out in Austria and Germany, Lenin saw that the hour had come in which the Red Army should fulfil its task of intervening in another country. Thus he wrote in a letter to the Central Committee at the beginning of October 1918:

> A political crisis has broken out in Germany . . . it will inevitably end with the transfer of political power into the hands of the German proletariat. The Russian proletariat is following the course of events with the greatest interest and enthusiasm . . . But it is not only following the course of events with the greatest interest and enthusiasm: it is also thinking of using all its strength to help the German workers for whom a stern trial lies ahead. The Russian proletariat is aware that in a short time the greatest sacrifices will be required of it in the interests of internationalism. The time is coming when circumstances will make it imperative to come to the aid of the German people, which is now liberating itself from imperialism, in its fight against Anglo-French imperialism.
>
> Let us begin preparing straight away. Let us show that the Russian worker can work with far greater energy, that he can fight and die with far greater self-sacrifice when what is at stake is not merely the Russian workers' revolution but the international workers' revolution. . . .
>
> We had decided to have an army of a million men by the spring. Now we need an army of three million men. We can have it, and we shall have it.[44]

On this occasion it did not prove necessary for the Red Army to come to the aid of the proletariat of a foreign power. Such an opportunity did occur, however, in 1921, when the Red Army intervened in Georgia which at the time was an independent country with a Menshevist government of its own. The *Soviet Encyclopædia* (vol. 12, p. 574) recognises that this was a case of armed intervention and justifies this proceeding by assigning it to the category of the just 'revolutionary war':

> With equal justification our armed intervention in the revolutionary struggle of the Georgian proletariat against the Menshevist power in 1921 can be included in the category of wars of revolution, since it took place at the invitation of the revolutionary proletariat which asked for help.

The justification which the author gives for wars of this kind is very characteristic. He refers to Marx, who attributed to war the function of midwife in the process of the birth of a new society from the womb of the old:

> Even if these wars do not have conquest or exploitation as their aim, their class character is evident since they are waged in the interests of the revolution which protects its achievements against the assaults of reactionary foreign forces or extends its territory at the expense of these forces. Furthermore, they contribute to the collapse of the out-of-date, reactionary political-juridical form of a foreign state which has only been maintained by force or indolence. These wars therefore fulfil the beneficent function of the 'midwife' without which the old society would not be able to give birth to the new society which has ripened in its womb.

A great deal of time has passed since then, however, and it might be imagined that the Red Army had now changed its purpose as well as its name (it is now called the Soviet Army). But that is not so. After the second world war, especially in the years preceding the death of Stalin, one often found references in the Soviet press to the fact that the popular democratic regimes could only have been established in the satellite countries with the aid of the Soviet army, although some of these countries were not yet ripe for the transition to socialism.

In his textbook on historical materialism Konstantinov wrote:

> Hardly any of the people's democracies belonged to the type of country with a highly developed capitalist system ripe for socialism. They included countries such as Poland and Rumania, with only slight capitalist development and with considerable relics of feudalism, where the agrarian problem played an overwhelming role.

The fact that it was possible nevertheless to establish a people's democracy in these countries was due to the Soviet army:

> Thanks to the Soviet army it was possible for the popular democratic regime to be constituted and established in these coun-

[44] Lenin, *Sochineniya,* vol. 28, pp. 82-84.

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> tries without any commotion or civil war worth mentioning. . . . In this way the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a people's democracy, carried out the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic republic, set about dealing with the tasks of the socialist revolution, and tackled the construction of a socialist system. The existence of the Soviet Union and its help have been of decisive importance in the development of the people's democracies on their path to socialism.[45]

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS

WE have come to the end of our discussion. We may perhaps sum up the results of our inquiry as follows:

(1) We believe that it should now be clear that unfortunately the principle of peaceful co-existence does not follow necessarily from Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The reference to Lenin does not therefore serve to confirm the sincerity of the Soviet offer of co-existence; on the contrary, it is more likely to render it suspect.

(2) From the standpoint of Leninist theory, the idea of 'exporting' the revolution is only to be rejected insofar as it involves an attempt to enforce socialism by military intervention in places where the preconditions for a socialist victory do not exist. But it would not be contrary to Lenin's doctrine if a socialist country intervened with military aid in a revolutionary struggle of the working class of another country which was already in progress.

It must be remembered that Lenin nowhere raises the question as to the numerical strength the proletariat must have in such a country and what percentage of the total population it should have attained. It is therefore in principle permissible for a socialist country to use military force to help a small minority of the population of another country to obtain dictatorial power over the large majority. We have indeed come upon the explicit formulation of a Leninist tenet, according to which the proletariat need not by any means represent the majority of the population in order to be victorious.

It should also be noted that Lenin never inquires whether the just claims of the workers might be met in other ways than by a minority setting up a dictatorship over the majority of the population.

(3) According to the Soviet view, all co-existence is merely provisional. It relates only to the period between the emergence of the first socialist and the (inevitable) disappearance of the last non-socialist country; but it does not imply a final solution of the problem of states with a different kind of social structure existing alongside one another.

(4) It is also important to remember that according to the Soviet view the principle of peaceful co-existence must not be transferred to the ideological field. Sovietism will therefore never tolerate the continued existence of another philosophy within its own sphere of influence, in the sense of a final arrangement.

(5) Although we have supplied evidence to show that the principle of peaceful co-existence does not follow necessarily from Marxist-Leninist theory, we do not wish to maintain that the Soviet Union in fact harbours aggressive intentions at the present time. One thing does appear to emerge, however, from what has been said, in reference to the Soviet desire for peaceful co-existence: this desire for co-existence is *not* conditioned by Soviet loyalty to Leninist theory. The Soviet readiness for co-existence depends on other factors.

(6) Nor have we come to any conclusion in this essay about whether or not the West should accept the Soviet offer of co-existence. We should therefore like straight away to rebut the criticism that the communists may be expected to make, namely, that our purpose is to defend the cold or even the hot war.

(7) On the contrary, we should like to express the hope that the Soviet Union may stand for a better conception of co-existence and one that is meant more sincerely than the Leninist principle of 'peaceful co-existence'.

[45] Konstantinov, *op cit.*, p. 328 f. In the second edition of this work which appeared in the autumn of 1954 in the relaxed atmosphere created by the Geneva summit conference, these passages, which many people might regard as too aggressive, were somewhat modified. We have therefore always gone back to the first edition which appeared during the Stalinist era, when there was no need to take such opportunistic considerations into account.

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TRENDS IN SOVIET GEOGRAPHY

W. A. Douglas Jackson

The following comparative studies of new Soviet text-books in the field of geography, history, ethnography, and philosophy are the first in a series to be published in this periodical. Future contributions will examine in detail text-books on literature, economics, and other subjects, as well as various aspects of the educational system in the USSR.

SINCE 1953, when Stalin died, geographical writing in the USSR has shown a remarkable surge of vitality as exemplified in the volume and scope of recent publications. This development is to be found particularly within the field of Soviet economic geography. On the other hand, physical geography, the other—and traditionally dominant—branch of the Soviet geographical sciences, has long enjoyed a reputation for scientific discovery and analysis. Publications over the past half decade have not in any way lessened its acknowledged position.

During the Stalinist period, economic geography, though never 'strong' either before the revolution or in the early years of Bolshevism, was reduced to the status of handmaiden to the regime. Perhaps this was inevitable, since economic geography in the USSR embraced all that was non-physical, or the human side of the equation. Because it was 'unsafe' to do otherwise, the Soviet economic geographer contented himself with the compilation of statistical handbooks on foreign areas, with publishing what were, for the most part, superficial and, frequently, highly propagandistic monographs and texts on the development, through the five-year plans, of the country as a whole or of its many regions, and finally with providing 'raw' data to governmental agencies for planning purposes.

Following the death of the dictator, Soviet economic geography began to stretch its limbs and throw off the shackles which hitherto had cramped it. While the ideological framework of economic determinism continues to slant the work of geographers and references are made to the writings of Lenin rather than to Stalin, nevertheless current research seems to be coming to grips more realistically with problems that have long interested foreign geographers. Propaganda statements of the most obvious kind have been toned down, if not eliminated almost entirely. Increasing use is being made of statistical data, made more readily available through the publication of official statistical handbooks. Maps and illustrations have been considerably improved, demonstrating a new clarity; in the case of maps in particular, improved techniques in presentation suggest advances in Soviet cartography. On the whole, the work in economic geography has grown in stature and merit; scholarship is running high and significant contributions are being made to our knowledge of the Soviet Union.

Significant discussions have been held among Soviet geographers concerning the nature of geography. Indeed, these discussions, centring on fundamental concepts, have taken on the form of controversy involving the relationship between physical and economic geography. Soviet physical geography, as Professor Hooson recently observed, 'is in itself well integrated and broadly based.'[1] Concerned with the study of functions and processes in physical geography, it has amassed what may well be the richest body of physico-geographical knowledge in the world. Yet Soviet physical geographers have never been addicted to a physical determinism; indeed, they have all but ignored the human aspect. On the other hand, economic geography reflects Marxian determinism and tends to be looked upon as a 'self-contained' social science. Soviet geography is thus marked by a dualism which is not characteristic of geography in the United States or, for that matter, of geography in western Europe. Consequently, the content and treatment of physical and economic geography have been separated, the underlying premise being that different laws govern the development of the phenomena which are studied in

[1] David J. M. Hooson, 'Some Recent Developments in the Content and Theory of Soviet Geography', *Annals* of the Association of American Geographers, March, 1959, pp. 73-82.

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either case. In effect, it is contended by many in the Soviet profession, this is as it should be. Conversely, the argument is advanced by a smaller and less strongly entrenched group that economic and physical geography should be integrated, especially with respect to regional studies. For the Soviet economic geographer the regional approach has been largely the means to attain geographical objectives, the region being an object which can be realised through study. Therefore, in the study of the region, the physical aspects cannot be ignored. Rather, they must be incorporated if a real understanding of the region is to be gained. To date, however, the degree of integration in Soviet geographical publication remains insignificant.

The recent large output of geographical writings makes the problem of selection a difficult one, although a partial solution is forced by the availability of the newer works. No attempt is made here to include the more significant articles which have appeared in Soviet geographical periodicals;[2] the selection has been limited to those monographs or texts which appear to reflect different aspects of research, especially where somewhat different methods of research are apparent. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this review will provide a representative sample and yield a correct impression of the scope, nature, and the trends in Soviet geographical writing.

SOVIET physical geography continues to embrace fields of study, such as biogeography, hydrology, and climatology, which in the United States have long withdrawn from the 'mother of sciences' to establish themselves as independent disciplines. There is, too, within the Soviet science a long-established interest in processes. Hence the literature contains much that may well be beyond the concern, and perhaps the competence, of the American physical geographer. The latter, however, will find himself much more at home with those works which specifically deal with physical regionalisation and physical landscapes. Studies of these kinds continue to hold the interest of what might be called the more 'geographical' Soviet physical geographers.

One of the better general physical geographies to appear for some time is the short volume by F. N. Milkov and N. A. Gvozdetskii, members of the geographical faculties of the Universities of Voronezh and Moscow, respectively.[3] The first half of the book deals with the geographical position of the USSR, with chapters on climate, soils, vegetation, water resources, fauna, and physical-geographical regionalisation. The latter part discusses the Russian plain and the southern mountain zones. The section on landscape zones is clearly an expanded version of a work published by Milkov in 1956, entitled *The Physical-Geographical Region and Its Content*. In Soviet physical geography, it should be noted, landscape zones and physical regions are terms which are used almost interchangeably. On the whole, the text is good, though it lacks the detail of Dobrynin's work published in 1948.[4] It is to be hoped that the authors will undertake a second volume on Siberia and Soviet Central Asia, providing a handy reference to that huge and complex area. It would not, of course, replace the thorough study of the Asian part of the Union, by Suslov, now in its second edition.[5]

A much more comprehensive regional physical geography is that of Central Asia, prepared under Professor E. Murzaev's direction, at the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow.[6] This is a work of great scope and detail, indeed, a work of classic proportions. There can be no doubt but that this volume on Central Asia will stand with the works of Berg, Dobrynin, and Suslov, as constituting a major contribution to Soviet physical geography. The introductory sections of the study mark a departure from the usual physical geographical method; there is a brief discussion by S. N. Riazantsev and E. G. Freikin, of the

[2] The two leading Soviet geographical journals are the *Izvestiia Vsesoiuznovo Geograficheskovo Obshchestva* and the *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, seriia geograficheskaia.*

[3] F. N. Milkov and N. A. Gvozdetski, *Fizicheskaia Geografiia SSSR* (Moscow, 1958).

[4] B. F. Dorbrynin, *Fizicheskaia Geografiia SSSR.* Evropeiskaia chast i Kavkaza (Moscow, 1948).

[5] S. P. Suslov, *Fizicheskaia Geografiia SSSR* (Moscow, 1947; second edition, 1954).

[6] *Srednaia Aziia,* Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Geografii (Moscow, 1958).

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economic geography of Soviet Central Asia, particularly with respect to the utilisation of natural resources. Without question, the value and usefulness of the study are enhanced by this economic orientation. Moreover, a blow has been struck for integration in Soviet geography.

A less thorough, though much-needed text is Professor Gvozdetskii's two-volume study of the Caucasus, based on lectures.[7] The first volume gives a general description of the area and the Caucasus Mountains in particular; the second continues with the Caucasian Foreland and the Trans-Caucasus. While the text begins with a brief history of the study of the Caucasus (unlike Murzaev's Central Asia), it does not include any treatment of the non-physical elements.

Some mention must be made of a series of studies dealing with specific regions or problems of a regional nature published in 1955-56 under the auspices of the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Sciences and the Chief Administration of the Hydro-meteorological Service. These include : *The Forest Steppe and Steppe of the Russian Plain; Nature and Agriculture in the Volga-Ural Interfluve; The Climatic Resources of the Central Regions of the European Part of the USSR and Their Use in Agricultural Production;* and finally, *The Agro-Climatic and Water Resources of the Regions of Assimilation of Virgin and Idle Lands.*

The first is an excellent study of the Russian plain, prepared under the direction of G. D. Rikhter and F. N. Milkov, whose work has already been noted in this area. It affords a wealth of material (hitherto unavailable to this reader), particularly with respect to historical changes and developments that have occurred within the plain; its value is further enhanced by the inclusion of sections dealing with land utilisation and crops.

The study of the Volga-Ural interfluve is similarly a work of merit. As indicated in the title, the study is concerned with the agricultural usefulness of the very dry area north of the Caspian Sea as related to its natural characteristics. Less than half the book is devoted to the natural conditions, a brief chapter describes the general character of the economy, and the rest of the work treats of the various natural sub-zones of the interfluve.

The third study, published under the auspices of the Chief Geophysical Observatory, was prepared under the direction of I. A. Goltsberg and O. A. Drozdov (the latter holds the chair of climatology in the faculty of geography at the University of Leningrad). Here, again, is a first-rate attempt to relate the physical characteristics of an area, in this instance the climatic conditions, to the problems of agriculture and crop cultivation. A useful appendix gives climatic summaries in tabular form.

The last of the volumes mentioned above, that dealing with conditions in the Virgin and Idle Lands, is, without question, the best study to appear on this vast area, where over the past four or five years more than 80 million acres of land have been ploughed for wheat and other crops. Published in 1955, it contains much valuable climatic data, in tabular, graphic, and map form, and clearly reveals the hazards to crop cultivation in the drier parts of the steppe. Unlike the other studies referred to above, it does not contain a bibliography.

Soviet geographies have also given attention to the physical elements of foreign countries. While in the past much of the attention was directed towards Western Europe, other parts of the world have increasingly come in for study. *Zarubezhnaia Aziia,* by B. F. Dobrynin and E. M. Murzaev (1956), is one of the larger and better of the more recent studies. It is based largely, if not entirely, on secondary sources, and has 13 useful maps.

Finally, in this summary of physical geographical writing, collections of essays should not be overlooked. The contributions are typical of those which appear in the geographical journals, involving processes and problems in morphology, as well as descriptive studies of physical regions and characteristics. Representative of such collections is the volume commemorating the life and work of the late Professor L. S. Berg, entitled *In Memory of Academician L. S. Berg,* published in 1955. In addition to a biographical study of Berg and

[7] N. A. Gvozdetskii, *Fizicheskaia Geografiia Kavkaza,* 2 vols. (Moscow, 1954-1958).

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his work, the volume includes some outstanding articles of considerable interest to geographers, in particular, an essay by G. T. Selianinov, a specialist on climate and the relationship between climate and agriculture, entitled 'Climatic Regionalisation of the USSR for Agricultural Purposes.' The volume also contains articles by Murzaev, Isachenko, Sokolov, and other well-known Soviet geographers.

Somewhat similar is the volume on *Physical Geography* (1957) in the series *Voprosy Geografii*, published by the Moscow Branch of the All-Union Geographical Society, and dedicated to the work of A. S. Barkov. Included in the text are discussions on methodology in physical geography, the physical geography of Africa and Asia, topography, as well as on the teaching of geography in Soviet middle schools.

ECONOMIC geography, as has already been pointed out, is generally regarded in the Soviet Union as a distinct science. As a socio-economic science, it is concerned basically with the study of the distribution of the productive forces within a given region, with the conditions affecting production, and with the peculiarities associated with the development of the productive forces in other countries.

The study of the distribution of the productive forces in the Soviet Union has been associated with the study of regionalisation, or *raionirovanie*, of the problems involved in regionalisation and, ultimately, of the region itself. Consequently, Soviet economic geography has been and remains basically regionally-oriented, with the region regarded as an objective reality. Clearly, then, the work of Soviet economic geographers can make its contribution to the work of the planning agencies.

The problems associated with the demarcation of the vast Eurasian mass into regions were the concern of geographers even before the Bolshevik Revolution. Soviet geographers built upon these earlier attempts and went on to redefine and elaborate on them; after World War II, and especially after the death of Stalin, increasing emphasis was given to *raionirovanie* as the Soviet regime stepped up its efforts to expand the economy further. In the study of regionalisation, however, Soviet political economists have contributed more of a theoretical nature, perhaps, than have economic geographers. The monograph by Kostennikov describing the 104 economic administrative regions of the USSR may be contrasted with the somewhat more theoretical work of Koloskovski, *The Basis of Economic Regionalisation*, and of Alampiev, *Economic Regionalisation in the USSR*, and with Krzhizhanovski's summary *Problems in the Economic Regionalisation of the USSR*.[8]

Soviet economists contend that[9] regionalisation affords the basis for planning the correct distribution of the productive forces in the USSR. Under socialism, these forces develop according to their own specific laws which derive from the fundamental economic law of socialism. This basic law is the law of the planned, proportional development of the national economy. It is the operation of this law which makes the distribution of the productive forces in a socialist society different from that in a capitalist society. In a capitalist society, economic development is not geographically proportional; rather peripheral regions are exploited to the economic advantage of the core regions, as the capitalist exploits labour.

The law of the planned, proportional development of the national economy, according to Soviet writers, is an objective law; it enables the state to plan production correctly. But, in order to turn possibility into reality, it is necessary to learn how to apply the law of planned development and it is necessary to compile plans which fully reflect the requirements of the law. In practice, of course, plans do not always reflect the requirements of the law; when this is so the law makes itself felt by the appearance of disproportions in individual parts of the economy as well as throughout the country, and by interruptions in the normal process of produc-

[8] V. M. Kostennikov, *Ekonomicheskie Raiony SSSR* (Moscow, 1958); N. N. Kolosovski, *Osnovy Ekonomicheskovo Raionirovannia* (Moscow, 1958); P. M. Alampiev, *Ekonomicheskoe Raionirovanie SSSR* (Moscow, 1959); *Voprosy Ekonomicheskovo Raionironvaniia*: Sbornik Materialov i Statei (1917-1929 gg.) (Moscow, 1957).

[9] Y. Ia. G. Feigin, *Razmeshchenie Proizvodstva pri Kapitalizme i Sotsializme* (Moscow, 1958); see also: *Political Economy* (transl. from the Russian, 1957).

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tion and circulation. Correct socialist planning should lead to the planned proportional development of the country. The task of the geographer, that is, of the economic geographer, therefore, is to gather data and to delineate the USSR into economic regions.

In a somewhat more academic way, Iu. G. Sauskhin, Professor of Economic Geography at the University of Moscow, defines the content of economic geography in his *Introduction to Economic Geography* (1958), a text based on his lectures given at the university. Economic geography, Sauskhin writes, is concerned not only with a description of the earth, but with natural phenomena and economic phenomena, and with the links between them. Economic geography, however, is essentially concerned with economic laws and processes. Natural conditions are not studied *per se*, but only with respect to their relationship to agriculture, industry, power development, and other economic activities. Clearly, Sauskhin represents the dominant school of thought which recognises two geographies, physical and economic.

Sauskhin's division of economic geography into stages of development is interesting. As he lists them, the stages are as follows : economic geography in the initial period of capitalistic development; economic geography in the period of the rise of capitalism; economic geography and the creation of a theory of scientific socialism; economic geography in the period of capitalistic decline (a category into which western economic geography presumably falls); and finally, Soviet economic geography. This periodisation of the field, with its faithful adherence to the Marxian dialectic, requires no further comment.

On the whole Sauskhin's introductory text seems to be more elementary than what would constitute a first course in economic geography in western countries, and particularly in the United States. It is more 'broadly' conceived and its approach might be considered somewhat 'old-fashioned.'

Sauskhin's lectures are essentially descriptive; little attention is given to the analysis of data, statistical or other. This rather superficial approach, further demonstrated in his lectures on the Economic Geography of the Soviet Union delivered in 1956 at the University of Oslo,[10] characterises much of the regional study in the Soviet Union, and lacks the integrated presentation of material so characteristic of the French school. In his Oslo lectures, Sauskhin proceeded from an economic evaluation of the natural conditions and resources, to a discussion of people as the main productive force, to a brief treatment of towns and settlements, and to a summary of the changes in the geography of the productive forces, including both industry and agriculture, concluding with a reference to types of economic regions and to the development of regions in the period 1956-60.

SAUSKHIN'S lectures apart, there have appeared within recent years several very good texts or monographs on the economic geography of the Soviet Union. They meet a real need, and make the most substantial contribution since the appearance of *Economic Geography of the USSR*, by Balzak, Vasyutin, and Feigin (translated and published in the United States in 1949). The latter, however, is based on pre-World War II data.

Considerably more advanced than the Sauskhin lectures is the text by Professors Volpe and Klupt, based on a lecture course given at the Finance-Economics Institute in Leningrad.[11] The first part deals with the general economic character of the USSR, with brief references to climate, soils, vegetation, and mineral base. The latter part is given over to a treatment of the economy, including the socialist reconstruction of the national economy and the distribution of the productive forces in the USSR, population, industry, agriculture, and transport. But the coverage is not complete; in the section on transport, for example, Volpe and Klupt deal only with rail and water. There is no mention of highway freight transport, relatively unimportant in the Soviet Union though it may still be, and air transport is also omitted. However, this is a handy text which promises much for future writing; above all, it represents a considerable advance beyond the rather elementary

[10] Y. G. Saushkin, *Economic Geography of the Soviet Union* (Oslo University Press, 1956).

[11] V. M. Volpe and V. S. Klupt, *Lektsii po Ekonomicheskoi Geografii SSSR* (Leningrad, 1957).

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descriptive type of thing found in the pages of Baranski's texts.[12] A second edition of the Volpe and Klupt book, complete with maps, appears to be in preparation.

A work of monumental proportions is the three-volume *Economic Geography of the USSR*, prepared under the direction of G. N. Cherdantsev.[13] One volume, published in 1956, deals entirely with the Russian Republic; a second, which first appeared in 1954 and reached a second edition in 1957, is devoted to the fourteen other Union republics; and the third, published in 1958, is a 'systematic' or topical study of the country as a whole. Together, these three volumes afford the best coverage of the economic geography of the USSR today.

The volume on the Russian Republic begins with a valuable condensation of materials pertinent to political administrative delineation and economic regionalisation. Then follows a section on the general characteristics of the RSFSR, with two pages in all devoted to natural conditions and resources, and a brief treatment of the population and the economy. The rest of the volume deals with the economic regions of the RSFSR.

A comparison of the two editions on the Union republics does not reveal any startling differences, but in the second edition there are several informative maps lacking in the first. From the maps appearing in both editions, it is possible to identify changes in the distribution of phenomena which help to illustrate the growth of the Soviet economy from 1954 to 1957. The population maps of the Ukraine suggest that Nikolaev and Kherson have grown in recent years, whereas Kerch has declined slightly. Belorussia now has more cities than in 1954 as, of course, does the Kazakh SSR. The third volume is not unlike the Volpe and Klupt text, except that the former is prepared in greater detail. On the other hand, the section on resources is considerably less informative than the corresponding section in the older work on the Soviet Union, by Balzak, Vasyutin, and Feigin.

One of the more remarkable achievements of post-war Soviet economic geography is to be found in the preparation and publication of a series of regional monographs. To date some twenty volumes have been published. At least six deal with various regions in the RSFSR; the remainder with the Union republics. There are two volumes on the Ukraine. The series was prepared at the Institutes of Geography and of Economics of the Academy of Sciences. For the most part the quality of work is good. (One wishes that a similar series of studies by American geographers existed on the United States.)

Method and content, however, vary significantly from one monograph to another. While the volumes on the Karelian ASSR and Western Siberia include a considerable amount of physical geographical description, the other volumes give less attention to such aspects, and Professor Baranski's monograph on the Kazakh SSR refers only very briefly to the climatic and soil conditions.

For a region of its obvious importance, the monograph on the Urals, by Professor P. N. Stepanov, is especially brief—162 pages, compared with more than 300 pages for Karelia. The three monographs on the Baltic Republics provide a satisfactory treatment of the geography of the area, although an earlier volume on Latvia by Ia. F. Bumbera and P. M. Alampiev is in some ways more detailed and better illustrated than the monograph volume by E. Veis and V. Purin.

The volumes on the Trans-Caucasian Republics are especially good, with first-rate map illustrations. Of the volumes on Central Asia, that on the Kazakh SSR by Professor N. N. Baranski is the most outstanding. Indeed, this monograph is probably the best of the entire series; used in association with Murzaev's physical geography of Central Asia, it gives the reader a fairly complete picture of the republic's geography.

IT is likely that, in future, Soviet geographers will examine every regional nook and cranny

[12] N. N. Baranski, *Ekonomicheskaia Geografiia SSSR* (Moscow, 1954); see also: N. N. Baranski, *Economic Geography of the USSR* (Moscow, 1956).

[13] *Ekonomicheskaia Geografiia: RSFSR* (Moscow, 1956); *Ekonomicheskaia Geografiia SSSR* (Moscow, 1954; 2nd ed., 1957); *Ekonomicheskaia Geografiia SSSR: Obshchii Obzor* (Moscow, 1958).

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of the Soviet Union and that the volume of publication will steadily grow. Already several short texts have appeared on sub-regions, as for example, the Lower Don and the Kabardino-Balkarsk ASSR (in the Caucasus).[14] It is to be hoped that economists as well as geographers will continue the very fine series which include such scholarly studies as *Problems in the Development of Industry and Transport in the Yakut ASSR* and the parallel volume on the Buriat ASSR, published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences.[15] As in the case of physical geography, the publication of collections of articles dealing with various topics in economic geography has considerable merit. The most recent and useful of these are *Economic Geography* (Volume 41 of the Voprosy Geografii series, dedicated to Professor Baranski), and *Economic Geography* (Volume XI of the Geograficheskii Sbornik series), both published in 1957.

There is no up-to-date, systematic study or set of studies on the geography of the United States published in America, and it may be that Soviet geographers will be the first to fill this gap. The Institute of Geography of the Academy of Sciences is issuing a comprehensive survey of the economic-geographical development of the United States, of which three volumes have so far appeared, with at least one more to follow in the near future. Now available are: *A Geography of Heavy Industry in the USA, The South,* and *The North.*[16] It is believed that later volumes will deal with *The West, Transportation,* and *Agriculture.* The work is being undertaken in the division of the Institute, headed by Professor Konstantin Popov, devoted to the geography of capitalist countries.

It is interesting to note that the division of the United States into three regions, the south, north and west, is one made many years ago by Lenin in an early study of American capitalism. Such a division is rather crude, and overlooks the growth of industry in the far south-west, not to mention developments elsewhere. Nor would American geographers find acceptable Gokhman's conclusions with respect to recent American economic growth. This, he says, is due to four major factors: (1) the militarisation of the economy and the arms race; (2) the intensification of foreign economic expansion by American monopolies; (3) the revival of fixed capital in a number of branches of industry, especially in new construction in which there was almost no increase in the pre-war years or during the war; and finally (4) the further intensification of the exploitation of the working class!

Mrs Polovitskaia's approach to the American South is conventional. A description of the natural conditions and the population, and a brief survey of the economy, occupy the first third of the book. Industry, agriculture, and transportation are dealt with in some detail in the middle third, while the remainder of the study consists of short descriptive sections on eight sub-regions. The treatment of racial and social problems is surprisingly brief and mild, although the Marxist or Leninist bias is apparent. The third volume on the North is more detailed than its companions.

THE study of geography occupies an important place in the curricula of the Soviet seven- and ten-year schools. The greatest attention is naturally centred on the geography of the Soviet Union, but the pupil is also introduced to foreign areas. If he goes on to enter one of the higher institutions of learning his training culminates in a well-developed programme of studies. The key departments of geography at the advanced level are to be found in the Universities of Moscow and Leningrad. These departments, as is evident by their publications, are the largest, best developed, and most productive in the Union.

Studies at the university extend over a five-year period. In geography this includes lecture

[14] A. I. Gozulov, *Nizhnii Don* (Kharkov, 1956); E. P. Maslov and K. N. Kerefov, *Ekonomiko-Geograficheskii Ocherk Kabardino-Balkarii* (Moscow, 1957).

[15] *Problemy Razvitiia Promyshlennosti i Transporta Iakutskoi ASSR* (Moscow, 1958); *Problemy Razvitiia Promyshlennosti i Transporta Buriatskoi ASSR* (Moscow, 1958).

[16] V. M. Gokhman, *Geografiia Tiazheloi Promyshlennosti SShA* (Moscow, 1956); M. E. Polovitskaia, *Ekonomicheskie Raiony SShA: Iug* (Moscow, 1956); *Ekonomicheskie Raiony SShA: Sever* (Moscow, 1958).

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courses and laboratory exercises, requiring the student's presence at the university, and field work, the importance and length of which grow with the progress of training and specialisation.

According to Jean Dresch, Professor of Geography at the University of Paris, who was invited to visit the Soviet Union in 1955, the following course of studies is followed at Moscow University.[17] Students, during the first year, take both physical and economic geography, in addition to work in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and geology. In the second year, specialisation begins. Thus, in addition to taking the general courses on the physical and economic geography of the Soviet Union and of the continents, students also embark on their selected programme, with courses in systematic geography. Specialists in economic geography, therefore, would follow courses in statistics, the geography of population, industry, agriculture, transportation, regionalisation, etc. However, specialisation in economic geography is always regionally-oriented, since the study of socio-economic relations is an important aspect of the study of economic geography and such relations cannot be divorced from the region.

This programme, with increasing specialisation, goes on until the fifth year. At the end of each year, students are examined on each course, and in the last two years they are also examined on their field work. The completion of the fifth year brings a thesis, which in a sense ends the undergraduate programme. A second thesis may come three years later, the *aspirantura,* which permits the student to continue as a candidate for a post equivalent to the *chargé de cours* in France or *dozent* in Germany. In the United States this would be roughly equivalent to the Master's Degree. The doctoral thesis comes later and gives the right to a chair of geography.

The goal of university training, therefore, is essentially research or teaching at the higher level. Teacher-training in geography is usually carried on in pedagogic institutes rather than in the universities.

That the training is thorough cannot be denied, especially in the field of physical geography. With long hours spent in the classroom and in the field, the young Soviet geographer is well-equipped for future study. In the case of economic geography, what might be termed his 'objectivity' is conditioned by the ideological framework within which he is compelled to work, a feature clearly marked in the works in economic geography cited earlier. It frequently leads to a superficial handling of materials, particularly with respect to the economic geography of the Soviet Union itself.

[17] *Annales de Géographie,* September—October, 1955, pp. 378-386.

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SOVIET HISTORIANS AND AMERICAN HISTORY

Max Beloff

SELECTIONS from the latest group of Soviet writings on topics of American history, and on the political institutions of the United States, raise a number of general questions of greater interest than the books themselves. Most of the works under consideration are written for specific instructional purposes at a secondary school or university level. One would imagine that, in dealing with countries of so great an importance to the Soviet Union, the essential thing would be to give the readers the factual information necessary for them to cope with such dealings with these countries in the political, cultural, or economic spheres as their subsequent careers may require of them. While one would naturally expect the approach to be conditioned by the ideological framework of Soviet thinking, one would feel that even on matters of history and political institutions there would be a common ground in matters of hard fact, and that it would be no more desirable for Soviet executives to be unaware of these than it would be for the designers of Soviet aircraft to be unaware of the data of aerodynamics.

These would not only seem to be reasonable expectations; they would also seem to be the assumptions held by protagonists of the theory of "cultural exchanges" with the Soviet Union. They have an instinctive feeling, arising from the traditions of western scholarship, that there should be this common ground of factual knowledge and that it is one of the aims of international contacts to increase and deepen this common store. It cannot, therefore, be said too emphatically that, whatever may be the case regarding Soviet historiography where earlier periods of history are concerned, or other scholarly subjects, this particular field is one in which the necessity of proving ideological points is so strong that it takes precedence over the need for giving Soviet citizens this desirable minimum of practical information. Nothing could be a better correction to the view that a mere diminution of tension in the political climate would suffice for breaking down the ideological iron curtain than the publication of a few direct translations of these Soviet works.

One must admit that a certain amount of what one finds to question is probably not the outcome of deliberate prejudice. It may spring from perfectly genuine ignorance. These historians and political scientists are working on the basis of the available literature in the field, and the footnotes and bibliographies they provide suggest that, by and large, their facilities for doing this are quite adequate. But there are genuine difficulties in the way of any foreigner studying the institutions of a particular country without the experience of direct contact—one has only to think of French attempts to understand or describe the British Commonwealth. These genuine difficulties are obviously enhanced by the fact that the Soviet writers' experience is so wholly different from that of citizens of Great Britain or the United States. If a Soviet writer is unclear about, say, the working of party primaries, it is not perhaps altogether surprising.

It is hardly necessary to stress that all this literature is written within the framework of Marxism-Leninism, but it may be desirable to point out precisely what this implies. It does not mean simply that the history of this country, like the history of others, is analysed according to the set of concepts supplied by Marxism-Leninism in order to see whether it conforms to them or not. The concepts are taken for granted, and the history itself is merely used to supply further illustrations of their infallibility. It is therefore necessary *a priori* to describe the institutions and political life of the advanced Western countries in terms of finance capitalism, to assume that the masses are downtrodden and oppressed, and that

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democracy is a sham. It is obviously not difficult to draw from the historical and political literature of Britain and the United States many facts which testify to the imperfections of these societies. The difficulty is to explain how political systems, viewed as the Soviet writers view them, could permit bourgeois writers so freely to attack various aspects of the systems themselves. One continually finds, therefore, such formulas as 'even bourgeois historians admit' or 'bourgeois historians cannot conceal the fact that', and so on.

QUITE apart from this dilemma about the use and reliability of sources, there comes the obstacle which the Marxist-Leninist doctrine appears to place in the way of precisely that kind of description and analysis which this particular category of literature involves. We have here what corresponds to something which is well-known to students of Soviet institutions themselves, namely, the apparent impossibility for Marxists to appreciate that there are such things as technical problems in government and administration which are quite irrelevant to the political content or bias of the regime. Historically, for instance, the problem of bringing into cultivation vast new areas, which has been a central theme in American development, does present a number of technical, economic, and administrative questions which could not be avoided under any imaginable social or political system. Or again, the mere problem of governing a country of the size of the United States involves questions of administration which must be different from those of more compact countries. Issues of this kind are passed over in total silence.

My own view would be that this lack of the ability to analyse economic and governmental questions is the major weakness of current Soviet literature in these fields, and that this is a much more important aspect of the matter than the more obvious use of historical writing to back up whatever may be the current line in foreign policy—for instance, the attempt over the last few years vastly to inflate the American role in the intervention during the Civil War period in Russia, or even the assertions about the alleged Machiavellianism of the Western Powers' policy in the 'appeasement' period. One is confronted, of course, both in regard to these obvious distortions and in regard to the wider questions already raised, with the familiar problems as to the extent to which this literature should be taken at its face value. Is it written by people who, even if uncertain about details, have in fact in their minds a much more realistic appraisal of the situation, or are we dealing with a generation in whose minds myth and reality are now hopelessly and inextricably confused? One is tempted at times to believe that perhaps there is another range of literature which is kept wholly secret from us, and that those upon whom real responsibility rests are not working under the handicaps which accepting these writings at their face value would imply. This may be very far-fetched, but the question of degrees of knowledge is one which is inescapable for students of totalitarian literature, from whichever angle they approach it.

In default of such wholesale translations as I have suggested, it would seem useful to illustrate the argument by a number of particular instances which, if not of overwhelming importance in themselves, do build up a certain picture in one's mind.

On the historical side we might have expected some sympathy for the near-Marxist approach of Charles Beard and his school. But in the Introduction to Efimov's *Outlines of the History of the U.S.A. (from the Discovery of America to the end of the Civil War)*, we learn that this is not the case. It is admitted that Beard and his 'economic school' were ready to recognise the revolutionary character of the Civil War and to treat it as the 'second American Revolution'; but they under-estimated the important contribution to it of the working class and especially of the struggle of the Negro people itself. Incidentally, the communist attempt to capture and direct the political energies of the American Negro is mirrored in all their historians' treatments of the American scene. Thus Deborin, in dealing with the doctrinal basis of the American Revolution—a period when the problem of slavery as such was pushed into the background by nearly all the writers he is treating—devotes a quarter of his space to dealing with slavery,

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even though this forces him to go right outside his chronological framework by bringing in Lincoln and the Civil War. In the same way, Kaverin's account of the impact of the great depression immediately leads to a discussion of the particular hardships admittedly suffered by the Negroes and other minority groups.

TO return to Beard and his followers, they appear in Efimov's treatment as the vanguard of the struggle against Marxism. Again, an American historian like Philip Foner, whose left-wing sympathies are well-known, is congratulated for his contribution to the history of the American working class in the pre-Civil War period, but criticised for idealising some of the leaders of the 'bourgeois slave-holding democracy', in particular Jefferson and Jackson.

The Declaration of Independence cannot, of course, be denied its 'progressive' character, because it embodies the idea that the people must decide its own fate, but the references to man's Creator and the attention to natural rights have to be stigmatised as incorrect. And even the sovereignty of the people—in itself a new idea—was not carried into practice, since the bourgeoisie wrongly identified itself with the people.

After criticism of formal bourgeois democracy on familiar Marxist lines, with further emphasis on the denial of democracy inherent in slavery, Efimov goes on to point out that it was in the name of popular sovereignty, that is, by appealing to Jeffersonian principles, that the Southern slave-holders justified secession in 1860-61.

It is not surprising that the Constitution should be treated along the Beard/Merrill Jensen lines as a reactionary document designed to protect propertied interests; some points are taken direct from Beard without acknowledgement; but Jensen's work is not referred to. All this is a matter of interpretation. What the Soviet reader has the right to expect is a description of the Constitution itself that would help to explain the subsequent workings of the American government. This is not achieved by an author who begins by describing the President as the head of the 'Cabinet'—a body unknown to the Constitution—and then describes the Secretary of State as his 'Deputy' in the Cabinet. The statement that the President can dismiss any 'Minister' provided that he has a two-thirds vote in the Senate is totally incorrect (he requires such a vote for appointments only—dismissals, it has long been settled, are for him alone).

While it is true that the Constitution differed from the Articles of Confederation in that the executive power could now reach directly into the States, the statement that the President has such power is meaningless without an explanation as to the particular spheres in which such action was permitted. Although a good deal is said about the class features of the Constitution and the reactionary role of the Senate —Stalin having laid it down that second chambers are necessarily reactionary—and of the Supreme Court, there is no analysis of the principal features of the Constitution itself, such as the distribution of powers between the States and the central government or the separation of powers at the centre. There is no analysis of the *Federalist* papers, which are only referred to in a brief sketch of the life of Madison.

On the Bill of Rights Efimov finds himself in some difficulty; many of its provisions cannot be denied their 'progressive' character. He is therefore put into the absurd position of accusing bourgeois historians of concealing the fact that the Bill of Rights was not included in the original Constitution and only came in as a result of pressures exerted during the ratification process. Then he has to say that although the Bill of Rights, like the Constitution, is a weapon in the hands of the people in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, the formal recognition of these Rights by the bourgeoisie has been a means of deceiving the popular masses.

IN examining the Monroe Doctrine the role of Russian expansion in bringing it about is played down, since it has to be defined as the doctrinal cover for United States domination in Latin America. When we come to the beginning of the slavery struggle and the Missouri compromise, we learn that as a part of Maine's admission to the Union, as a balance to Missouri, slavery was abolished there; it

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had in fact been prohibited in Massachusetts, of which Maine was part, by its constitution in 1780. Although it is true that there was a tendency to admit free and slave States in pairs after 1820, no agreement to this effect was made in 1820, nor is it easy to see how it could have been. This lack of attention to constitutional and legal issues makes it impossible to give a coherent narrative of the actual events. It is correct that the provisions about fugitive slaves in the 1850 compromise were offensive to the free States; but it is not true that prior to this any Negro who got to free soil was automatically considered free—this was only the case when he went there with his master's consent. Indeed, the Constitution specifically provided for the return of fugitives. Even more confusing is the author's total inability to distinguish between 'State' and 'Territory' in the United States Constitution, which makes it impossible for him to give a coherent account of the Kansas/Nebraska bill, or correctly to present the significance of the Dred Scott decision. Indeed, the effect of judicial review upon the Constitution in any of its aspects is totally ignored. Neither Marshall nor Taney figures in the index of names.

This inability to describe and analyse the actual working of institutions is even more remarkable in a book like E. B. Chernyak's *The Governmental Structure and Political Parties of the USA*, despite the fact that its footnotes often refer to standard American works. The historical sketch with which it begins has the same weaknesses as Efimov's. Like Efimov, Chernyak has to equivocate about the position of the masses: they cannot be denied a leading role, yet they have to be represented as continually thwarted. For instance, the masses are pictured as having demanded the condemnation of the institution of slavery in the Declaration of Independence and having been thwarted by the planter interests. They are again credited with winning the Bill of Rights and thus strengthening the democratic character of the Constitution. The author's need to make the case against American imperialism leads him to refer to the acquisition of the Philippines but to omit the steps leading to their independence. But the main point again is the lack of precision where constitutional questions are concerned. The essence of the Missouri Compromise and its relation to the problem of Congress's power in the Territories again baffles the author.

On more recent questions the Anti-Trust legislation is treated only in relation to trade unions. The Taft Hartley act is listed among other reactionary measures, but its content is not described—this is the more pertinent in that it figures as the major political issue in the period from its passage until 1956. Various acts of Congress are denounced as being contrary to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. But what is the Soviet reader to make of the author's summary of the Fifth Amendment 'by which an innocent man may not be compelled to make false accusations against himself'? In what context could a constitutional provision of this kind be meaningful?

Voting rights are another source of confusion —how far wilful it is perhaps hard to see. Chernyak picks up from an American textbook the statement that only a little over 50 per cent of the population have the right to vote, overlooking the fact that most of the remainder are children. Voting in the United States is not 'free', we learn, since the governments of most States demand of the voter that he state in advance for whom he is going to vote—no indication is given that this provision is directly related to the system of primaries.

In dealing with procedure, there is of course the further problem that although bourgeois democracy has to be exposed and the two American political parties represented simply as the agents of monopoly capitalism, it must be admitted that the political system can produce progressive legislation; otherwise there would be no point in stating, quite correctly, that the Senate's lack of a closure rule means that filibustering is one of the main weapons of reaction.

Chernyak cannot escape the problem of federalism. He has to account for the increasing centralisation of power, to show that the rights of States are more formal than real, and that so far as they exist they may be exploited for reactionary purposes. But in order

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to explain the system, Chernyak does not follow the normal method of showing what the federal powers are under the Constitution and how they have been expanded, but instead lists the powers of the States.

The States may not, we learn with surprise, lay taxes on property, which are reserved for the Federal Government (what, then, of the whole controversy over the income tax-amendment?). The States can, we learn, make laws about commerce within their own boundaries, but there is no discussion of what this means in the light of the inter-State commerce clause. After listing the residual rights of the States to deal with such matters as health, education, roads, etc., Chernyak makes the breath-taking statement that 'it is obvious that all this activity of the States in fact takes place under the control of the Federal Government'—how and in what sense? It is impossible to see how the Soviet reader, with only his own experience to guide him, could possibly understand what is involved here—or, to take a concrete case, follow the legal issues involved in 'desegregation'.

This question is mentioned in passing in the account of the Supreme Court. The Court's constitutional functions are treated with distaste, and it is pictured as a bulwark of reaction. But it is admitted that under pressure of public opinion, and after the introduction by Roosevelt of a few more liberal figures, it did in 1954/55 take some steps against segregation.

THE problem of the political parties is of course an acute one for Soviet analysts of the United States. If both represent the forces of finance capitalism, why are two needed? Is one even more reactionary than the other, or is Democratic 'liberalism' a mere device for winning votes? If so, why are the masses taken in? How is the allegiance of so much of the trade union movement to the Democratic Party to be explained? To none of these questions does Chernyak contrive to give an answer. The discussion is trenchantly disposed of by A. Gromyko in his book, *The Congress of the United States*. He writes: 'However hard the apologists of monopoly capitalism may try to put forward concrete differences between the two American bourgeois parties, it is impossible to hide the fact that at bottom they are simply the double face of monopoly capitalism.' Gromyko criticises some previous Soviet authors for paying too much attention to the formal antithesis between President and Congress, and in particular to the growing predominance of the executive branch. This obfuscates the real unity in the system, which derives from the fact that the whole government apparatus is the scene of a conspiracy between the great capitalist monopolies, and that the conflict between executive and legislature is only a very secondary one.

More scholarly works reflect the same basic weaknesses. In the first volume of his *Social and Political Doctrines of Modern and Recent Times*, A. M. Deborin devotes a chapter to the American Revolution of the 18th century and its political ideas. Although he emphasises the historical significance of the American Revolution, Deborin is limited in his study by the necessity of formulating the revolution as the result of a 'national-liberationist and bourgeois-democratic movement of the American colonies'. That is to say that he plunges into the arguments by which the colonial pamphleteers justified the colonists' resistance to the claims of the British Parliament without examining the nature of the imperial problem itself or the different answers to it that divergent developments dictated to the two sides. There is, indeed, neither any appreciation of the work done by British and American scholars in recent decades in order to illuminate the nature of the relationship between the mother-country and the colonies, nor any evidence of a direct study of the documents the author is dealing with. Indeed, those quoted are from translations that occur in works by pre-Soviet Russian historians.

This lack of acquaintance with the sources makes it more plausible to argue, as Deborin does, that the ideological roots of the American Revolution can be traced directly to the English Revolution of the 17th century, and in particular to the Levellers. Anyone more familiar with the documents would have noted rather the surprising absence of reference to the last

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great outpouring in English of basic political arguments.

The difficulty of working within the formula comes up again in dealing with the constitutional convention, where Deborin points out the class character of its composition, and the fact that it did not contain a single representative of the workers, who in fact 'made the revolution'. He stretches the point even further by ascribing an outstanding role to Alexander Hamilton with his 'monarchical sympathies'. As a result, he sees the Constitution as the product of a secret compromise between sections of the ruling class carried out behind the backs of the people. It was fear of the people that led the Convention to meet in private and its records to be kept in conditions of the greatest secrecy in Washington (*sic*). But again no reference is made by Deborin himself to the records of the actual discussions, which have after all been available to historians for 120 years.

The essays in the collection *Questions of Modern and Recent History*, edited by E. M. Zhukov and others, are only in part concerned with the United States. There is an essay by G. I. Kaverin on the working-class question in the United States between 1933 and 1936. The general line is characterised from the outset by the picture of Roosevelt as the instrument of monopoly capital—the 600 acres of Hyde Park are also brought in to identify him with large-scale property interests. Since no one (outside a Republican fringe) disputes Kaverin's main point that the New Deal was designed to save capitalism, not to overthrow it, his subsequent interpretation is less radical than he may believe. But his ostensible subject—the role of the working-class and trade-unionism—cannot be properly handled by someone who cannot look at their development as part of the changing American scene, nor appreciate the importance of the accretion to their countervailing power which New Deal legislation helped them to achieve. Thus Section 7A of the NRA is described (on the authority of the New York *Daily Worker*) as 'a new instrument in the hands of the capitalists for building up company unions'. What happened next can only be explained in the familiar way: first, that Section 7A, although enacted under pressure from the United States working-class, did not alter its fundamental situation, and second, that it was nevertheless used by the working-class, against the intentions of its authors, to pursue its own struggle.

MORE striking is the attempt to make the measures of the early New Deal period appear as an attempt to increase the United States' military resources. The Civilian Conservation Corps is thus seen as part of a programme of militarising the labour force. Even more important was the intention to isolate American youth from exposure to revolutionary ideas that might have led it to overthrow capitalism.

The Tennessee Valley Authority, that so fascinated European observers of the New Deal, is condemned outright as being wholly in the interests of monopoly capital and great landowners (shades of the power companies lobby!)

The more significant fact is that the formula, in what is meant to be a piece of original historical writing, not vulgarisation, is just the same—communist sources for the most part, with a couple of 'bourgeois' historians quoted when convenient. Incidentally, the number of errors in spelling, etc., in the footnote references to English language sources is very striking.

An essay by V. P. Androsov follows on the 1955 merger of the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. The leaders of the joint organisation are accused of concealing, under the cover of anti-communism and of anti-racketeering, its role as the agent of reaction in its preparation of a new onslaught against the working-class which the deepening crisis of United States capitalism must inevitably bring about. An article on the European Defence Community and on United States responsibility for the idea follows familiar lines.

V. Ya. Leede, in dealing with American-German relations between 1939 and 1941, is concerned to show that both the orthodox school of American diplomatic historians and the Beard 'revisionists' omit to stress the fact that United States policy was dictated by the

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conflict between those American monopolists with British interests and those with German interests. He treats the Nazi moves after the fall of France to secure the continuation of United States neutrality, on the basis of the United States disinteresting itself in Europe, as evidence for a plot between the Germans and the pro-Nazi elements in American big business for cooperation against the Soviet Union which had always been the main purpose of United States policy. This was only unsuccessful because of the threat to United States markets and other American interests from the advance of German power. No evidence is produced for this version of American policy and there is no reference, needless to say, to the fact that the Soviet Union at the time was actually collaborating with the Nazi Government. This omission deserves extra emphasis in that American historians of the period are specifically blamed for neglecting the role of the USSR in the diplomacy of the time.

The current analysis of United States policy in the collective work *Questions of the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and Contemporary International Relations* is along conventional lines. Two essays deal respectively with the USA's 'colonial' policy in Asia and its 'monopoly' in Latin America. The latter theme is expanded in the separate volume by Grechev. Another more general essay expands the thesis that American foreign policy is wholly motivated by the pretensions of United States capitalism to global mastery.

The current emphasis on American imperialism makes the Spanish-American War of 1898 of particular interest to Soviet historians. The book by Vladimirov is based on some of the standard sources and makes some use of unpublished Russian dispatches of the period. Slezky's slighter work makes some use of writers in Spanish to emphasise the role of the Filipinos and the Cuban insurgents.

This article is based upon a consideration of the following Soviet publications: —

A. V. Efimov, Ocherki Istorii SShA (Moscow, 1955).

E. B. Chernyak, Gosudarstvenni Stroi i Politicheskie Partii SShA (Moscow, 1957).

A. Gromyko, Kongress SShA (Moscow 1957).

Voprosy Vneshnei Politiki SSSR i Sovremennikh Mezhdunarodnikh Otnoshenii, ed. L. F. Ilichev and others (Moscow, 1958).

L. Yu. Slezkii. Ispano-Amerikanskaia Voina 1898 goda (Moscow, 1956).

L. S. Vladimirov. Diplomatia SShA v Period Amerikano-Ispanskoi Voiny 1898g. (Moscow, 1957).

M. A. Grechev, Imperialisticheskaia Ekspansia SShA v Stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Moscow, 1954).

Voprosy Novoi i Noveishie Istorii, ed E. M. Zhukov and others (Moscow, 1958).

A. M. Deborin, Sotsialno-Politicheskie Ucheniya Novovo Vremeni, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1958).

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RECENT RUSSIAN HISTORY

Continuity and Change in the Standard Texts

John Keep

THE Muse of History is still prominent amongst the creatures that dwell upon the Soviet Olympus. But Clio's place has been taken by a lady of doubtful virtue, whose song varies according to political expediency. For the importance given to the teaching of history in Soviet schools and universities is due to the belief that it is one of the most powerful instruments for moulding the minds of the young and stimulating in them the responses acceptable to the ruling Party. As a writer in one Soviet periodical recently put it with great clarity:

> The XXth Congress emphasized that the communist education of youth is a most important task. To solve it all means of ideological influence must be utilized. One of these means of training pupils ideologically and politically is the teaching of history. Based upon the unshakeable foundations of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet historical science profoundly and comprehensively reflects the objective laws of social development and serves as a powerful source for training pupils in the spirit of communism, Soviet patriotism, and proletarian internationalism.[1]

One point, at least, seems clear: the purpose of teaching history is not to educate, but to indoctrinate: not to enlarge the student's mind, give him respect for the past and deepen his insight into contemporary problems, but to induce him to accept unquestioningly the dictates of authority, and at best to turn him into an active and enthusiastic 'builder of communism.'[2]

The basic concept which guides Soviet historians in their work is that of *zakonomernost*: the view of history as a continuous process of development according to certain laws which are scientifically ascertainable—or which, it would be truer to say, have already been ascertained with finality by the supreme pontiffs of Marxist-Leninist theory. This process, it is believed, is leading inexorably to the world-wide establishment of communism on the Soviet pattern. Historical events or movements are therefore assessed according to their contribution to 'progress'; those which awkwardly spoil the tidy logical scheme in the historian's mind are either distorted into suitable shape, or, if this is impossible, simply suppressed. The result is a 'history' which bears only incidental resemblance to the reality of the past, but which fits fairly neatly the doctrinal requirements of Soviet officialdom.

Bias is not, of course, a Soviet invention; and a certain amount of partiality may be considered an inescapable, and perhaps even a desirable, element in the historian's make-up. What distinguishes the Soviet historical method from all others is its claim to be the only scientific approach to the study of the past, whereas in fact it is precisely the reverse of scientific: deductions are not arrived at empirically from an objective analysis of the facts, but concocted artificially on the basis of preconceived and unchallengeable doctrinal postulates. The facts singled out for mention are valued not for their own sake but as illustrations of the operation of the supposed laws of history. This gives Soviet historiography its curiously abstract and unreal flavour.

This defect has not gone totally unrecognised even amongst Soviet historians.

> Hitherto, remark the editors of the journal *History of the USSR*, facts have not served as the point of origin of research, as the 'building material' for general conclusions and characterisations of phenomena, but only as an illustration to them. And where writers have not considered it necessary to draw upon full factual information to illustrate a general hypothesis advanced *a priori*, they have often restricted themselves to adducing several facts in order to bolster up their general hypothesis.[3]

[1] *Prepodavanie istorii v shkole*, 1958, 5, p. 3.

[2] For a general discussion of this theme, cf. W. H. Burston, 'Soviet History Teaching', in *History*, Vol. 30 (1954), pp. 76-89.

[3] *Istoriya SSSR*, 1959, 2, p. 14.

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Unfortunately, it may be doubted whether editorial exhortations against 'schematicism' can do much to improve the standard of Soviet historical writing. This vice is inherent in the Marxist-Leninist approach, with its insistence that historians should consistently devote themselves to proving the truth of established doctrine.

The critical articles that appear so frequently in the press indicate that Soviet historians are still far from fulfilling their onerous tasks to the Party's satisfaction. As in other fields of intellectual life, the very intensity of the pressure exerted by the totalitarian State creates counter-pressures which prevent its directives from being fully carried out. Authority would dearly like to be served by a historiography which is both absolutely loyal to the current ideological line and at the same time original, scholarly, and objective. But these two aims are, of course, incompatible.

NOTHING shows this more clearly than the confusion and conflict which developed amongst Soviet historians after the death of Stalin. The slow and hesitant 'thaw', culminating in the late dictator's spectacular dethronement and subsequent partial rehabilitation, threw them into a ferment, the repercussions of which can still be felt today. The familiar ideological landmarks by which they had been guided for so long were suddenly called in question; their confidence in the correctness of the policies of the leadership was shaken, and they began to ask openly questions which it would have been suicidal to raise before.

Basically, the historians aspired towards a more honest, truthful, and objective representation of the past. Once a certain amount of political stability had been restored, the Party replied with administrative measures: in the summer of 1957 most of the editorial staff of the main historical journal, *Voprosy Istorii*, were dismissed. But the authorities were also obliged to make some modest concessions to the historians' demands. A number of new periodicals for various specialised fields were established, which gave them fresh opportunities for self-expression within the framework of the new line. History, it was conceded, should henceforward be treated in a more factual manner; there was to be less 'citation-mongering' *(tsitatnichestvo,* i.e. repetitive and platitudinous references to the Marxist classics), and improved documentation: original sources were to be quoted wherever possible, and for this purpose restrictions on access to national and local archives were modified.

Another post-Stalin development was a shift of emphasis to the modern era, and particularly to the history of the Soviet epoch. This had hitherto been delicate territory upon which writers had hesitated to tread for fear of the political risks involved. But it was now singled out as the most desirable field for investigation. To avoid the danger of misinterpretation, whether deliberate or accidental, authoritative guidance was now given regarding the line to be followed—even on the thorniest aspects of the Stalin era. This had, of course, a political motive: the new leadership was well aware of the services which the historians could render in bolstering up its authority by testifying to its 'Leninist' respectability. The recognition that the Stalin era had had its 'negative aspects' would serve to make his successors shine forth more brightly as wise and beneficent rulers, associated in the popular mind with years of peace and growing prosperity.

In recent months this accent on modernity has been intensified. History is to be written in a less academic and more militantly anti-bourgeois spirit. More attention is to be devoted to critical examination of Western writings, and all Soviet historians are urged to preface their works with a critique of the relevant non-Soviet literature. It remains to be seen whether this advice will in fact be heeded. If so, this technique is perhaps more likely to stimulate critical thinking than to convince the reader of the innate superiority of the Soviet approach, and for this reason may be welcomed in the interests of intellectual liberalisation.

But thoughts of liberalisation are far from the minds of those who at present determine the Soviet cultural climate. Henceforward history teaching is to be an even more important element in political indoctrination than ever. At the XXIst Congress Khrushchev lamented the fact that young people, who did not experience

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personally the tribulations of their parents in the pre-war and war years, fail to appreciate the heavy cost in toil and suffering at which their present relatively high standard of living has been acquired, and tend to look upon this as their birthright. History teachers must accordingly emphasise this point in order to combat feelings of egoistic individualism and to inculcate proper respect for physical labour. The history classroom is to serve as a nursery of 'communist morality'. At the same time the very place of history within the educational system has been brought in question as a result of the abolition of the ten-year school. In the past teachers have often complained at the over-loading of the syllabus: the pupil's knowledge is expected to embrace the entire history of mankind, including a vast mass of dates, statistics, etc., as well as solid indigestible chunks of Marxist theory. Despite this, the course which was previously spread over ten years has now somehow to be compressed into eight. Discussions are currently in progress as to what sections of the old syllabus should now be omitted: whilst some favour a general survey of universal history, others wish the emphasis to be laid upon the Russian past, with only incidental glances at the outside world.[4]

THE confusion which at present reigns in the historical field is evident from a perusal of the textbooks now in use. There has been no fundamental change in Soviet historiography since the early 1930s, when the official Stalinists prevailed over the deterministic Marxist school represented by M. N. Pokrovsky. (Incidentally, though Pokrovsky has been in his grave for more than a quarter of a century, his name still appears frequently in current textbooks as a target for abuse, to serve as a warning to fledgling historians of the penalties of error.)

In the Stalin era the standard university manual was the two-volume *History of the USSR* edited by a team of top-rank historians from Leningrad and Moscow led by M. V. Nechkina. This work, the second edition of which was published in 1948-9, only covered the ground up to the year 1900. For the modern era, with all its manifold problems, the student had to rest content with Stalin's notorious *Short Course* and sundry specialised studies (such as, for example, P. I. Lyashchenko's *History of the National Economy of the USSR*). Secondary school pupils were more adequately served, thanks to the zeal of the formidable Mme Pankratova, the *doyenne* of Stalinist historiography. Her three-volume *History of the USSR* covered the whole of Russian history up to World War II.

Shortly after Stalin's death a revised version of Nechkina's textbook began to appear,[5] edited largely by members of the old team. But publication of this work was rapidly overtaken by events. At the XXth Congress Mikoyan drew attenion to the 'abnormality' of a situation where, almost 40 years after the Revolution, there existed no textbook which depicted 'the multifarious life of the Soviet fatherland', as opposed to just its 'façade'.[6] Without going far into the reasons for this embarrassing *lacuna*, the Party called upon the historians to fill it without delay. The result was a stout volume entitled *The Epoch of Socialism*, which appeared in a large edition in time for the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of October. Significantly enough, no one from Nechkina's *kollektiv* was associated with this work, the product of a group of young newcomers.

One result of this hurried operation was to leave another embarrassing gap elsewhere, which still remains unfilled: the years 1900-1917 are covered neither by the old textbooks nor the new. Will another team undertake the unenviable task of describing these seventeen years, which in Leninist chronology are dignified with the name of the 'imperialist epoch' in Russian history? Or will the gap remain until a fourth and this time comprehensive, edition of the standard university textbook is eventually published?

At present, therefore, the student reads Russian 19th-century history in Nechkina's volume of 1955, which incorporates the changes

[4] *Prepodavanie istorii v shkole*, 1958, 6.

[5] *Istoriya SSSR. Izdanie tretye, ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe. Pod redaktsiey . . . M. V. Nechkinoy.* 2 vols. (Moscow, 1954-5).

[6] *XX s'ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1956). Vol. I, p. 325.

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rendered necessary by political developments after 1949, relies upon his teacher for the early 20th century, and reads Soviet history from a textbook which has been 'de-Stalinised'. Since it is still in use, it is worth considering the 1955 volume, even though this takes us back to the ideological milieu of Stalin's last years. It serves as a salutary reminder that, if one takes the last decade as a whole, the changes made during the first few years have left as profound a mark upon current teaching practice as the more spectacular modifications that have taken place since Stalin's death.

A careful comparison of the 1955 and 1949 volumes[7] reveals a greatly accentuated note of nationalistic exaltation. The changes introduced were the result of a deliberate effort to bolster up the regime by exploiting the last ounce of Russian patriotic feeling, and to combat 'bourgeois nationalism' in the non-Russian regions of the USSR by asserting the supremacy of the Great Russian people.

The Russian working-class is portrayed as the liberator *par excellence*, as much by reason of its nationality as its social status. The Russian people are depicted here as having marched consistently in the van of human progress. Facts considered injurious to national prestige (e.g. the high mortality rate in Tsarist Russia as compared with more advanced Western countries), are omitted.[8] The 1949 volume referred to the backwardness of Russian industrial development by comparison with the capitalist nations of Western Europe; the 1955 volume, by contrast, stressed the point that Russia was able to outpace some Western countries in her industrial development towards the end of the 19th century, because she could utilise the technical experience gained in the more advanced countries—a projection backwards into history of the idea of 'overtaking America'.

This more 'positive' appreciation of the Russian past necessitated a revision of the traditional strongly negative verdict on Tsarism, as the 'gendarme of Europe' and most implacable foe of the Russian revolutionary movement. Although the old conventional phrases are still repeated, and Russia's achievements ascribed to the people rather than to the regime, this distinction is often illusory in practice. Tsarism now stands condemned, not so much for its reactionary political and social policies, as for its inefficiency, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy. The Imperial Government, the student is led to believe, failed to take adequate steps to protect Russia's vital national interests, and allowed her to become a semi-vassal of Western imperialism. For example, it permitted the sale to the United States of Alaska, "a land with enormous natural resources, the discovery and exploitation of which were due to the really heroic efforts exerted during more than one hundred years by the Russian people".[9] The earlier (1949) volume did not consider this transaction worthy of mention. This revision is more than just a reflection of fashionable 'cold war' anti-Americanism. It implies a re-appreciation of the historical significance of the October Revolution. Instead of being, as the Bolsheviks believed in 1917, a prelude to the victory of the European proletariat, it is now seen by Soviet historians as the prelude to subsequent 'anti-colonial' revolutions in Asia. The emphasis has shifted from the social to the national aspect: as well as being a revolution of the 'exploited toiling masses' against their fellow-Russian exploiters, 1917 is now also justified as a means of preserving Russia's national integrity.

THIS hyper-sensitive nationalism is expressed with particular crudity in the treatment of military campaigns. Russia, it appears, never lost a battle. Where she participated in combined international operations, as at Leipzig in 1813 or Navarino in 1829, the earlier and more objective account is amended to show that her role was 'leading' or 'decisive'.[10] The drum-thumping, excusable perhaps for 1812, sounds hollower when we reach the Crimean War: a passage in the 1949 edition recording Russia's defeats in Transcaucasia is neatly excised from that of 1955. Still less can official history afford to recognise that Russian troops occasionally suffered reverses at the hands of untrained

[7] Only 19th century Russian history will be examined here, for reasons of space.

[8] 2nd edition, p. 528; 3rd edition, p. 498.

[9] 3rd edition, p. 575.

[10] 3rd edition, pp. 93, 159.

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native armies. A successful action by tribesmen during the annexation of the Kokand khanate is expunged from the record—presumably lest their success should inspire their descendants with reflections dangerous for Soviet security.[11] Even courage, it seems, is now a Russian monopoly. In the 1949 version we read of a 'daring sortie' by certain besieged tribesmen against a Russian force near Tashkent in 1865; in the latest edition the adjective 'daring' is omitted.[12]

Some of the previous nationalistic excesses have been toned down, but the move towards greater objectivity is more apparent than real, and each concession is carefully counterbalanced by other amendments. Thus we are no longer told that Schilling, a Russian, discovered electro-magnetic telegraphy four years before Morse. But lest false inferences should be drawn from this, the rating accorded to a Russian engineer, Anosov, is suitably inflated, and several new names are added to the catalogue of inventors. Moscow has ceased to be the 'holy city for all Slavs' which Pan-Slav sentiment made it in 1949. But we are now taught that the spread of culture amongst the western and southern Slavs was greatly assisted by the creation of a modern Russian literary language, and a new paragraph has been inserted to record a journey to the South Slav lands by a Russian Slavist scholar, V. I. Grigorovich. It is doubtless not accidental that, of all the Slav peoples, the Yugoslavs should especially require to be reminded of their debt to Russia. With regard to Bulgaria the compilers of this textbook display a touchy sensitivity. In 1949 it could still be admitted that the plot to depose the Bulgarian king, Alexander (1886), was the work of Russian agents. But by 1955 it was no longer thought politic to draw attention to this shadowy page in the relations between the two countries: not even in the past could Russia be presented as anything but the friend and protector of the smaller Slav nations. In defiance of the historical evidence, responsibility for the plot is now assigned to the Bulgarian liberal opposition.[13]

So far as the Slavs are concerned, the villain of the piece, of course, is Great Britain, supposedly eager to subject them to Turkish despotism. The note of accentuated hostility towards Britain, incidentally, is one of the minor curiosities of this volume. Unobtrusive corrections have been made to present Britain in the worst possible light. In 1949 students learned that at the Convention of Reichenbach (1813) Britain provided her allies against Napoleon with financial subsidies. In the later edition, this passage has been carefully excised, and it is merely noted that no British troops participated in the Continental campaign of that year—leaving the casual reader with the impression that, as in the days of World War II, *Albion perfide* supposedly deliberately left her allies to bear the brunt of the fighting. But what, then, of Waterloo? The battle itself can hardly be suppressed. But the Duke of Wellington's part in it can be—and duly is.[14]

But it is when one turns to consider the passages dealing with the history of the non-Russian peoples of the Empire that the note of nationalism becomes most marked. The Poles, the most active opponents of Tsarism, have had their allotment of space ruthlessly pruned. In the eyes of official Soviet historians the revolutionary content of Polish history is a drawback rather than a merit: for was not this struggle waged against Russia, 'liberator' of the Slavs, partly under the influence of the cosmopolitan West? The revolutionaries of 1863 are now depicted as having striven to establish a 'united Poland' within the old pre-partition frontiers, and no mention is made of their projects for a reconstruction of the Empire on a democratic federal basis.[15] As regards the Ukrainians, the line now taken is more generous—a reflection, no doubt, of the political situation immediately after Stalin's death. Tribute is paid to the relatively advanced level of economic development in the Ukraine.[16] T. G. Shevchenko, previously referred to as 'a great democratic poet', is re-labelled 'a great *Ukrainian* democratic poet' and given a more detailed and positive appreciation.[17] But care

[11] 2nd edition, p. 589; 3rd edition, p. 547.
[12] 2nd edition, p. 584; 3rd edition, p. 543.
[13] 2nd edition, p. 775; 3rd edition, p. 746.
[14] 2nd edition, p. 111; 3rd edition, p. 95.
[15] 2nd edition, p. 480; 3rd edition, p. 442.
[16] 2nd edition, p. 176; 3rd edition, p. 281.
[17] 2nd edition, p. 185; 3rd edition, p. 289.

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is taken to prevent such modifications from being interpreted as implying official tolerance of autonomist aspirations. On the contrary, increased emphasis is laid upon the links between the Ukrainian and Great Russian proletariats (now referred to as 'inseparably' connected, instead of merely 'closely'), and the Ukrainian socialist leader Drahomanov is sharply devalued on account of his federalist views, which suffice to brand him as 'an opponent of brotherly love between peoples".[18] Even in 1955 his ideas were evidently still considered dangerously attractive to certain elements of Ukrainian opinion.

THE history of the various eastern peoples absorbed into the Russian Empire had to be re-written after 1950-1, when the Party officially repudiated the doctrine of the 'lesser evil'[19] in favour of the view that their incorporation was an unmitigated blessing for the peoples concerned. Though challenged by non-Russian intellectuals during the de-Stalinisation crisis, the old line now seems to have been re-established in all its former rigidity. It carries the implication that imperialistic territorial expansion, although repugnant by definition, can be justified when carried out by Russia, because in this case it led to economic progress, improved security, and contact between the native intelligentsia and representatives of progressive Russian thought. Logically, the same arguments could be used to justify colonial acquisitions by any other country; but the parallel is, of course, not one that commends itself to the masters of dialectic in the Institute of History, who are determined to have their cake and eat it. One can detect no glimmer of objectivity in their treatment of such matters, no attempt to draw up a balance-sheet for the complex phenomenon of colonial rule.

Yet the defects of this black-and-white approach are only too obvious. In the case of many non-Russian nationalities the editors are hard put to it to discover any evidence of intellectual contacts with Russian revolutionaries. Granting for the moment that such contacts were an absolute gain for the peoples concerned, no historical justification exists for the doctrinaire assertion that they compensated for the negative aspects of Imperial rule. The compilers of the textbook are, indeed, compelled to recognise this indirectly by the liberality with which they resort, in the relevant chapters, to the censorial scissors and paste. Unpleasant facts about Russian domination of the annexed territories, mentioned at some length in the 1949 edition, are now minimised or suppressed.

The camouflage is often varied to suit local conditions. Consider, for example, the awkward question of Russian settlement in non-Russian areas, surely the very kernel of 'imperialism' as generally understood. In Kazakhstan a single stroke of the blue pencil suffices: where the 1949 edition stated that Russian settlers acquired 'the best Kazakh lands', the later version omits the words 'the best'.[20] In the Volga area the true nature of Russian settlement is concealed by listing Russians along with non-Russians as 'natives' of the area.[21] In Bashkiria the fact of expropriation of land is duly recorded—but the chief culprits are now identified, not as Russian settlers, but as (native) 'bey elements'.[22] In Georgia the very fact of Russian landowning is simply omitted from the later edition.[23] In Central Asia expropriation is itself held to have been beneficial, since it showed the natives the superiority of a non-nomadic way of life![24] It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the cynical manner in which historians are required to manipulate facts to suit the current political preoccupations of the Party leadership. By no stretch of the imagination can these amendments be regarded as the result of a genuine historical re-assessment.

Comparison of the two editions of the textbook does not reveal any significant changes in the treatment of other aspects of Russia's internal history. On the contrary, it is a curious paradox that, the closer one approaches matters of moment for loyal Communists, and espe-

[18] 3rd edition, p. 681.

[19] That is, that it was a lesser evil for the non-Russian nationalities to be incorporated into the Russian Empire than to remain independent but sunk in feudal stagnation, or to fall victim to Western colonialism.

[20] 2nd edition, p. 593; 3rd edition, p. 551.
[21] 2nd edition, p. 213; 3rd edition, p. 341.
[22] 2nd edition, p. 749; 3rd edition, p. 725.
[23] 2nd edition, p. 260; 3rd edition, p. 324.
[24] 2nd edition, p. 595; 3rd edition, p. 556.

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cially the history of the revolutionary movement, the more muddled and confused the exposition becomes, and the further removed it is from anything approaching historical objectivity. Even the language used becomes more stereotyped. The reason for this phenomenon is the sacrosanctity attached to even the most ephemeral of Lenin's writings; the historian does not dare stray an inch from the accepted canon for fear of exposing himself to the dread charge of 'revisionism'. The result is that the—to a Communist—most supremely dramatic of all historical themes is treated in an extraordinarily flat and dull manner, and that in some places the narrative barely makes sense.

The chapter devoted to the populist (*narodnik*) movement is a case in point. These socialists and democrats, rivals of the Bolsheviks for the allegiance of the masses, were the targets for some of Lenin's sharpest polemical diatribes. Accordingly, they are presented here as bourgeois reactionaries, a prey to liberal illusions, eager to bargain with Tsarism at the people's expense. Yet the spiritual progenitors of the populists, radical thinkers such as Herzen or Chernyshevsky, were held by Lenin in high esteem, and have to be appraised positively by Soviet historians. This necessitates a good deal of clumsy juggling with terminology and chronology, in an effort to show that the 'revolutionary democrats', as they are called, had no connection with the populists, but much in common with the Bolsheviks—also by definition 'revolutionary' and 'democratic'. The studious avoidance of the designation 'liberal' is not accidental. Most students of political theory will concede that in the 19th century the ideas of liberalism and democracy developed in close association. But the Soviet historian is obliged to treat them as incompatible and antagonistic concepts. Liberals are *ex hypothesi* reactionary, whilst the only true democrats are revolutionary ones, *i.e.*, the Bolsheviks and those officially recognised as their ideological forerunners, such as the Decembrists and the radicals of the 1860s. How can the unfortunate student make head or tail of this caricature of history? It comes as no surprise to find a Soviet teacher frankly admitting that 'it is difficult to imagine how muddled are the ideas about populism which prevail in the minds of pupils when they leave secondary school'.[25] Unfortunately, their confusion is hardly likely to be dissipated when they reach university, where they will merely be subjected to denser clouds of the same inky fog of misrepresentation.

One further point may be mentioned in this connection. The third edition of Nechkina's textbook does not contain any noteworthy change of emphasis with regard to that hoary old Marxist conundrum, the role of the individual in history. For all the repetitive talk about 'the popular masses as the real creators of history', it is clear that the decisive role in bringing about the onward march of events is allotted to their leaders—especially, of course, where they are Communists. This anti-deterministic attitude is a cardinal tenet of the Bolshevik creed, and there seems no reason to suppose that the emphasis temporarily laid upon the principle of collective leadership between 1953 and 1957 will lead to any more 'democratic'—or rather 'democentric', if one may coin a phrase—approach.

WITH regard to the Soviet period, the lack of any university textbook prior to *The Epoch of Socialism* makes it impossible to examine in detail the twists and turns of official historiography. One may readily agree that the new volume represents a marked advance upon the meaningless generalisations and ominous heresy-hunting of the *Short Course*. It is up to date, better proportioned,[26] and contains an abundance of factual information—although these facts, for reasons already mentioned, are very arbitrarily selected and arranged. The reader's mind is constantly bludgeoned by a stream of dubious statistical information, and the virtual absence of tables or diagrams must make the book irritatingly unpractical from the viewpoint of the ordinary Soviet student.

[25] *Prepodavanie istorii v shkole*, 1958, 6, p. 41.

[26] Of the space devoted to the years 1917-1941, only 44% concerns the revolutionary and civil war epoch, as against 64% in Pankratova's textbook for secondary schools (both the 1946 and 1957 editions). This is perhaps an indication of a shift of emphasis away from militant struggle towards peaceful construction.

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The most interesting feature of the volume from the non-specialist standpoint is, of course, the line taken on Stalin. After the violent oscillation of 1956, the pendulum has now swung back towards the centre: an attempt has been made to give Stalin his due place in Soviet history in accordance with the principles laid down in the Party resolution of June, 1956, on 'The Cult of the Individual'. This means that Stalin's 'errors', as they are euphemistically called, are presumed to date from 1934, and that before that date he is portrayed as the loyal agent of the Central Committee. The whole matter is, of course, played down as much as possible: the emphasis is all upon the supposedly 'basic' aspects of Soviet history (economic and cultural progress, etc.), and political tensions are treated as matters of marginal concern upon which it would be 'unscientific' to enlarge at length. By an ingenious trick, excessive preoccupation with 'the effects of the cult of the individual' is subject to condemnation on the same grounds as the actual 'cult' itself.

The real explanation, naturally, is that consideration of such delicate matters would bring into question the very basis of the authority exercised by the present regime. Total suppression of Stalin's misdeeds being impossible, they must be minimised and thrust into oblivion as far as feasible; the passage of time, the frailty of human memory, and the operation of totalitarian controls will do the rest. In the 750 pages of *The Epoch of Socialism* the Stalin cult is allotted a bare page and a half. 'These negative phenomena', it is explained smugly, 'could not shake or alter the essence of the Soviet system. . . . The individual mistakes and failures were overshadowed by the tremendous successes [achieved], and the negative results of these mistakes were rapidly made good by the colossal growth of the vital forces of the Party and of Soviet society.'[27] Historians cannot afford to examine the effects of Stalin's admitted 'mistakes' upon the nation at large. They must confine themselves to a brief reference to the consequences for the governing elite: during the purges, we are informed, 'many honest Communists' were 'repressed'—but of the millions who perished without trace, not a word is said.

Thus although this volume represents an advance upon anything written during the Stalin era, the first elementary step towards an objective history of the USSR has yet to be taken. In their introduction the editors promise that the book will 'show the difficulties and failures which the Soviet people had to overcome in the course of their triumphant construction of socialism'.[28] But the references to mistakes are rare, and confined to secondary issues.[29] The conventional limits of 'self-criticism' are fully observed: individual executants or operational details of Party policy may be criticised, but not the policy itself, which is deemed to be infallible. There is as yet no sign of any realisation that there can be more than one 'correct' answer to a given problem, or that two or more answers may each contain some element of truth. The impression which this volume is designed to leave upon the reader is one of Party and people marching in step towards a goal predordained by the impersonal logic of history.

The Soviet student may be assured by his history textbooks that the pattern of life is determined by *zakonomernost*. But (after he has embarked upon a career, at least) his daily experience teaches him otherwise: a myriad instances arise to cause him to doubt whether events are really developing in complete accordance with the prognosis of the leadership. The de-Stalinisation crisis provided one such mental jolt on a nation-wide scale. The continued existence of what are officially termed 'negative phenomena' in Soviet life, and which are so obviously *not* the 'survivals of capitalism' they are made out to be, help to promote a mood of scepticism towards official ideology. Admittedly the human mind has an immense capacity for self-deception, and prefers the easy path of routine to the hazardous road of independent thought. But even within the walls of the history classroom the seeds of doubt and heresy are not entirely dormant.

[27] *Istoriya SSSR: Epokha sotsializma* (Moscow, 1957), p. 490.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[29] E.g. excessive official zeal in organising the Stakhanovite movement, leading to failure to encourage ordinary workers sufficiently to improve their productivity (p. 467).

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'FUNDAMENTALS OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY'

A Critical Analysis

George L. Kline

IF, in recent years, Soviet 'collective leadership' has given way to more traditional political forms, a reverse process has been apparent in the production of Soviet philosophy. One-man treatises have almost disappeared; Marxist philosophy now results from 'collective authorship.' To be sure, such collectivity is not new; collective volumes on dialectical and historical materialism were published in the 1920's and 1930's. But only a decade ago a few individual Soviet authors still ventured to write whole books on philosophy. In 1947 Professor M. M. Rozental and the late Professor M. A. Leonov both published studies on *The Marxist Dialectical Method;* and in 1948 Leonov brought out his *Outline of Dialectical Materialism.* Academician G. F. Aleksandrov's ill-starred *History of Western European Philosophy* (1946) was the last full-length Soviet work in the history of philosophy to be produced by a single hand.

Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii ('Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy'), the current Soviet philosophy textbook, appeared in the fall of 1958 in a first printing of a quarter of a million copies. It is intended for use in institutions of higher learning as well as for individual study. Its 684 closely-printed pages, divided almost evenly between dialectical and historical materialism, are the work of an eleven-man 'collective.' Among the authors are five Corresponding Members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, all with the rank of (senior) professor; three Doctors of Philosophical Sciences, also with the rank of professor; one non-professorial Doctor; and one Candidate of Philosophical Sciences (i.e., holder of a degree corresponding roughly to the British M.A.). In addition, five of the contributors are on the editorial board of *Voprosy Filosofii,* the official Soviet philosophical journal, one of them—Academician M. D. Kammari—being until recently its editor-in-chief.

Responsibility for each chapter is carefully assigned; the contributions range from the half-chapter each of Professors A. F. Shishkin and V. F. Berestnev (about 25 pages, under 4 per cent of the text) to Professor G. Ye. Glezerman's three chapters (133 pages, nearly 20 per cent of the text). The four-page preface and seven-page general conclusion presumably represent the work of the entire 'collective.'

The general editor, Academician F. V. Konstantinov, also contributed a chapter, but neither his name nor the fact of his editorship appears on the fly leaf. (The six contributors not yet named are M. A. Dynnik, P. N. Fedoseyev, Yu. P. Frantsev, P. V. Kopnin, I. V. Kuznetsov and M. M. Rozental.) Judging from the figures which Soviet philosophers gave me during a 1957 visit to Moscow University, these eleven contributors have been richly rewarded for their collective labours—their individual honoraria ranging from one or two score to several score thousands of roubles. (Twenty thousand rubles is eighteen months' wages for a Soviet mechanic or physician in general practice.)

Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii was prepared under the auspices of the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and bears the imprint of the State Publishing House for Political Literature. Nothing has been spared to make it 'authoritative.' The interesting question is, how does this text compare with its immediate, as well as its more remote, predecessors?

The last Soviet philosophy textbook was published in two volumes, that on historical materialism appearing in 1951 (second revised edition, 1954) under the editorship of Academician Konstantinov, that on dialectical materialism in 1953 (revised second edition, 1954) under the editorship of the now disgraced Aleksandrov. An earlier two-volume text (1932, 1933) was edited by M. B. Mitin and I. P. Razumovski. In many respects the 1958 text is more like its ideological grandparents of the early 1930's than like its parents of 1951-54.

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The resemblance is evident, first in the citation of doctrinal authority. Stalin was cited only sparingly in 1932-33, copiously in 1951-54, and again sparingly in 1958. More significantly —in view of the Marxist-Leninist insistence on the unity of theory and practice in general, and of ideological and political leadership in particular—the 1932-33 and 1958 texts make scarcely any reference to doctrinal pronouncements of *current* Soviet (or communist) leaders, whereas the 1951-54 texts, as well as the Rozental and Leonov treatises of 1947-48, teem with such references. The 1953 edition of the text on dialectical materialism edited by Alexsandrov is a curious special case. It cites Malenkov at least half a dozen times and goes out of its philosophical way to defend the 'Malenkov line' on priority of consumer-goods production. (Aleksandrov, we recall, was elevated by Malenkov to the post of Minister of Culture of the USSR in March of 1954, and unceremoniously dismissed by Malenkov's successors a year later.)

The 1958 text cites only one living communist leader—Mao Tse-tung—on doctrinal points, and most of these are minor. Mao's name appears half a dozen times; Stalin is mentioned four times, Khrushchev twice. (Perhaps a subtle arithmetical hint that Khrushchev is only *half* the theorist that Stalin was?) Khrushchev is nowhere acknowledged as a theorist; the nearest thing to such acknowledgment is the general statement that Marxism-Leninism 'in our time is receiving its further creative development in the works of the leaders of the CPSU' (p. 5). In contrast, Stalin—despite mild criticism of the excesses of the 'personality cult'—is called an 'outstanding Marxist,' 'a major Marxist theorist,' whose works constitute a 'valuable acquisition of Marxist thought' (pp. 110, 632). Furthermore, neither of the Khrushchev citations is a doctrinal pronouncement in the strict sense: one is simply a paraphrasing of Lenin's position on the withering away of the state (p. 547); the other is a restatement of the Leninist insistence on the socio-political function of the arts (p. 612).

Mao's doctrinal influence is rather more substantial. His 'excellent, profound, and interesting' essay *On Contradictions* is praised as an 'outstanding contribution to the theory of Marxist dialectic' (p. 273). Chinese, and Chinese communist, influence is evident at other points as well. There is some discussion of *tao* (pp. 41f), a concept entirely ignored in earlier texts. The sole doctrinal innovation in this entire book is the modification of a point in social ethics to accommodate Chinese communist policy. Hitherto, Soviet authors have unequivocally repudiated all forms of birth control as expressions of misanthropy, cannibalism, and Neo-Malthusianism. In the 1958 text this adamant stand is softened to admit some 'rationally implemented limitation of the birth-rate' as a temporary measure in countries, like China, characterized by strong population pressure and relatively low food production (pp. 398f, 399fn.1). But the Soviet authors insist that the long-term remedy is increased food production.

ON at least five substantive points the 1958 volume differs significantly from its predecessors:

(1) Like the pre-1950 texts, it makes no reference at all to the Stalin-Marr controversy on the nature of language and its relation to the ideological 'superstructure' of society. The 1951-54 texts, of course, laid major stress on this controversy.

(2) 'Revisionism' is here attacked with an urgency unknown in Soviet writings since Lenin's clash with Bogdanov and the other 'Machians' half a century ago. To-day, as in Lenin's time—we read—Marxists must do battle on two ideological fronts: 'against the dogmatists, who would convert historical materialism into a dead schematism, and against the revisionists, who pervert historical materialism in the spirit of bourgeois sociology' (p. 381). The 'dogmatists,' it turns out, are the 'anti-Party group'—Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and 'Shepilov, who allied himself with them' (this book went to press before Bulganin had been unequivocally added to their ranks). But their 'dogmatism' does not seem to involve any specific dogma; rather, it is a matter of general rigidity, a failure to take new economic and political circumstances into account. In any case, the 'anti-Party' position has little, if

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any, relevance to Marxist *philosophy*.

Moreover, the two-front battle seems quite one-sided; most of the ideological artillery is concentrated on the 'revisionist' rather than the 'dogmatist' front. The CPSU, we are told, fights revisionism, defending the 'purity' of Marxist-Leninist principles (p. 682); contemporary revisionsts 'slip into a reformist position,' replacing revolutionary dialectic with a 'superficial theory of evolution' (p. 111). They try to hoodwink the workers into believing that capitalism can 'change its nature without revolutionary transformations' (pp. 242, 245; cf. p. 517).

Strangely enough, no contemporary revisionist is ever identified, either by name or nationality. But other Soviet sources make it clear that the targets of attack include West German and Austrian socialists, as well as Yugoslav (and presumably even Polish) Communists (cf. *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1959, 4, pp. 172-3). The 1958 text contains one clear, if implicit, reference to Tito's, or Gomulka's, 'national' socialism: revisionist social philosophers are said to stress the particular, ignoring what is universal in the laws of social development, while the dogmatists stress the universal and ignore particularities (pp. 206f).

Revisionists are systematically lumped together with 'bourgeois' philosophers. This is an old trick, practised by Lenin and Akselrod, in the early 1900's, in their attempt to discredit Bogdanov *et al.*, by identifying his philosophic position with that of Mach, Avenarius, Kant, and even Bishop Berkeley! Bogdanov, incidentally, is still prominently listed—along with Bernstein, Kautsky, and Max Adler—as a revisionist who 'betrayed' Marxism (p. 34). Today's revisionists are also warned—as Lenin long ago warned (or threatened) Bogdanov—that 'any departure from communist partisanship leads to a denial of the truth . . .' (p. 377, fn. 2; cf. p. 379).

(3) On one major doctrinal point the 1958 text represents a return to the pre-Stalinist position. In the 1920's and early 1930's every Soviet writer on Marxist-Leninist dialectic followed Hegel, Engels, and Lenin in distinguishing *three* 'laws of dialectic': the laws of (a) transformation of quantity into quality, (b) unity and conflict of opposites, and (c) negation of the negation. At the height of Stalinism (c) was quietly dropped, perhaps because Stalin feared the counter-revolutionary possibilities of its practical application: Tsarism was 'negated' by the Soviet system, but what would 'negate' Sovietism? In any case, Rozental and Leonov in 1947 managed to write entire books on the 'Marxist Dialectical Method' without once mentioning this classical 'law.' Their practice was continued in the philosophy texts of 1951-54. But with the de-Stalinisation of 1956 the law of the negation of the negation began to creep back; in the 1958 text an entire chapter—though the shortest one in the book—is devoted to it. The treatment lacks the militant self-assurance of discussions of the 1920's: it is gingerly, tentative, and seeks to draw the political sting implicit in Hegelian 'negativity'. Development through negation of the negation is characterised as 'continuous and progressive' (p. 301). Soviet critics have criticised the chapter for giving the impression that 'negation of the negation' is merely an appendage to 'unity and conflict of opposites' (*V.F.*, 1959, 7, p. 162).

(4) Rather more credit is given Hegel for laying the foundations of materialist dialectic than was the case in earlier texts. There is a five-page discussion of Hegel's philosophy, and 27 additional references. Several Hegelian concepts and turns of phrase which had not figured in earlier texts are featured here, and the general attitude towards Hegel seems more sympathetic than formerly, although the political and religious conservatism of his later works is still harshly condemned. On the other hand, central Hegelian concepts like '*Aufhebung*' (Russian '*snyatiye*') and 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' are introduced without reference to Hegel (pp. 292, 295).

(5) The Soviet authors of this philosophy text emphasise that philosophers—like everyone else—now live in an age of sputniks. Indeed, Soviet priority in putting an artificial earth satellite into orbit is offered as evidence of the superiority not only of the Soviet social system, but even of Marxism-Leninism as a philosophy! It is no accident, we are told, that the Soviet system produced the first atomic

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power plant, ICBM, and sputnik (p. 620). Sputnik I was a 'new and very great triumph of progressive science' and 'a new and powerful blow against obscurantism, religion, and the idealist world-view,' making it 'increasingly difficult for idealism and religion to defend their positions' (p. 346). The hidden premise in this 'argument' is that religion and idealism deny the power of human reason and science.

DESPITE the prevalence of such 'arguments,' Soviet reviewers have praised the 1958 text for 'grounding' rather than merely 'proclaiming' Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In fact, most of the 'arguments' are transparent fallacies or sophistries. Consider the following: (a) *Question*: How can Marxist philosophy be both 'partisan' (i.e., class-subjective) and 'scientific' (i.e., objective, non-subjective)? *Answer*: Because the proletariat alone among classes wants and needs to know the world as it really is, so as to transform it effectively. *Ergo,* proletarian 'partisanship' (but no other) is thoroughly scientific and objective (pp. 35f)! (b) *Question*: Why did socialist revolutions occur first in industrially under-developed countries like Russia and China? *Answer*: Because these countries represented 'weak links' in the chain of world capitalism; under stress, they were the first to snap (p. 362)!

The only visible tendency towards a more careful or thoughtful presentation is to be found in occasional analyses of ambiguous terms—'metaphysics' (p. 20, fn. 1), 'evolution' (p. 243, fn. 2). But this analytical conscientiousness is overshadowed by the continuing use of such crucially ambiguous terms as 'concrete,' 'reflection,' and 'consciousness,' without the least attempt to make them clear or precise.

In general, *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii* offers its readers 'more of the same'; the same doctrines, the same verbal expression, the same slogans, the same intellectual carelessness and dishonesty, as characterised its predecessors. Half a dozen familiar features call for brief comment:

(1) *Dogmatism.* Despite the familiar claim that Marxism-Leninism 'does not tolerate rigid dogmas' (p. 681), there is no philosophic tenet in this book which was not enunciated by Marx, Engels, or Lenin at least fifty years ago. Soviet philosophers recognise no unsolved, let alone insoluble, problems. Every problem has its clear-cut 'classical' solution, and every solution is presented with didactic certainty, devoid of tentativeness. Two examples from the present text: (a) '. . . At no time or place in the world has there ever been, is there, or will there ever be anything except moving matter or the product of moving matter' (p. 158). (b) '. . . There are not and cannot be any actual facts (*sic*) which would disprove the causality of microphenomena' (p. 200).

(2) *Arrogance.* Not only has Marxism-Leninism settled all questions; it has settled them with unrivalled brilliance and definitiveness. Only Marxism-Leninism—the 'true and uniquely scientific world-view of the present day'—offers a 'scientific, correct answer to the root questions of the contemporary world' (pp. 88, 683). This 'great and all-conquering world-view' has 'absorbed everything valuable, scientific, and progressive from over two thousand years of philosophical development' (p. 678). Naturally, Marxist philosophy represents the 'highest stage of development of philosophic thought' (p. 640).

(3) *Abusiveness.* An ideological opponent is branded a 'braggart and self-enamoured poseur' (p. 623, in this case Kerensky). 'Bourgeois' political philosophers 'provide a brightly daubed advertising billboard to conceal the squalor . . . and ulcerous growths of contemporary capitalism' (p. 644). Present Western governments are guilty of 'monstrous misdeeds' (p. 517, fn. 2); the United States 'has transformed many countries of South and Central America into colonies and semi-colonies and is ruthlessly plundering them. . . . In two world wars the USA has become rich, making fabulous profits on the blood of the peoples' (p. 363).

(4) *Distortion.* Nietzsche once remarked that every philosopher caricatures his intellectual opponents. Soviet philosophers, despite their public loathing of Nietzsche, pay constant—if unconscious—homage to his insight. The chapter devoted to 'bourgeois philosophy and sociology' is so arbitrary and fanciful in its presentation of philosophical and sociological

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schools, especially pragmatism, positivism, and existentialism, that even Soviet critics have complained (*V.F.*, 1959, 7, p. 164).

(5) *Obsequiousness*. There is nothing in this text to equal the fawning before Stalin of earlier 'philosophical' works; and Glezerman even ventures to call Stalin 'incorrect' in predicting increased class struggle after 1937 (p. 542). But Lenin is always referred to with respect bordering on reverence, and his works are 'works of genius.' The chapter on pre-Marxist philosophy slavishly reproduces Lenin's, Engels', and Marx's judgments of various Western and Russian thinkers; it offers nothing resembling an independent or fresh evaluation.

WE find in the 1958 text the familiar claim, no better supported here than in earlier texts, that 'the development of science at every step confirms the truth of the principles of materialist dialectic' (p. 679). As a matter of fact, no convincing instances of such confirmation are offered; and the scientific theories which tend to *dis*confirm Marxist-Leninist doctrines are either (a) ignored, or (b) rejected on philosophical grounds.

(a) There is some discussion of relativity physics (p. 148), but no mention is made of the relativising of simultaneity, entailed by the general theory of relativity, but unacceptable to dialectical materialists on doctrinal grounds. I have already quoted the Soviet *ipse dixit* concerning microcausality (p. 200); the embarrassing implications of quantum mechanics on this point are cavalierly ignored. (In other, more technical, works these implications are denied or 'explained away.')

(b) The 'recessional' ('expanding universe') hypothesis, based upon interpretation of the red-shift in the spectra of distant galaxies as a Doppler effect, is unacceptable to Soviet scientists and philosophers because it casts doubt upon the eternity and uncreatedness of the universe. The interpretation of the red-shift accepted by almost all non-Soviet astronomers and astrophysicists is denied outright (pp. 141f). (If science refuses to 'confirm the principles of Marxism-Leninism,' so much the worse for science!)

Certain minor defects of this book might be attributed to editorial slovenliness, except that they all tend to further the book's general aim of combating 'idealism' while inculcating Marxist-Leninist dogma.

(1) Reference is often made to a given volume of an author's complete works without indication of the title or date of the specific work cited. In the case of revisionists like Bogdanov and Struve, philosophic opinions are often cited without any indication of their source — presumably to discourage Soviet readers who might wish to consult the original text.

(2) Concepts and even phrases are often discussed without mention of their originators. This is true not only of Hegel (as indicated above), but of Stalin and Khrushchev.

(3) Thinkers are often double-quoted through a critic or commentator. Thus, Berkeley is quoted as quoted by Lenin (p. 124), Schlick as quoted by Beck in an introductory text (p. 647).

(4) Reference is made to reprints, with no indication of the date of original publication. Thus, Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919) is cited in a 1954 edition, apparently to give the impression that it is a recent work (p. 18).

(5) Non-contemporaries—even the living and the dead—are sometimes scrambled together. Thus, among 'intellectuals sympathetic to communism' Anatole France (died 1924), Romain Rolland (died 1944), and Theodore Dreiser (died 1945) stand beside Paul Langevin and J. D. Bernal (p. 517, fn. 2).

Like many Soviet textbooks, *Osnovy marksistskoi filosofii* has no index, a fact which limits its usefulness as a reference work. (But I suspect that it will be read mainly by the 'captive audience' of Soviet university students). Despite its relative simplicity and lack of philosophical sophistication, it seems unlikely to appeal to the Soviet 'general reader.' Readers acquainted with earlier texts in Marxism-Leninism who dip into it run no risk of ideological trauma, for its novelty of doctrine and expression is negligible; but they do run a considerable and familiar risk of intellectual ennui.

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ETHNOGRAPHY: SCOPE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Lawrence Krader

WRITINGS on ethnography in the Soviet Union are so numerous that a brief appraisal of their character and value is a difficult matter, although the appearance in recent years of a number of surveys by Soviet specialists of the growth and current status of their fields of study makes the task much easier. The views reached from reading these surveys have been further explored in discussions with Soviet ethnographers and anthropologists who have visited America, and on the occasion of my visit to the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1956. One of the difficulties in any such summary is that the field is neither as simple nor as unified as it once was. This is in part a result of the increase in the number and activity of ethnographers in the Soviet Union; but other factors also come into play: the scope of work has been widened, and criticism has gone deeper. Nevertheless, several trends of a general nature can be detected.

Ethnography is defined in the Soviet Union as a branch of the science of history; under this heading are studied the culture and life of the peoples of the earth, their origins, distribution, and culture-historical relations. As such, Soviet ethnography covers a broader field than it does in Western usage. Whereas in the West ethnography is a descriptive field, Soviet ethnographers consider their field to be the development, relations, and conditions of culture.[1]

There is no general conception among Soviet specialists of anthropology as the study of man and of peoples, whereas this conception of anthropology is dominant in Britain and the United States. Anthropology in Soviet usage is akin to that on the European continent, which restricts the term to the study of human biology, of man as a physical organism. Since there is no all-embracing field of the study of man in the USSR, and since studies will obviously be undertaken which relate the biological to the cultural, it is ethnography which tends to cover the broader issues, involving any combination of ethnography, physical anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics. The Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and its journal, *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* perform these broader functions and others as well; they provide certain practical services, such as the publication of background articles descriptive of the political, social, and economic situation of countries or peoples of topical interest, for example, underdeveloped areas.

Since Soviet ethnography is in the large sense a branch of history, its fundamental intent is diachronic study. Problems of social structure, of the cultural pattern, statics, and of comparative analysis, are not regarded as valid; their rejection is in part ideological, deriving from the Marxist-Leninist hostility to formalism and idealism in philosophy.

During the period extending from the nineteenth century through the early 1920's, anthropology in Russia maintained a close relationship with the natural sciences, particularly geography. The nineteenth century explorer of Oceania, N. N. Miklukho-Maklai, was equally active in the study of man and in the study of the earth and the oceans. (His outstanding contribution is acknowledged in the naming of the Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences—Institut Etnografii imeni N. N. Miklukho-Maklaia.) D. N. Anuchin, who perhaps more than any other single thinker imposed his mark on the development of anthropology in Russia at the turn of the century, was at the same time an earth scientist. But, it was not only through the predictions and influence of individuals that this relationship was maintained. During the nineteenth century, ethnography was a section of the Institute of Geography in Moscow. After the Revolution, in 1919, the teaching of

[1] *Ocherki obshchei etnografii,* S. P. Tolstov, M. G. Levin, and N. N. Cheboksarov (Moscow, 1957, p. 7).

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ethnography was undertaken as a separate faculty of the Geographic Institute in Petrograd, and in 1925, when the Geographic Institute was joined to the University of Leningrad, ethnography was taught within the new geography faculty. Anuchin taught anthropology (physical anthropology, palaeo-anthropology, and ethnography) at Moscow University in the natural sciences faculty from 1919 until his death in 1923. In this respect, Russian anthropology was not markedly different from anthropology in other parts of the world, but, during the 1920's the formal ties between anthropology and the natural sciences were cut in the USSR.

THE formation of the Russian empire from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century established the framework within which the greater part of Russian anthropological studies have been pursued. The great variety of cultural types, ranging from the simple cultures of the Chukchi and Koryak to the high cultures of Central Asia and the Caucasus and eastern Europe, brought together under a single and contiguous sovereignty, presented a vast and fertile area of exploration. It is a situation without parallel elsewhere (with the possible exception of the Austro-Hungarian empire). British or American anthropologists must travel to foreign lands in order to study high cultures other than their own. In Russia the juxtaposition of cultural varieties produced an outpouring of ethnographic descriptions which started slowly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, expanded rapidly in the eighteenth, and gained great volume in the nineteenth century.

By an odd anomaly, the internal enemies of the Russian empire made a great contribution to the study of its peoples. The Siberian exile system of the Tsarist period brought a number of brilliant young political revolutionaries into forced contact with the native peoples of the north. Out of this contact a generation of ethnographers and a series of excellent ethnographic studies emerged: Vladimir Bogoraz on the Chukchi, Lev Sternberg on the Gilyak, Vladimir Jochelson on the Koryak and the Yukagir. There were many other figures beside these: D. A. Klements, P. S. Efimenko, A. Makarenko, W. Sieroszewski. Of this group, Bogoraz and Sternberg were active in the organisation of ethnographic studies in Russia after the Revolution.

During the 1920's and 30's, a number of institutes and commissions were set up which were either in the charge of ethnographers or else employed their services to study and advise on the problems of the national minorities: this formulation of the problem was the umbrella now covering the study of the non-Russian tribes and nations within the Soviet system. The definition of tribal and other national minority groups, their demarcation, divisions, and fusions, was part of the vast undertaking of this formative period in the organisation of Soviet life. In many instances, ethnographers served as members of or advisers to political commissions specially created for these purposes. The Revolution introduced profound changes and discontinuities even in the lives of peoples far removed from its scenes of major activity.

It was a period of turmoil, even in such relatively minor matters as determining the names of peoples. New names appeared: the Gilyak are now called Nivkh; the name of the Chukchi was changed to the Luorovetlani, and changed back to Chukchi; other names remained. Traditional groups were absorbed into others, e.g., the Taranchi and Taleut. Others were subdivided, such as the Samoyed and the Tungus; these terms now have linguistic rather than ethnic referents.

The field of ethnography itself underwent rapid change, due less to internal factors than to the pressures exerted by economic and political forces during the Stalinist period. The ethnographers responded by a prudent withdrawal, by narrowing their field of activity. During the 1930's most contributions, both technical and general, bore what French writers call a *chapeau*, in these cases a quotation from Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin as a guide for the reader to the link between the article or monograph and the doctrine of the regime. As the field contracted, entire areas of accepted ethnographic interest were eliminated, while the relationship of ethnography to history was tightened and non-historical investigations tended to be suppressed. The concern with

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ethnographic questions beyond the borders of the USSR diminished; studies dealing with geography or works concerned with current social questions were dropped. Questions of religion and of psychology were disregarded. Attention was concentrated on 'survivals' of primitive life in the current period.[2]

Soviet ethnographic thought during this period was characterised by the application of abstract schemes, often adopted uncritically. This was the era in which N. Y. Marr's ideas on linguistics, ethnography, and archaeology were dominant. The system devised by Engels, after Lewis Henry Morgan, for social evolution was applied schematically, often in contexts to which it was not suited, or to which the evidence had no relevance.

To some extent the controversies with anthropologists outside the Soviet Union influenced the adoption of one or another theoretical position. The elimination of such variables as culture areas, that is, areas which are geographic unities and combine a number of peoples sharing certain distinctive traits and processes of development, may be related to at least two extraneous considerations: the theory of culture areas, and the techniques of culture areas analysis, were a predominant concern of 'bourgeois' anthropology, such as the *Kulturkreis* school of Father Wilhelm Schmidt,[3] or the approach to culture areas by lists of traits, developed by A L. Kroeber; secondly, at the given stage of development of the discipline, it was difficult if not impossible to hammer out a valid concept of culture areas, each with its characteristic mode and tempo of development, upon the anvil of unilinear evolution constructed according to the schemata of nineteenth century thought.

SINCE 1945 interest in ethnographic affairs beyond the Soviet frontiers has reawakened, according to Tolstov, who speaks with authority as the director of the Institute of Ethnography. A subject index of articles and other items published in the journal of the institute issued as a supplement to *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* supplies a reliable guide to the scope and composition of its concerns. The predominant interest in the period 1946-1955 lay in the ethnography of the Russian people, which accounted for 134 articles The Ukrainians came next, with 44 articles, while other peoples in the Soviet Union scaled down from there. Beyond the frontiers it is the nations allied to the USSR who next occupied the attenion of Soviet ethnographers: there were 22 articles and other items published on China, and 18 on Bulgaria. The highest number for countries outside the Soviet sphere was 15 items for the United States; India and Pakistan followed with 13 items, while the Arabs, Australia, and Oceania, each claimed 10 items.[4]

The listing in the index is self-explanatory. Tolstov had commented in his review article that Soviet enthography during the 1930's had shown a declining interest in folklore and folk music. During the post-war decade this trend had been reversed: folklore and its related fields of folk music, folk literature, folk theatre, and folk representational art was by far the most important substantive field. The items published in *Sovetskaia Etnografiia* (including the book reviews) devoted to this general field, were 22 per cent of the whole, or more than 300, during 1946-55. There were nearly 200 items published on folklore alone. The combination of fields which may be designated as material culture, including tools and implements, food, dwellings, dress, pottery, means of transportation, accounted for 225 items. Within this group dwellings came first—nearly 100 items. Articles and other items in the field of social organisation, together with tribal composition, ethnonymy, family and marriage, kinship, matriarchate and military organisation were 88 in number. Social organisation, which is more or less the core area of British social anthropology, as it is to a slightly lesser extent in the United States, claimed no more than 31 items.

There is no category of religion in this index; however, there were 84 items listed under Beliefs and Customs. The category of political organisation is not represented, nor is that of

[2] Cf. S. P. Tolstov, *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* 1957, no. 5: 38-9. Trends in Soviet anthropology since 1917 are surveyed in this issue.

[3] Cf. E. G. Kagarov, *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* 1935, no. 2.

[4] *Sovetskaia Etnografiia. Ukazatel statei i materialov v* 1946-1955 (1956).

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the relations between culture and the environment, or human ecology. No category of culture and psychology is to be found, and its absence was to be expected, since the field of culture in relation to the psychology of the personality is condemned as a form of racism; Western anthropologists who have contributed to this field have been attacked as racists. In contrast to the lack of coverage of political organisation, there were 15 items published on Colonial Politics.

It may be noted that the absence of studies of the environment and of psychology in relation to human society and culture, and of studies of political organisation, is characteristic only of the present period. Russian ethnographers of past generations and their colleagues made major contributions in these fields. For instance, Vladimir Bogoraz wrote an excellent study of the psychology of shamanism in 1910.[5] It may be that the rejection of the ideas of Friedrich Ratzel's anthropogeography and of Ellsworth Huntington's environmental determinism, both extreme statements regarding the relations of geography and culture, has led by over-reaction to an avoidance of the field of human ecology as a whole; similarly, extreme statements of the psychoanalytic school in cultural anthropology and in the psychology of cultures in general and of 'primitive' man in particular, have led to the rejection of this traditional field of study.

Between 1941 and 1957 there was a considerable expansion in the anthropological field as measured by the number of personnel. In 1941 there were 50 scientific workers *(nauchnye rabotniki)* employed in the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences. Of these, five had doctoral degrees, and twenty had candidate degrees. By 1957 the professional personnel had expanded to 160, of whom thirteen had doctoral degrees and 87 the degree of candidate. The rate of growth was highest in the middle category, the candidate, which expanded over fourfold; the increase in the number of doctorates in the Institute, as well as in the number of personnel below candidate level, was far lower.[6]

[5] *Etnograficheskoe Obozrenie,* 1910, no. 1-2: 1-36.
[6] Tolstov, *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* 1957, 5, p. 40.

CERTAIN recent trends have been further developed during the past two or three years. Areas far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union now occupy a place of greater prominence. A number of articles have been devoted to problems of African ethnography and political development. I. I. Potekhin, who is one of the vice-directors of the Institute of Ethnography, is following the course of African political development closely, and published two articles on this theme in 1957. The first concerned the state of Ghana and the second reviewed the ethnic composition of Africa in relation to the fall of the colonial system.[7] Potekhin visited Ghana and was a guest of the University of Accra.

Until quite recently, religious themes had been subsumed under another heading. In 1957, A I. Zalesski wrote an article on the attitude of the rural population of Belo-Russia to religion and on the growth of atheism among them, based on materials gathered in a collective farm near Minsk. Zalesski notes that the kolkhoz in question is in advance of other collective farms in Belo-Russia; it is therefore atypical. He noted a rise in atheism, although religious tendencies 'survived,' especially among the old.[8] In the same issue, G. P. Snesarev published an article on the question of religion among the Uzbeks of a kolkhoz in the Khorezm region. He too treats the question as one of the persistence of survivals.

A full-scale study of a Russian collective farm village, the outcome of several years of study, was published in 1958 by Pavel Kushner.[9] The village of Viriatino grew up at the beginning of the 17th century; it lies in the black earth region some 400 km south-east of Moscow. Kushner's study is in two parts, the first dealing with life in the village before the Revolution, and the second with contemporary life. The work is a collective enterprise, with over a dozen participants in the collection of data and in the writing. There are chapters on the economic life before and after the revolution, the village settlements and dwelling

[7] *Sovetskaia Etnografiia,* 1957, no. 2, 4.
[8] *Ibid.,* 1957, no. 2.
[9] P. I. Kushner, *Selo Viriatino v proshlom i nastoiashchem* (Moscow, 1958).

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pattern, clothing, the family, customs, and education. As part of the undertaking, Kushner had a film made which is technically impressive (and which he ran for me in a classroom of the new Moscow University). Mme B. I. Krupianskaia, who had been in charge of the field work, commented on the film when it was shown. The purpose of the study is to supply a measure of the change in the daily life of a Russian village before and after the Revolution. The principal techniques for measuring the change are quantitative; economic (including household budgets) and demographic. The village and the family are analysed in terms of number. However, there are also detailed descriptions of the school system, marriage, religion. Considering the aim of the study, there are two surprising gaps: folklore is scarcely treated, and there is no systematic analysis of the kinship system, both of which may supply good measures of change.

Apart from the marshalling of evidence in relation to the purpose of the study, there is a larger contextual problem. We cannot discover from the book where the village stands in the context of the general rural scene in Russia or the USSR. Only passing mention is made of comparative data or comparable studies. While it is true that this is a research monograph, it would have been useful to indicate whether Viriatino is an average or an advanced village in its economic life; that is, to indicate, however briefly, the reasons for its choice as a research site, and its position in contemporary rural Russia.

THERE have been a number of excellent works on the problem of ethnogenesis, combining data of ethnography, physical anthropology, and archaeology. This subject forms a significant part of Soviet ethnography. M. G. Levin has recently published a work on the ethnogenesis of the peoples of northeast Asia, with reference to the Manchu-Tungus peoples, the Gilyak, Ainu, Eskimo, Chukchi, Koryak, Kamchadel, with an appended chapter on the physical types among the Koreans and Japanese. The investigation was conducted along taxonomic lines, with correlative data from related fields. The result is a sophisticated discussion of ethnic and physical origins and current distributions of types in North Asia. G. F. Debets has made important contributions to the ethnogenesis of the peoples of Siberia; recently he led an expedition to Kirgizia and edited the first of a series of publications on the ethnography, physical anthropology, and archaeology of the Kirgiz. There has also been a comprehensive investigation of the ethnogenesis of the peoples of Central Asia (Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens) by L. V. Oshanin which approaches and explores the problems in the same general terms.[10]

Interesting work is being done by a leading Soviet Africanist, D. A. Olderogge, who has examined the general question of the nature of kinship and of the social structure. His article (*Sovietskaia Etnografiia*, 1958, 1) is a considered reappraisal of the legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan in the study of kinship systems. He examines and reaffirms a series of propositions which were implicit in Morgan's work, and which are the foundation of modern work in this field; the kinship system is part of the social structure of a people; it is the basis for the formation of the family and of certain other institutions; it expresses real (objective) social relations and corresponds to objective social categories. Kinship terms and expressions are neither psychologically subjective categories nor are they purely linguistic categories. The affirmation of the positive methodological contributions of Morgan is at the same time an affirmation of tradition in this field of study (which the present writer discussed intensively with Professor Olderogge and the Central Asian specialists Mme. K. L. Zadykhina and S. M. Abramson of the Ethnographic Museum in Leningrad).

A major undertaking of the past twenty years, the archaeological and ethnographic expeditions to Khorezm, has been the subject of three large volumes. Both the expedition and its publications are under the general direction of

[10] M. G. Levin, *Etnicheskaia antropolgiia i problemy etnogeneza narodov dalnevo vostoka.* Trudy Instituta Etnografii, vol. 36 (Moscow, 1958); G. F. Debets, ed., *Trudy kirgizskoi arkheologo-etnograficheskoi ekspeditsii,* vol. 1 (Moscow, 1956); L. V. Oshanin, *Antropologicheski sostav naseleniia Srednei Azii i etnogenez ee narodov,* 2 vols. (Erevan, 1957-1958).

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S P. Tolstov. The first volume, covering the work of the expedition during 1945-1948, was published in 1952. The second is devoted largely to the archaeological work of the expedition, and includes a 250 page account by Tolstov of the work of the expedition during 1949-1953. The ethnographic work of the expedition reported in the second volume is contained in two relatively short accounts by T. A. Zhdanko and K. L. Zadykhina of collective farm life in Karakalpakia. These accounts are concerned mainly with the economy and material culture of the collective farms. The third volume is devoted chiefly to the ethnic history of the Karakalpaks. The first contribution under this heading is by B. V. Andrianov on the subject of the distribution of the Karakalpaks in the north of Khorezm during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An account of the composition and distribution of the Karakalpaks during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by T. A. Zhdanko, was published in 1950. Mme Zhdanko, the leader of the ethnographic section of the expedition, has turned her attention to folk ornament of the region.[11]

THE most considerable undertaking now in progress is a fifteen volume work, *Peoples of the World*, under the general editorship of S P. Tolstov. When completed there are to be five volumes devoted to the peoples within the territory of the Soviet Union, nine to the rest of the world, and an ethnographic atlas. Of the Soviet parts, *Peoples of Siberia* has appeared under the editorship of Levin and Potapov, both vice-directors of the Institute of Ethnography. Two volumes are planned on the peoples of European Russia, one on the Caucasus, one on Central Asia. One volume on the peoples of Africa, one on Australia and Oceania, and one on Southwest Asia have already appeared.[12]

[11] S. P. Tolstov, ed. *Trudy Khorezmskoi arkheologo-etnograficheskoi ekspeditsii*, vols. 2 and 3 (Moscow, 1958); T. A. Zhdanko, *Ocherki istoricheskoi etnografii Karakalpakov*. Trudy Instituta etnografii, vol. 9 (Moscow, 1950).

[12] *Narody Sibiri*. M. G. Levin and L. P. Potapov, eds. (Moscow, 1956); *Narody Afriki*. D. A. Olderogge and I. I. Potekhin, eds. (Moscow, 1954); *Narody Avstralii i Okeanii*. S. A. Tokarev and S. P. Tolstov, eds. (Moscow, 1956); *Narody Perednei Azii*. N. A. Kisliakov and A. I. Pershits, eds. (Moscow, 1957).

The first part of the volume devoted to the peoples of the New World has appeared (although I have not yet seen it). Still to appear are the volumes on the peoples of Hindustan (India and Pakistan), Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central and East Europe, Western Europe, and the Atlas of world ethnography. We may consider two of these volumes as representative, Siberia and Southwest Asia.

The volume on the peoples of Siberia has more than a thousand pages in two substantive divisions, one general and historical, the other containing sketches, eight to sixty-two pages in length, of some thirty Siberian peoples. In the first part there are studies of the archaeology and early history of Siberia by A. P. Okladnikov, of the physical types by M. G. Levin, and of the history of the Russian settlement of Siberia down to the Revolution by L. P. Potapov. Both these chapters are valuable by virtue of their extensive coverage and analytic treatment of their subjects The articles on the individual peoples are short surveys of the sort found in encyclopedias, similar in scope and content to the ethnographic articles of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, which in some instances gives more recent data: in the Siberian volume there are few demographic data of more recent provenance than the 1926 census. The space devoted to each people is too brief to permit of any extensive historical or comparative analysis of the kind found in the articles by Okladnikov and Potapov. Questions of language, linguistic types, and genetic affiliations are not treated in a co-ordinate manner, but are discussed *passim*. There are no systematic and extensive discussions of culture-historic areas, economic types, geographic zones, and contacts by primitive exchange and warlike conquest or the mutual absorption and acculturation of peoples. Nevertheless, the scope of the work commends itself and perhaps even helps to explain its uneven character. It is richly illustrated, and has a bibliography, glossary, and index.

The volume on the peoples of Southwest Asia is much shorter, some 600 pages. The archaeological and historical surveys are relatively cursory, and the section on the origins of the peoples of the area is of exceptional brevity in

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relation to the ancient and complex histories of the peoples. The treatment of the peoples and their distribution is arranged according to country or other major political division. It is therefore both less systematic and more compendious than the Siberian volume. Each ethnic group of Southwest Asia is discussed in the context of the several countries in which it is found. On the other hand, the data pertaining to Southwest Asia are in general far more recent than those for Siberia. The Southwest Asia volume is 'encyclopedic' and non-analytic, whether in the use of data or their sources, save for the addition to each chapter of a brief characterisation of some current political movements among the given people or country. Perhaps the outstanding feature of the book is its excellent cartography. In each volume the internal organisation of articles of ethnographic description follows a uniform plan; there is a systematic coverage of each people or country, under a fixed order of topics. Works such as these are primarily of use to one who is not a specialist in the particular area, but who needs to follow a question such as tribal composition or folk ornament across a national boundary into an area other than his own; or to students of history, politics, etc., who are seeking ethnographic background to their subject.

For the beginner in ethnography, a shorter, three-volume world survey of ethnography has been planned by Tolstov, Levin, and Cheboksarov. The first of these volumes, dealing with the peoples of Australia, Oceania, America, and Africa was published in 1957.[13] Volumes devoted to the peoples of Asia and of Europe are to follow. The first volume has a fifty-page introduction by the editors on the general problems of races, languages, and peoples. Under the rubric of races, questions of human origins, the formation of races and their distribution are discussed; under languages, questions of their morphological and genealogical classifications are discussed and under this heading, the views of N. Y. Marr and of many bourgeois scholars regarding the growth of language from isolating to agglutinative to inflective forms are subjected to attack. While the presentation of the case against Marr may be relevant to the study of linguistics in the Soviet Union, where Marr's theories held a dominant position for several decades, the attack on the evolution of morphological stereotypes is scarcely relevant to current work in linguistics in the West. The introduction ends with a brief examination of the questions of economic-cultural types and historico-ethnographic areas. It is a cautious, even conservative statement of the problems of typology and of culture areas.

The section on Australia and Oceania was prepared by S. A. Tokarev; that on the New World by B. I. Sharevskaia; the section on Africa was prepared under the direction of D. A. Olderogge. An intensive effort has been made to bring the materials up to date. The cartography is again excellent.

S. A. Tokarev displays a mastery of world ethnography. (I am told that he was the Soviet expert on ethnographic questions at the time of the Trieste dispute shortly after World War II.) His own contributions to Australian ethnography cover three decades. He has written a good history of the Yakuts (1940), and recently published an ethnographic compendium of the peoples of the Soviet Union for university instruction.[14] The work bears the sub-title, Historical foundations of the life and culture of the peoples. For each of the peoples there is a standard order of presentation of the data: a few paragraphs or pages (depending on the people and the availability of the data) each on the demography, economy, settlement and housing, dress, social structure, religion, and art.

He has been criticised by his colleagues because the primary concern of the book is not with the modern life of the peoples, but with their traditional culture. This, however, was the intent of the work and he kept to its stated purpose. He has also been criticised—with greater justification—for failing to give precise references. He does not, for example indicate when the Kazakhs numbered 3.1 million, and whether this figure shows a population increase or decrease. (The figure in fact refers to 1939, and represents a sharp decrease from the figure for 1926.) Other critics point out that in certain instances there are no data on family organisa-

[13] *Ocherki obshchei etnografii, op. cit.*

[14] S. A. Tokarev, *Etnografüa Narodov SSSR* (Moscow, 1958).

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tion. In regard to a number of peoples, there is no more than a phrase, such as patriarchal-clan structure, to characterise the social organisation. Another critic suggests that such an undertaking should have been a collective enterprise.

Tokarev's work is heavily weighted by straight description; analysis and generalisation play a secondary part. He asserts that Soviet ethnography in contrast to western usage is more than a descriptive discipline; in his terms, as in Tolstov's and others, ethnography goes beyond the mere reporting of facts. But if this is so, then is it sufficient to say of the historical characteristics of the social structure of the Tungus-speakers, that they had a patriarchal-clan organisation, and were exploited by Chinese, Manchu and Russian merchants? How is the consideration of their exploitation relevant? Further analysis is required, for there are several suppressed premises: since in the Tungus clan there is neither class differentiation nor class exploitation (exploitation being externally imposed by foreign merchants), mercantile exploitation is not properly part of the Tungus social structiure, as is the clan. But these relatively minor defects apart, the book is highly informative and well-organised.

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The first part of Mr. Broncel's essay on the Polish cinema appeared in the previous issue of *Soviet Survey*.

CORRECTION: We inadvertently omitted to state in our last issue that Mr. Leonard Schapiro is Reader in Russian Politics and Government in London University.

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THE CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA

Sources and their Use

Jan Meijer

THE publication of sources—the secret treaties concluded by the Tsar's government—was one of the first diplomatic actions of the Soviet government. If the action was of importance for the historian, this was not the Bolsheviks' first concern. But (in this context) the intentions that govern the publication of sources leave the historian indifferent. His primary concern is with the light shed on his problem by the new material. In this article we propose to deal with sources published in the Soviet Union relating to the Russian Civil War. We do not purport to give a bibliographical survey, but shall try to indicate the main trends and conditions that have influenced publication.

Chronologically the first source, and an important one, is, of course, the newspapers. They are indispensable for the day-to-day developments and give a wealth of material. The flow of news, however, was not unrestricted. Censorship is normal in a country at war. The military news shows the usual reticence about the movement of troops, or, speaking generally, about anything which might be of help to the enemy. But the concept of enemy in a civil war and under communism is inclusive in a Pauline way. One after the other the non-communist newspapers were closed down. The press was avowedly not only a source of news, but also an instrument of propaganda. At that time, however, this did not mean the absence of discussion or the glossing over of differences of opinion within the party and government. Much material can be found, for example, on the problem of military specialists, both in *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*. But news about events that tended to lower the moral standing of the government, such as strikes and Cheka excesses, was scanty.

Next in order come the reports of Party congresses and conferences and the official collection of laws and decrees. These were all reported in the press, but the laws and congress reports were also published separately. The same applies to speeches and addresses by party and government leaders, appeals to the population, etc. The propaganda literature that did not appear in the daily press sometimes also contains valuable material.

During the Civil War itself, source material was published concerning glorious episodes which were felt to be of critical importance for the course of the War.[1] Some of these works, particularly the memoirs which form a substantial proportion of the whole, have a freshness which compensates for the lack of annotation.

The systematic gathering of material and preparing for publication started at an early date. In 1920 the committee for the history of the CP (*Istpart*) was instituted on Lenin's orders with precisely this object.[2] It concerned itself with the history of the revolutionary movement and of the October Revolution, including the Civil War. It was at first a department of the State Publishing House, was then put under the People's Commissariat of Education, and eventually attached to the Central Committee of the Party. It existed until 1928, when it was incorporated into the Lenin Institute, but books under its imprint continued to appear until well into the thirties. Besides the head office in Moscow there were a number of local branches, the most important being those in Leningrad and Kiev. Apart from books it published periodicals: *Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya,* the central one, *Krasnaya Letopis* in Leningrad, and *Letopis Revoliutsii* in Kharkov. In *Istpart* publications, both books and articles, it is difficult to distinguish between primary and secondary sources. References to archives are relatively rare, no doubt because in the twenties these were only in the process of formation.

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[1] e.g. *Borba za Petrograd* (1920). For works on the civil war, see *Bibliografiya russkoi revoliutsii i grazhdanskoi voiny* (1917-1921), Prague, 1938.

[2] N. S. Komarov, 'Sozdanie i deyatelnost Istparta' in: *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* 1958, 5.

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Documentary publications are relatively scarce. A large proportion consists of memoirs. Collections of memoirs were often published locally, and many books and articles not presented as memoirs were written by active participants in the events described and for this reason can justifiably be called primary sources, even if they are not based entirely on first-hand knowledge. Their reliability can in many cases easily be checked against other publications on the same subject.

Although the *Istpart* publications are not restricted exclusively to party affairs, the greater part of the material on the actual conduct of the War was published by the military agencies.[3] During the Civil War itself, however, this literature was largely of a propaganda and agitational character. As with *Istpart* after the War, but for different reasons, much was due to local initiative. It happened that a division that had succeeded in finding paper and printing facilities in its own area published more than the army of which it was a part. Thus in 1918 more than 90 periodicals were published by military units. The publishing house of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) had a military section. The All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars and the Political Administration of the Military Revolutionary Council of the Republic (MRCR) that succeeded it, had their own publishing departments.

WITH the centralisation that followed the Civil War, the character of the publications changed from mainly propaganda to mainly technical and historical. In January, 1921, all military publishing was concentrated in the section of military literature of the MRCR. The section was headed by an editorial council presided over by a member of the MRCR. It had a number of branches attached to the armies, and a central periodical was published. In 1924 the daily *Red Star* began to appear, with Bubnov as chief editor. In those years the main attention was devoted to schooling and over half of the literature was in this field. In 1926 the editorial council was dissolved and replaced by a commission for military publications. By 1926-7, centralisation was completed, and there remained only the military section of the State Publishing House and the separately published periodical *Military Courier* (*Voenny Vestnik*).

It was the editorial council that in 1923-5 published Trotsky's *How the Revolution Armed Itself* (*Kak Vooruzhalas Revoliutsiya*) in 5 volumes. It contains orders, speeches and articles by Trotsky on all the main episodes and problems of the Civil War. It gives valuable annotation and is fundamental for the study of the War. For the Ukraine Antonov-Ovseenko's *Memoirs of the Civil War* (*Zapiski o Grazhdanskoi Voine*, 1924-33) are of the first importance. It is less carefully edited than Trotsky's book and its quotations are not always literally correct, but it gives an extensive and very informative survey of the War in the Ukraine up to June, 1919. Its four volumes reflect the changes in military publishing. The first volume appeared under the editorial council, the second under the military section of the State Publishing House, and the remaining two under the State Publishing House for Military Literature. Some monographs are of importance for our subject, because they contain important documents. This is the case, for example, with Kakurin's *How the Revolution Fought*,[4] a good military history of the Civil War, which has a number of appendices. The three-volume *Civil War*[5] is of a looser structure, its first volume having largely the character of memoirs. Under the same title, with the subtitle *Materials*, three volumes appeared that contain not merely documents but also articles.

The last category of sources, in chronological order, is constituted by the publications of the Lenin Institute, i.e., the first, second, and third editions of Lenin's *Works* and those volumes of the Lenin *Miscellanies* that are devoted to the Civil War. The latter often include even the briefest marginal notes written by Lenin on documents sent to him; this, and the careful editing they share with the *Works*,

[3] Article: 'Voennaya Pechat', in *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, first edition.

[4] N. Kakurin, *Kak srazhalas revoliutsiya*, 2 vols., 1925-26.

[5] *Grazhdanskaya voina* 1918-1921. Editors: A. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, R. P. Eideman (vols. 1 and 2, 1928; vol. 3 (this one being co-edited by Tukhachevsky also) 1930).

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makes this category quite valuable. In this connection mention should be made of the collected (though incomplete) *Works* of Trotsky and of Kamenev and Zinoviev, put out by the State Publishing House.

The works mentioned can be considered representative for the first period after the Civil War, which, for our subject, roughly coincides with the twenties. On the whole, the crop was rich and variegated. The fresh memories of success, won sometimes against heavy odds, stimulated research into the history of those formative years. On a number of subjects there were clear differences of opinion. Antonov-Ovseenko, for example, in his memoirs stoutly defended his attitude towards the partisan spirit (*partizanshchina*) in the Ukraine. The Commander in Chief Kamenev was severely criticised by Kakurin for his plan of attack against Denikin in the Summer of 1919, which had been opposed by Trotsky; though it is true that there is no mention of the division in the Central Committee of the party over this question. Sources emanating from the enemy side were read and quoted, and it was not considered obligatory to treat them as falsifications. A wide selection of 'White' memoirs was made available in a five volume edition and this is not the only work of this kind.[6]

BUT history was as little autonomous as any superstructure and gradually the effects of political developments began to make themselves felt. The first major incident was Trotsky's being told how not to write the history of October.[7] In 1936 the last vestiges of the relative freedom of the first period had disappeared. From 1930 onwards, the outcome of the ideological fight and the ascendancy of Stalin began to be reflected directly in the literature of the Civil War, first through a shifting of emphasis and later through the restriction of material. In his last volume, Antonov-Ovseenko added, more or less as an afterthought, how helpful and understanding Stalin had always been. In his book on the campaign against Denikin, which appeared in 1931,[8] Egorov also thought it wise to praise Stalin, but the praise is fairly perfunctory and does not directly influence the account of events.

The inflation of Stalin's role in the Civil War was at first reflected more in the use that was made, or rather not made, of the available material than in the actual publication of sources. The time-lag is probably to be explained by the fact that a number of old bolsheviks who were no longer in government posts devoted themselves to historical work. Thus the second edition of vol. XI of the *Leninskie Sborniki*, published in 1931, i.e. after Trotsky's exile, in one place still refers to a volume of his collected works.[9] The third edition of Lenin's *Works*, completed in 1933, and the new edition of the stenographic reports of the party congresses which continued through 1936, still had an extensive critical apparatus. But this came definitely to an end with the purges. From then on many sources, in fact all that had been written by 'enemies of the people', became virtually taboo. They themselves could be mentioned only in vilification or not at all. In a volume of documents on the partisan movement in Western Siberia, relevant data on the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee were withheld, no doubt because they are in memoirs by I. N. Smirnov, who was sentenced to death in the trials.[10] The only compensation was the new material that could be used to bolster up Stalin's role, such as the telegrams and documents quoted by Genkina in her articles on the de-

[6] *Revoliutsiya i grazhdanskaya voina v opisaniyakh belogvardeitsev*, 1926-1930. Other works of this kind are: V. G. Boldyrev, *Vospominaniya* (Boldyrev was a moderate White general who surrendered in 1922 and who at the time of publication was working in a planning office in Siberia). A translation of John Ward, *With the Diehards in Siberia* (London, 1920), was published in 1923; the translation is not complete, but the gaps are indicated in the foreword.

[7] 'Kak ne nuzhno pisat istoriyu oktiabria. Po povodu knigi t. Trotskovo 1917', *Pravda*, 2 November, 1924 (also published separately).

[8] A. I. Egorov, *Razgrom Denikina* 1919 (1931).

[9] *Leninski Sbornik XI*, first edition 1929, second edition 1931; in this edition the reference is on p. 23 (between the two editions the Editorial Board was changed).

[10] *Partizanskie dvizhenie v zapadnoi Sibirii v* 1918-1919 *gg. Partizanskaya armiya Mamontova i Gromova, Sbornik dokumentov*, Novosibirsk, 1936. Smirnov's memoirs (*Borba za Sibir: vospominaniya piatoarmeitsa*) are in *Borba za Ural i Sibir*, 1926, pp. 123 ff. The Sibburo had three members: Goloshchekin, I. Smirnov, and D. K. Goncharova, plus three Siberian members.

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fence of Tsaritsyn,[11] and material on the work of those listed as Stalin's true comrades (published mostly after their death). No attempt was made to square the new line with the earlier material; the new simply suppressed the old. This reduced both the writing of history and the publication of sources to a political exercise in reliability and adulation.

The change becomes clear from a comparison of the sources published in the two periods, or from the serial publications that continued through the Stalin era. We find, for example, that in the fourth edition of Lenin's *Works,* as far as it was published under Stalin, a letter on agrarian policy in which Lenin denied any difference of opinion between himself and Trotsky on this point, has been suppressed.[12] The material on the eighth congress in the second edition has 27 notes, covering nearly 20 pages and giving references to other literature, while the fourth edition gives 23 notes, with no references, on less than four pages. As early as 1933, the plan of attacking Denikin in the late summer of 1919 was attributed to Stalin. We find this in a note in vol. 24 of the *Leninskie Sborniki* (p. 19) to a document which does not concern this plan. The further annotation in this volume is adequate and it has the usual index. The next volumes concerning the Civil War period, vols. 34 and 35, lack an index and the annotation falls far below the level of the earlier volumes. References to Stalin are much more numerous. The decrease in the amount of information provided can also be followed in the successive editions of the resolutions of party conventions. In the introduction to the resolutions of the eighth congress, the fourth and fifth editions, of 1933 and 1936 respectively, list the entire Central Committee elected by the congress. The seventh edition lists only Lenin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinsky, Vladimirsky *and others.*[13]

The next stage was to omit the names in the documents themselves. In some of the Lenin documents published in the Stalin era, the names of unmentionables have been replaced by their functions, and in at least one case a few words have been omitted—all this, of course, without any reference to the changes made.[14]

THE Second World War brought a certain revival of interest in the Civil War, and some volumes were published. The great majority of them had been published before, and the publications did not depart from the established practice.

These practices did not end with Stalin's death. Although his glorification stopped rather abruptly in the daily press, historical Stalinism continued in a mitigated form until Khrushchev's secret speech. Apparently the first change was in the access to archives. This can be inferred from the fact that the non-periodical *Istoricheski Arkhiv* was made into a bi-monthly periodical as from 1955. Easier access to the archives was sanctified by a regulatory order of the Council of Ministers of 7 February, 1956, just prior to the twentieth congress (*Istoricheski Arkhiv,* 1959, 1, p. 9). As far as is known, the order was not published, but is referred to in subsequent writings.

The definite change, then, came with Khrushchev's speech. The rejection of the personality cult and the announcement of rehabilitations reopened fields of research and historians were quick to grasp the opportunities, even if the approach to the new material was cautious.

[11] *Istorik-Marksist,* 1935, 7; *Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya,* 1936, 7.

[12] *Otvet na Zapros krestianina,* first edition, vol. XVI (1930), p. 28; second edition, vol. 28, p. 504-8. It has been republished in the first supplementary volume (vol. 36, 1957, p. 459-462).

[13] *VKP (b) v rezoliutsiakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK.* The 'others' are: Beloborodov, Bukharin, Evdokimov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krestinsky, Muranov, Radek, Rakovsky, Serebriakov, Smilga, Stasova, Stuchka, Tomsky, Trotsky, most of whom were purged. Vladimirsky was a candidate member. The seventh edition was published in 1953.

[14] For example: from a telegram to the Ukrainian *Sovnarkom* of 29 May, 1919, two paragraphs have been omitted. In the first edition of Lenin's *Voennaya Perepiska* (1943) a sentence has been omitted from a telegram of the same date which has been reintroduced in the 1956 edition. Examples of names omitted and replaced by the function of the omitted person: two telegrams of 13 August 1919 (L. Sb. XXXIV, p. 207). The *Voennaya Perepiska* 1956 gives the names, while referring to this source which does not. All those not named in the first source were purged: Smilga, Lashevich, Sokolnikov, Rakovsky, Trotsky, Kossior. This practice seems not yet to have been entirely dropped. Cf. *Ist Arkhiv,* 1958, 2, p. 206.

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Whereas in 1955 *Istoricheski Archiv* published no material on the Civil War, 1956 and the following years yield a fairly rich crop. Documentation on Blücher's activities in the Civil War was given as if his fame had never faded. Vatsetis, another probable victim of the purges, appeared in some of his reports to Lenin, written in his quality as C.-in-C. The annotation on the persons mentioned in the documents generally gives the year of their death, but remains silent on the cause, and in indicating their activities does not as a rule go beyond the beginning of the purges. It is perhaps not accidental that the most telling notes so far have appeared in a party publication, the second volume of *Memories of Lenin*. The formula there is that so-and-so 'fell a victim to hostile slander'.[15]

One important effect of the change was a certain restoration of the earlier source basis. In the supplementary volumes to the fourth edition of Lenin's works we find again the letter on agrarian policy repressed in the earlier volume. There is a note which characterises Trotsky as the worst enemy of Leninism. One now finds new references to works like the three volume *Civil War* under the editorship of Bubnov, Tukhachevski and Eideman, and criticism of Stalinist works. Mikoyan singled one out for attack at the twentieth congress, and elsewhere we find the remark that such works 'had a weak source basis and were inadequate from a historical and methodological viewpoint'.[16]

For further new sources we have also to consider articles on the Civil War. An article by four historians in *Kommunist* (1956, 12), referred *inter alia* to a letter from Stalin to Lenin written in the Autumn of 1919, which, under Stalin, had been used, by misdating it, to credit him with the plan that routed Denikin. In this article the letter was still misdated, but in a later article by one of the four authors (*Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, 7, p. 30) the date was corrected. It noted that the original had been misdated (the convincing arguments for the right date could have been established at any time during the last thirty years or so). The episode shows a gradual breaking down of inhibitions, which is confirmed by other writings. This, no doubt, is clear gain as compared to the Stalin area, but differences from pre-Stalin times still persist: whereas in the twenties the facts were there to be used, now every new field of research has to be conquered, as it were, against the inertia of entrenched tradition. One cannot say that a clean sweep has been made of all taboos. The dismissal of the editorial board of *Voprosy Istorii* in March, 1957, goes far to prove this. But if interpretation is still subject to taboos, these are definitely fewer than under Stalin, and access to sources is certainly far less restricted.

THE wider access to archives and the general situation in the field of sources on the Civil War can best be demonstrated by the large amount of source publications in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the October revolution. To date they number about a hundred.[17] Those concerning the whole of Russia or crucial episodes of general importance were published by the central institutions, but a sizable proportion was published locally, sometimes by the local government archive alone, but sometimes in collaboration with the local party archive. The fact that such an amount was published in so short a time suggests that the enterprise was the result of a central initiative executed locally. This in itself testifies to the extent of the Soviet archival apparatus. Besides nine central archives, there are 230 others. In 1958 further measures concerning their organisation were taken.[18]

Editorially the publications range from rather haphazard collections without index or notes, to stately volumes with numerous indexes and extensive annotations. The difference is no

[15] This is said of Y. S. Ganetski, N. P. Gorbunov, P. A. Danilov, M. S. Kedrov, N. V. Krylenko, S. A. Lozovski, A. P. Pinkevich, O. A. Piatnitski, I. I. Radchenko, Y. E. Rudzutak, G. S. Sokolov, V. G. Sorin, in *Vospominaniya o V.I. Lenine*, II, 1957.

[16] *Dokumenty i soobshscheniya instituta istorii AN* SSSR, No. 11, 1956, p. 94. In one case the reaction led to a reference being made to a document as being in the archives, although it had in fact been published twice in the 'twenties. In *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, 7, p. 22, Kuzmin refers to S. S. Kamenev's order of 23 July 1919 as being in the archives; it was published by Kakurin, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 413, and by Rymshan, *Reid Mamontova* (Moscow, 1926), p. 48.

[17] Cf. bibliography in *Istoriya SSSR*, 1958, 5, 197 ff.

[18] Decree of the Council of Ministers of 13 August 1958, discussed in *Istoricheski Arkhiv*, 1959, 2, pp. 170 ff.

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doubt due in part to local facilities, the volumes edited by local branches of the Academy of Sciences being in general better equipped than those of a small local archive. The period covered also differs. As a rule it begins just before October, and ends either with the establishment of power or with the end of the Civil War for the locality concerned, or, in one case (Lvov) with the establishment of Soviet power, in 1939. Besides archival documents, there is a fairly large number of items from newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, etc. Certain documents written by Lenin appear again and again in different publications.

Documents issuing from the non-Soviet side are very scarce; this is the result of deliberate policy. In 1956 rules for the publication of historical documents were published.[19] They were the outcome of broad and intensive discussions. In their published form they list 205 points, mostly technical, on the whole useful and reasonable; among them are a few with direct bearing on our subject. We quote from points 1, 9, 14, 15 consecutively: (1) The choice of the theme is determined by its scientific value and its political topicality and should answer the requirements of the science of history and those of the economic and cultural construction of a communist society . . . (9) In selecting documents special attention should be paid to documents of the CP and the Soviet government . . . of V.I. Lenin and his comrades in arms. . . . (14) In publishing documents on the history of Soviet society, documents issuing from hostile classes and parties may be used as material for unmasking them. (15) If the theme of the publication as a whole is not the unmasking of the camp hostile to the Soviet state, documents of the hostile camp that are included in the publication may be used to supplement the factual data; they should be of secondary importance as compared to the other documentation, and should be provided with very careful commentaries.

Thus a bias, stronger than the party bias of the twenties, even now conditions the publication of sources. A victor, after forty years, should be able to be more generous or, at least, more open-minded. But we see once more that the inertia of the Stalin era has only partly been overcome by the events of 1956. This does not mean that these sources are worthless. They give interesting data on the establishment of Soviet power in the various regions, and often on the persons involved on the Soviet side. Only it must always be borne in mind that the other side of the picture is lacking and that from these documents alone it is impossible to gauge what were the respective parts played by enthusiasm, persuasion, and naked force in bringing Soviet power to a given locality.

In addition to the documents, collections of memoirs were published in a number of places. Most of these were written only recently. For this reason, and also because most of the authors occupied only minor posts in the Civil War, they are in general less important than those published before the Stalin era. In some cases, however, they do convey the atmosphere of army life at that time. More important are the memoirs of army leaders such as M. Bonch-Bruevich, A. Samoilo, and Budenny, that have of late become available.[20] Mention should be made, lastly, of the republication of works on the Civil War and the Red Army by Bubnov, Gusev, and Frunze.[21] But in all these cases, the new editions are less complete than the old. One possible reason is that some of the passages omitted were too favourable to people who have not yet been rehabilitated.

If one compares the three periods one finds that the most valuable material was published in the relatively uninhibited pre-Stalin period. Under Stalin, in particular after 1936, both the quality and the quantity of the literature decreased, while one cannot always be sure that the documents are presented complete and undistorted. Since 1956 the heavy blanket that lay over research in this field has been torn in many places, but not entirely lifted. How far this will eventually be done only the future can show.

[19] *Pravila izdaniya istoricheskikh dokumentov* (March 1956).

[20] M. Bonch-Bruevich, *Vsya vlast sovetam* (1957); A. Samoilo, *Dve Zhizni* (1958); S. M. Budenny, *Proidenny put* (1958).

[21] A. S. Bubnov, *O krasnoi armii* (1958); S. I. Gusev, *Grazhdanskaya voina i krasnaya armiya* (1958); M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*, 2 vols (1957).

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Marx on Education

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF COMMUNIST PEDAGOGY

Horst Wittig

IN his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* Hegel argued that man as a rational being existed only in the State, and he made it the function of education to operate in such a way that the individual ceases to be a subjective being but finds his objective embodiment in the State. Since, for Hegel, everything that exists must be regarded as an expression of the Absolute, man is conscious of himself as one in absolute knowledge, and he is himself a factor in the development of that power from which laws originate. The existing separation between State and Society, however, made the general into a particular, which is marked off from the real life of the individual and 'alienates' him.

In opposition to this concept, Marx fashioned his model of a political community of 'true democracy', in which the political State would disappear. The 'reasonable State' of Marx's 'true democracy'—later to become the 'classless society'—was to abolish the existing 'separation of the private affairs of the individual and the common affairs of the community; in it every individual would at the same time be a communal being'.[1] In this political community of the future man would become his own species.

In the course of his philosophical 'self-realisation' Marx came to the conclusion that the existence of division of labour degrades man and his labour power to a commodity, and in this way man is forced into 'self-alienation'. If he wishes to surmount this condition and by 'reification' return to his real, true nature, theoretical recognition must be transformed into 'criticism of weapons' and thus for this purpose must become a 'practical person'. By this reasoning Marx placed himself in opposition to the 'contemplative principle' of Feuerbach's philosophy in which, according to Marx, the 'contemplation of matter' remains arrested in thought. Marx, on the other hand, required of his theory that it become a material force once it had 'seized the masses'. Thus, in the Marxist scheme, man as a species—the whole man—as mass and proletariat, becomes part of his historical materialism, making it possible for us to speak of a Marxist anthropology. Marx puts on man the duty of becoming what, according to an immanent law, he ought to be. In other words, man must turn completely against existing being, which is not true human being. For if (alienated) man is to be transformed into (true) human man, he must first become 'conscious' of himself. Only then will it be possible for him to attain the 'universal human emancipation' which it is his task to achieve in order that the true identity of private and public life can be made a reality. By this act of 'self-realisation' man, according to Marx's prognosis, will find his 'true human being'. He will become a 'true man'.

THESE anthropological principles from Marx's early writings have to be taken in conjunction with his philosophy, in which the proletariat has a universal historical mission. This task is assigned to the proletariat not because it is glorified as divine, but, in Marx's words, 'the other way round, because the abstraction from all humanity . . . is, in the developed proletariat, almost complete'. It will therefore be necessary, says Marx, to explain class consciousness to the proletariat. In this way it will conquer its own alienation and at last throw off, in its own (revolutionary) self-emancipation, the chains of entire alienated humanity. Then humanity, made whole, can arise, brought into being in the classless society that has no history—the blissful existence without conflict or tension. In sketching this vision of the future Marx secularised the realm of

[1] Karl Marx, *Die Frühschriften* (Stuttgart, 1953), p. xxvii.

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justice and peace conjured up by the prophets in their eschatological predictions. It was not for nothing that Marx called this goal of historical materialism 'the realm of freedom'.

Since an image of man underlies every scheme of education, a philosophical anthropology culled from Marx's thought must be fitted in with this line of reasoning if Marxist pedagogics are to be translated into practical education. It is therefore understandable that, in Marx's own thinking as in the modifications of Marxist theory introduced by his successors (of all shades), education is accorded an important place. For, given this basis, what else could education be but instruction for the proletariat to make a thorough study of its 'moral duty', of the teachings of Karl Marx? Until the revolution, that alone is the function of education. After the proletariat has fought its last fight, after the revolutionary struggle for emancipation, history as known till then will, according to Marx's prophecy, give way to a state of affairs in which the economic is subordinated to the human, and a new world will be built. In this new world of a classless society man will come into true and full possession of his human dignity. Possessed of his true human essence, man will, as species, subdue both nature and history. In this way the humanised human being realises himself as the highest being of complete wholeness, since he has achieved in full paradise on earth. In this vision of the future Marx approached Hegel's idea of education, Humboldt's educational ideal, Rousseau's concept of the natural man, and similar images drawn from Western humanist thought and from Jewish, Christian, and classical sources.

Marx contends that, once in possession of his true being, that is, in the classless society, the realm of freedom, man no longer needs education. For since, in this future political community, man no longer lives in a state of alienation, he will develop his own nature without outside aid. That is to say, the true man will achieve the full and complete development of all his aptitudes and capacities. There will no longer be 'occupation' and occupational work, for society will regulate production in common, and so make it possible for a man to do one thing today and something else tomorrow. This is how Marx envisaged the subordination of the economic to the human: to be in the happy position of 'hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon, raising cattle in the evening, and even judging food, without ever being either hunter, fisher, herdsman, or food taster, just as I fancy'.[2] Because, in this realm of freedom, economic constraints have lost their force, man will be able to engage in all desirable activities, even artistic creation in all its various forms.

The real break with this optimistic vision was made not by the Bolshevik revolution, but by Marx himself, although he always held fast to his goal of a realm of freedom. But for the transition to that state of bliss he devised an expedient, the 'realm of necessity', in which the proletariat has already taken over political power in certain countries but has not yet reached the classless society. Let us now turn to this intermediate stage for which, too, Marx roughed out a definite theory of education.

IN the realm of freedom, according to Marx, education in the traditional sense will disappear. It will no longer be necessary, for man will have attained to his 'real being', and because of the change in economic circumstances will be in the happy position of developing all his individual natural powers harmoniously, fully, profoundly, and comprehensively. For this happy future Marx promised that the 'mere fragment of a man', the 'detail-worker crippled by lifelong repetition of one and the same trivial operation', will be replaced by 'the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours . . . to whom the different social functions he performs are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers'.[3]

In Marx's time, however, the world revolution did not come to pass. The European revolutions did not broaden out into the great world revolutionary struggle for emancipation of which Marx and Engels dreamed, after which the whole of humanity was to be freed of the chains of alienation. Marx refers in a footnote to John Bellers, who at the end of the seven-

[2] *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* Abt. I, Bd. 5, p. 22.
[3] Karl Marx, *Capital,* I, p. 494.

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teenth century 'saw most clearly the necessity for abolishing the present system of education'.[4] So Marx found it necessary to seek a transitional system of schooling for the 'realm of necessity', and this he sketched out in the first volume of *Capital* (1867) as 'Education of the Future'. Marx and Engels believed firmly that the transition period would be brief, and in every rumble from the continent they thought they heard the thunder of world revolution drawing near. The education for this realm of necessity was conceived by Marx as a system of half work and half school in which, for all children above a certain age, productive work would be combined with instruction and physical training, not merely as a method of increasing the total volume of production, but as the only way of producing the fully developed man.

This idea had already been embodied by Marx in one of the so-called 'recommendations' of *The Communist Manifesto* (1848). For the realm of necessity he had demanded that education be combined with material production, but at that time he still retained the traditional school framework. Marx thought that 'there can be no doubt that when the working class comes into power . . . technical instruction, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the working class schools'.[5] In these Marxist 'polytechnical schools', which will pay for themselves by their own output, instruction, physical training, and manual labour were to be combined. In *Capital* Marx quotes with approval a 'naïve silk manufacturer': 'I am quite sure that the true secret of producing efficient workpeople is to be found in uniting education and labour from a period of childhood. Of course the occupation must not be too severe, nor irksome, or unhealthy . . . I wish my own children could have some work as well as play to give variety to their schooling'.[6]

For the German delegation to the meeting of the International Workingmen's Association in Geneva in 1866 Marx drew up a memorandum in which for the first time he formulated the idea of polytechnical education that has in our own day acquired such topical importance in the educational system of the Soviet Union and its associated countries. For this future educational system Marx laid down a combination of productive work with instruction and education, education to be construed as follows: 'First, intellectual education; second, physical training, as given in the schools of gymnastics and in military training; third, polytechnical training, which gives instruction in the general scientific principles of all production processes and at the same time initiates the child and young person into the practical use and operation of the simpler tools in all occupations'.[7]

The school designed for this system was to have three classes or stages, in each of which education as defined by Marx was to be carried on in combination with certain forms of production. The first class would be for children aged 9 to 12, who would do two hours' work daily in workshops or in a home. In the second class, for children of 13 and 14, there would be fours hours' work in production each day. The third and last class would be for young men and women up to 17, who would spend six hours in production each day. Marx called the silk manufacturer's statement naïve because, although he saw the pedagogical advantage of combining instruction with labour and physical training, he failed to see the most important condition for such a new educational system, the transformation of existing society into classless society in which, with the disappearance of the division of labour, the exploiters will be deprived of their economic and political power.

TWO ideas of education can thus be deduced from Marx's work; these were for him not alternatives, but two different stages. One was the educational system for the realm of necessity, the other the educational ideal for the realm of freedom. But what began 'as a humanistic demand (the whole, all-round man) is now seen to be a technical postulate which capitalist society, doomed to perish, cannot provide, but which only socialism can bring

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 494, footnote.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 489.
[7] *Der Vorbote* (Geneva), 1866, No. 10, p. 151.

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into being'.[8] In socialism it is the communist party, or, more precisely, the summit of the party, its central committee, its leader or dictator, who defines 'the will of the proletariat'. In this (Leninist) view the party, with the sanction of its leaders, is alone entitled to formulate the will of the proletariat and so the will of society as a whole. The deficiencies and imperfections of socialist society, which, as the realm of necessity, represents no more than a brief transitional stage towards the realm of freedom, must first of all be eliminated root and branch before the last step can be taken into the classless society which will have no history. Only then, according to Marx, will the kind of work determined by necessity and external expediency disappear. In the third volume of *Capital* Marx describes the realm of freedom as that in which such work ceases; thus, in the nature of the case, it lies outside the sphere of actual material production. Then begins the development of human powers as an end in itself, the true realm of freedom which can, however, only be reached by passing through the realm of necessity.

Here again we catch in Marx's thought the echo of the classical *polis* which, however, he modifies and takes further, for in his classless society the Aristotelian division into master and slave disappears and both master and slave are elevated to 'true man'. This true man embodies in himself and in his public and private activity the community which he himself is. Then labour makes nature human, and the labour process makes man natural. The goal of the movement of history is the 'resurrection of nature', the ascent to abundance, the unification of man with his political community and with nature.

Marx clearly formulated his differences with traditional pedagogics. For him education and training were not the assimilation in school of the subject matter of education, as visualised by the neo-humanists and by Hegel; in the classless society man will be in a position to attain the full development of his individual powers by mastering the totality of the means of production. In this Marx proceeds from the assumption that mastery of all the means of production is linked to the mastery of all the capacities of man himself. Siegfried Landshut called the basic idea in Marx's work the 'realisation of the true destiny of man'. Marx remained true to this idea in his later work, too, although in its 'education of the future' man is equipped for production and is to be made capable of meeting varying labour requirements by 'polytechnical training'.

THE Soviet school reform of December, 1958, and the parallel changes in the educational systems of the associated countries, were referred back to Marx's idea of abolishing the difference between mental and manual work. Khrushchev wrote that 'our schools must produce thoroughly educated people, with a sound knowledge of the rudiments of science, but at the same time fit for systematic physical work. A desire must be inculcated among young people to be useful to society, to take an active part in the production of the commodities essential to society'.

This section of Khrushchev's letter to the presidium of the central committee of the CPSU was given the heading 'Polytechnisation' (*Pravda*, 21 September, 1958). By reviving polytechnical training, a theme discussed again and again in Soviet pedagogics since 1917, and occasionally put into practice, the first party secretary was aiming both to reach the educational goal of the Soviet 'realm of necessity' and to eliminate the shortage of labour power. Moreover, the Soviet Prime Minister hopes by his reform to raise the general educational level of the Soviet population, an urgent necessity in the age of automation and atomic energy. These three objectives are to be achieved with due deference to Marx's thesis on education, and the change in the Soviet educational system was therefore initiated under the slogan of 'consolidating the links between school and life'.

It should be remembered that determining factors in Marx's polytechnical education and also his 'education of the future' coincide with trends in Soviet pedagogics which Leonhard Froese calls 'early Soviet reform pedagogics'.[9]

[8] Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, III, p. 873.

[9] Leonhard Froese, *Ideengeschichtliche Triebkräfte der russischen und sowjetischen Pädagogik* (Heidelberg, 1956).

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The names of Blonsky, Shatsky, Lunacharsky and others recall the attempts to put into practice in the early years of the Soviet regime the pedagogical ideas contained in Marx's earlier work. Even the classical figure in Soviet pedagogics, A. S. Makarenko, despite his strong links with the Bolshevik movement, introduced certain elements of Marx's ideas into his educational system; even his specific idea of the 'collective' reveals a link with Marx's 'education of the future'. At the same time we can see especially clearly in Makarenko the deep and tragic schism characteristic of all Soviet pedagogical efforts: the more it prescribed in externals the utilitarian educational ideal of the politicised and professionalised Soviet man, the greater was the inner urge to establish the impossible synthesis between collective dogmatic unfreedom and personal human dignity.

Despite the problematic character of Marx's concept of species, the element of personal human dignity is to be found in his idea of the education of 'true man'. In education as it operates in the USSR today, however, the emphasis is unmistakably shifted from the development of the personality to the operation of the planned economy designed to produce the practical workman-technician by the polytechnisation of the educational system. G. Glesermann brought out the essential goal of Soviet pedagogics when he said: 'On the degree of consciousness of the masses, on their energy and initiative, depends, to an ever increasing extent, the rate at which Soviet society develops.'[10] This consciousness, with its Marxist impress, will be achieved, however, only where the whole man has been educated. If Soviet pedagogics wishes to reach this goal by polytechnical education, and if in addition it bases itself on the ideas of the young Marx, it may possibly raise the consciousness of the masses.

But in practice Soviet education is in so far a cog in the machinery of planned economy as it is obliged to educate man to be a functioning unit in the mechanism if the machine is to run without friction according to the instructions of the CPSU. Man, in his all round, harmonious, whole and true personality, as Marx envisaged him, does not fit into the disciplined typology of a totalitarian state machine. The dilemma of Soviet education provokes the question whether in fact there is in the proletariat a social element which awakens in response to conscious proletarian action and in the social revolution emancipates not only itself but the whole of society, as Marx predicted.

[10] G. Glesermann, *Der Marxismus-Leninismus über Basis und Ueberbau* (Berlin, 1951), p. 29.

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THE POLISH CINEMA

II. The Growth of an indigenous School

Z. Broncel

WAJDA'S 'Ashes and Diamond', discussed in the first part of this article (*Survey*, No. 29) is probably the best Polish film yet made. Its only rival is, perhaps, Andrzej Munk's 'Eroica', more precise and skilful as a film, but lacking the other's dynamic power. Like Wajda, Munk is a graduate of the Lodz Film School, but he represents another type of producer. He tends to be an observer, to analyse; primarily he observes the individual and his link with the changes in Poland's history; he does not embody this relation in a symbol, nor present a synthesis of the whole, but renders concrete the situation in which a given event occurs or a given man acts.

Munk's 'Man on the Line', scenario by Stawinski (1957), presents the posthumous rehabilitation of a man who suffered because the concepts used in the Party had been narrowed down to a few crude categories such as 'opposition', 'class enemy', 'sabotage'. An old railwayman, a competent workman and the best teacher of young workers, refuses to undertake a productivity obligation intended to reduce the consumption of coal in locomotives. This is enough to have him suspected of hostility to the new regime. When his corpse is found near a train held up on the line, it is at once suspected that he was preparing to derail the train in revenge for his enforced resignation. The truth does not emerge until careful investigations reveal that the old-fashioned disciplinarian, though unable to adapt himself to the less formal relationships in the railway service, or to the new structure of authority, yet even off duty remained faithful to his duties and saved a train which a linesman had failed to signal.

Munk constructs his film from a series of statements made by several witnesses, each of which—as in the Japanese film 'Rashomon'—gives a different aspect of the truth. In this case, however, the truth is distorted not by the psychological reactions but by a ready-made class interpretation. Not until the last statement is the riddle solved and the man's steadfast devotion revealed. The moral drawn is concise and clinched by a shot of the train suddenly brought to a halt at night, the scream of brakes, and the shadow of a man falling. The mobility of the camera, the extraction of poetry from the railway lines leading into infinite space, the photographic cult of iron monsters and gleaming machinery—as in Gance's classical 'Wheel of Torment'—all are there, but the action is slow, and add to the slowness of the insufficiently dramatised analysis of the incident itself. This film shows Munk as a producer closely linked with everyday life, who uses realistic methods for his own pedagogic purposes.

Politically, 'Man on the Line' takes no particular risks and fits easily into the Party's attempts to draw closer to the masses. It is singular, however, in creating a vivid character out of a man of the older style, temperamentally incapable of accepting changes in habits, less so even than he is capable of accepting social changes. But this was not enough for Munk's audiences. The films made after October, with their violent action and tragic suspense, the rehabilitation of the Home Army in literature and journalism, all overstepping official boundaries, had given audiences a strong appetite. Looking back to their own personal grievances, dismissals from work, hunger, familiar with suicides from despair and starvation, they expected something more profound, something less controlled. Munk gained an award at Karlove Vary for his production. Its construction out of several separate stories reveals his tendency to treat his subject as a compact and precise sketch. This is apparent in 'Eroica', which many critics think the best Polish film. 'Eroica' (1958) is in two parts, based on two tales, 'Hungary' and 'The Flight'; the sub-title, suggesting the 'composed' character in which chosen themes are linked, is 'a

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heroic symphony in two parts: Scherzo alla polacca: Ostinato—lugubre'. Munk has come far since the early documentaries and experiments, in which his independence was restricted to the effective dramatisation of schematic episodes associated with the fulfilment of productivity plans. Not until 'Man on the Line' did he cease to provide opinions; here, as in 'Eroica' he left this to his audience and placed a question mark after the old truisms.

ALL these films came from the 'Kadr' group, and gave them the leading position in the Polish cinema. The Lodz Film Academy has unexpectedly proved to be another important artistic centre. Here short films have been made, and some which were begun as training exercises afterwards achieved fame abroad as revealing and original work.

The best known short Polish film of an experimental kind is 'The Last Day of Summer', which gained first prize at the Venice Festival in 1958. This was the work of Tadeusz Konwicki, a well-known writer, and Jan Laskowski: it was made on a slender budget, with only two actors, and filmed outdoors on the sea-coast with a minimum of dialogue. It has the purity of a delicate metaphor. The action, fantastic on the surface, symbolises the contemporary 'human condition' while keeping within the bounds of verisimilitude, and is played against a realistic background.

This background is provided by the sea, the sky, and sand-dunes on a deserted stretch of coast. Two people unexpectedly meet here, and within a few hours a relationship is established between them which ends with death. The underlying cause is the re-opening of imperfectly-healed war scars in the depths of the human psyche. The film begins on the last day of a young woman's holiday at the seaside. When she goes bathing on a deserted beach, she is followed by a young man who keeps out of sight. He does not dare speak to her until the last day of her holiday, nor to emerge from the solitude in which he lingers, half in the present and half in the past, re-living a nightmare of battle scenes, the shock of war, and private problems connected with his daily work. Only complete isolation from other people can guarantee him peace of mind.

It is not until this meeting that he is tempted, and his temptation is intensified by his interest in the woman. Moreover, the woman resembles him in that she too has known similar ill-treatment, though she has not reached such a depth of disorder. The man she loved did not return from the war but chose to settle down in a foreign country. The war and the years of occupation have left their stamp upon her, deepened by the horrors following the war. Finally, life has become a mechanical activity devoid of any real meaning. She can escape from this monotony only in dreams, in fantasy and fairy tales.

The man she accidentally meets on the edge of the sea is sufficiently unreal to allow her to substitute pleasures for life. When, after holding back for a long time, the two strangers offer each other all they have to give—love—this exhausts their capacity for experience. Awakening from a deep sleep, the woman finds that the man is no longer with her. She follows his footsteps. They lead to the sea. She follows him into the waves and disappears.

Apart from the minimum of dialogue required to provide a brief survey of the past they both knew, the only sounds we hear are the roar of the sea and the shrill wind, broken by the whine of jet-aircraft. As this is the sea-coast and therefore a frontier zone, the jets flying past give the impression of pursuing other aircraft escaping into another world. There are other natural associations: a constant feeling of danger, of ceaseless surveillance from the air, of readiness for battle. If we accept this second interpretation—and the choice is left to the audience—an ironic note appears. For the jets are on guard over the security of a life in which there is no inner security, and in which life itself is worth little.

'The Last Day of Summer' is a pessimistic and nostalgic film. The linking of its symbolic action with the idea of holidays, a short period of freedom, creates the feeling that its ending is unavoidable. In any case, the gesture of departure or suicide with which Konwicki ends his film suggests the conclusion that the values justifying life are worn-out. We witness the last of these—a poetically-coloured and joyful interlude, an attempt at love. But love cannot

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endure, for neither has the strength for intense feeling. That was destroyed by their war-time experiences, and then after the war, by the final break-down of hope. The dialogue holds allusions to persecutions, betrayals, injustices suffered and committed. It is hardly a matter for surprise that the film was attacked on two counts at the Plenum of the Party Central Committee: it was said to be incomprehensible and eccentric, a harmful work, ill-disposed towards and sceptical about the socialist future.

Yet artistically this is probably the most interesting post-war Polish film. As a writer, Konwicki achieved an ideal combination of poetry and prose, of realism and symbolism, delicate and discreetly indicated. On the surface, this metaphorical sketch can be accepted as no more than a bitter idyll, the expression of the feelings of people of our time. But one may also go deeper, and find in it a direct reflection of the situation of the entire Polish people, and their successive disillusionments. The immediacy of the film, the fine photography, free of all affectation, bring it remarkably close to its audience. The means employed to obtain effects, the blending of shots and sounds, fade from view, and what the creator has to say strikes directly at the audience.

THE next film in the scale of international popularity is a more modest work, though equally expressive on a different level and in a different way: this is Roman Polanski's 15-minute film 'Two Men and a Wardrobe'. It was made during the final stage of Polanski's studies at the Lodz film school, under very poor conditions and on a typically 'student' budget. But it was shown at the Edinburgh Film Festival in 1958, and as a supporting film in London's most discriminating cinemas, and it made something of a sensation at the Brussels Festival of experimental films during last year's Exhibition. The originality of its underlying idea, and its approach, made this film stand out among the 133 films which the Festival jury selected, from several hundreds, for screening.

The film opens with a shot of the sea. Two men emerge from it, dragging an old-fashioned, clumsy wardrobe out of the depths. They carry it carefully over the beach and into the town, where it at once becomes an object of curiosity, since it does not fit into the general scheme of things. Everyone pushes the two men and the wardrobe out of the way, persecutes them, gets rid of them as birds expel intruders with different plumage. They refuse to allow them on the trams, deny them lodging or a hotel room; girls turn away from them with laughter, and the local hooligans attack them. What at first seemed but a chance incident, an amusing illustration of the difficulties of not conforming, changes into a social comment while still preserving its light, casual tone.

The hooligans' favourite form of attack is to strike people in the face with a dead cat. This provocative act is designed to draw the victim into a squabble, in which he will be soundly beaten-up by other hooligans, hidden behind a heap of coal. This is what happens in Polanski's film. The owners of the wardrobe meekly endure insults, stoically accept blows and wounds, but go back to the sea, out of this malicious world. Once again they cross the beach with their heavy piece of junk saved from an age obliterated by the war: cautiously they pass by rows of sand castles built by children. They are tender and careful not to hurt anyone else, or to spoil their pleasure. This shows they have undoubtedly come from a fairy-tale land at the bottom of the sea.

Polanski's film is really hardly more than a note; it is not polished and does not underline the point it makes: it is clearly the work of a beginner. Yet this may be precisely why the joke does not turn into a symbolic comment on mass culture, the vulgarisation of life, the disappearance of concern and respect for what is original, for the world of private values. In a word, this film is nearer—as a film—to the expressive absurdity of Ionescu than to the metaphysical terror of Beckett.

The Grand Prix at the Brussels festival was won by the film 'The Home', made by Walerian Borowczyk and Jan Lenica. It has less spontaneity than Polanski's student experiment, but nevertheless its effects also hit the mark and are finely calculated to summon up a mood of uncertainty, of the collapse of the world's traditional framework. Recollections of times

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past are embodied in objects such as old photographs, small souvenirs, first shown with feeling and presented with emotion, but later brutally destroyed. The whole film is based on the idea of a threat to everything that 'home' stands for —a haven of peace, of security, of love and family life, of links with the past, and the contrast is underlined throughout between the sublimation of objects via the emotional value people give them, and the unexpected appearance of the threatening power of a dead world.

What lay behind the script of 'The Home' was made explicit and deliberately didactic in another original short film entitled 'Life is Beautiful'. To the accompaniment of American jazz, the film unwinds as a chronicle *sui generis*, shots of an atomic bomb exploding, of concentration camps and acts of tyranny and cruelty interwoven with scenes of contemporary dancing: the frenzy of rock 'n' roll mingles with the sentimental melody of *J'attendrai*. . . . The montage, calculated to strike at the audience and shock them, is reminiscent of a similar French film, 'Vivre', in which shots of war, revolutions and executions were associated with *musique concrète*.

A NUMBER of short documentaries, which came to be known as the 'dark series', took on social and even, indirectly, political significance as attempts to bring to light various unpleasant aspects of Polish life shamefully hidden away during the period of false optimism. This series included an expressionist film showing the interior of a bar seen through the eyes of a young drunk. Its atmosphere of disillusion, of pointless emotion and futility is characteristic of the stories of Marek Hlasko, whose work has deeply influenced the general tone prevailing in Polish films. Hlasko wrote several scenarios and some of his stories have been made into films, though Hlasko himself has never crossed the dividing line between literature and the cinema. Aleksander Ford attempted to film Hlasko's startling *The Eighth Day of the Week*, but the Polish censor prohibited the screening. The film was withdrawn at the last moment from the programme of the Cannes Film Festival, nor was it allowed to be shown in Venice, though this did not prevent the German version being shown *hors de concours*.

But the world of Marek Hlasko's stories often appears in the 'dark series' documentaries. For example, the recently-established award of the Association of Polish journalists, for the best film made in Poland in 1956, was given to the short film 'Beware, Hooligans!' by E. Skorzewski and J. Hoffman. It is one of a number of films dealing with such subjects as living conditions, prostitution, work on Nowa Huta, the new industrial city which has sprung up outside Cracow, and which is mainly inhabited by workers of peasant origin. Others, lyrical in character, have nothing to do with the class struggle, but tackle the universal themes of unhappy love, illness, and growing old. Among these, Lomnicki's 'House of Old Ladies' deserves mention.

These films can be compared, by and large, with British 'free cinema', in that they have similar artistic interests; they differ in the passion with which the Polish film makers approach their subjects and employ their methods. The Polish films have more social urgency and are more daring in experiment. This sometimes leads to the use of obsolete 'avant-garde' methods, to a search for pure form as a way of shaking off the restrictions to which young film workers were subjected during the earlier post-war period.

It looks as though this renaissance of the film, which has occurred in less than two years, is already meeting with difficulties inside Poland, despite the successes gained abroad. The new films would have been impossible had not an oasis survived through the period of 'socialist realism' and of vulgarised political tendentiousness in the State Higher Film School in Lodz, directed by the pre-war critic and theoretician of the film, Jerzy Toeplitz. The showing of work by this school during the 1958-59 season in London has made possible a study of the School's methods and of the students' interests.

As long ago as 1956, short films with a satirical flavour were being made in the Lodz School. Some of these had an effect outside the cinema, such as the abolition of the incessant broadcasting of propaganda messages and cheap music by street loudspeakers Other films took

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as their model the realism of the post-war Italian school, while still others strove to render by metaphor the mood of the period, and show the influence of Kafka, Ionescu, and Beckett. The Lodz school has developed two styles: the full-blooded dynamism of the Wajda type, echoed in other student films, and the subdued poetry, built around abstractions, revealed in the films of Konwicki and Polanski.

Polanski was co-author with Guillemot (a graduate of the Paris Ecole des hautes Etudes cinematographiques) of the film 'Polish Suite'. This is perhaps the best of the 'dark series', as it refrains from exaggeration. It is unbearably sad, perhaps without the makers either realising or intending it to be so. It shows a depressing journey through time, in the period of 'industrial progress', in the 19th-century utilitarianism of an industrial city. Here sombre houses and blocks of flats endanger health and challenge the sunlight. The 20th-century follows and the gloom increases. Socialism brings a House of Culture to Lodz, a sombre and repulsive building weighed down with third-rate sculpture. The place has an air of desolation, of a dead thing cared for by no one, even though its purpose was to bring life to the city, and to break its deadly monotony.

The work of students who entered the School in 1957 is outstanding by reason of its European flavour and the use of devices frequently used in the West. It includes purely abstract compositions, films illustrated by *musique concrète*, and the filming of Kafka stories. These attempts may well go beyond Wajda and Munk, and beyond the influence of the French, Italian, and British films which have been widely shown in Poland over the past three years.

CHANGED circumstances and the removal of many restrictions evoked a wave of genuine enthusiasm among Polish film makers. In 1957, a total of sixty feature films was made, indicating the end of the boycott of the film industry by artists and of artists by the State. In addition, 35 documentaries and many educational films were made. These figures are still low in comparison with, for instance, Finland, which also has a restricted market for its films owing to the language difficulty: yet two Polish feature films won important international awards and the short films created a sensation in the film world. This is all undoubtedly linked with the reorganisation of the system of production and the formation of independent groups of film makers. The Central Cinematograph Office was abolished in 1957, and its place taken by six administrative groups whose members are drawn exclusively from the film world.

But the machinery set up after 1956 is again being threatened by new plans which would restrict the artistic freedom of film workers. If these restrictions come into force—as eminent producers already complain—this interesting sociological and artistic experiment, so full of promise for the future, would cease developing. For although the emergence of a number of new Polish talents came as a surprise, the style of the Polish film—while highly individual—is, in a sense, obsessed by the past, shown most clearly in the choice of subject. This is an attempt to make up for the period when artistic statement was either impossible or painfully distorted. Even now, the Polish film only dimly reflects contemporary life, and is far removed from the everyday, even though it often gives the impression of standing close to the drama of our times in its constant references to war, loyalty, patriotism, and treachery.

The quintessential tone can be detected by comparing two films, Wajda's 'The Generation', the first of his films to deal with the drama of the younger generation and the first important film of the post-Stalin period; and Chmielewski's satirical comedy 'Eva Wants to Sleep' (1957). 'The Generation' is consumed with such a thirst for freedom and independence that it is difficult to conceive how the young people of this generation could be subjected to any kind of totalitarianism. Irrespective of their attitude to the economic and social system, no authoritarian system could succeed in winning them over. The only chance of ensuring the permanence of the social changes in Poland is to democratise the system of government.

Chmielewksi's comedy, on the other hand, shows how far-reaching the satire of the bureaucratic version of Socialism can be. The satire behind this absurd film is mordant and yet at

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the same time good-humoured. It never attacks the principles of the system, but takes every occasion to reveal its absurdities and failure in practice. By ridiculing the Stalinist version of Socialism, linking Marx and Mack Sennett, 'Eva Wants to Sleep' reduces everything to nonsense. This makes it easier to survey the unpleasantnesses of the past while providing a protective injection against the next dose of slogans, an inoculation against faked reality. Between this striving for freedom and individuality on the one hand, and this sharp awareness of absurdity on the other, it would be hard for any new formulas of humbug and servility to find a place.

In the field of short experimental films, fantasy and abstraction have provided a refuge from boredom. These purely poetic films seek a synthesis within an artificially-created situation, where metaphors play the part assigned to themes in the earlier philosophic *conte*. Here the youngest generation of Polish film makers comes very close to the contemporary theatre in Western Europe. Modern morality plays are making their appearance on the European stage and on Polish screens, their sociological conclusions and political observations embodied in a parable.

In feature films, the characteristic trait of the 'Polish school' is the rejection of sentimentality, commonplace romantic themes, and the traditional love idyll. Indeed, there is a certain reluctance to display emotions, as though they were a luxury at critical turning points. There is a flight from nostalgia for the world of private emotions into a sharpness of outline, a brutality of effects, the rendering of reality without regard for the audience's sensibilities. A true appreciation of the film's heroes can be gained only if the audience is not spared. It is only by exploring the greatest possible range of truth that they can understand and share in the experiences of the film's heroes. The scenes are linked in straight sequence, like facts set out in a military report. Lyricism is suppressed, kept hidden. Frequent visual allusions to un-named matters are used as a dramatic device, and this very restraint conveys its meaning. They are nearly always films to which a key is required, and are therefore difficult for foreigners to interpret because of the specifically Polish context. The uneven flow of narration and a lack of consistency in their development are their weakest aspect, plus the inexperience of young actors in carrying their dialogue along. The text itself is over-shadowed by what lies beneath. It is as though Polish producers were saying that the fate of Numa and Pompilia is secondary, when compared to the real subject, which the audience should be able to perceive, divine, and name.

CORRECTION

The document "Philosophy and Natural Science" (which appeared in our July—September issue) came from the magazine *Vestnik Istorii Mirovoi Kultury*, No. 1, 1959 and not as stated in the editorial note to our translation.

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DOCUMENT

Cosmopolitanism, 1959

The following extracts are taken from Kosmopolitism — imperialisticheskaya ideologiya poraboshcheniya natsii, *by E. Modrzhinskaya, published by the Academy of Sciences in Moscow (passed for the press 8 December 1958).**

COSMOPOLITAN ideals were manifested particularly clearly in the case of the Stoics of the Roman Empire, especially in the case of Seneca (5-65 A.D.). This was conditioned by profound economic and political causes. The Roman Empire deprived other nations of their independence without taking into consideration their political and social particularities. The Stoics in the time of the Roman Empire were the ideologists of Roman expansion, the apologists of slave-holding empire. Seneca maintained that there was only one state and one fatherland—the whole world, thus reflecting the interests of the ruling upper crust of ancient Rome which was interested in 'proving' the 'justice' of Roman Imperial sovereignty over other nations.

The Stoics' acknowledgment of the equality of all the people in the world, was essentially false and hypocritical, as they did not even think of considering the question of social equality between slaves and slave-owners. No one among the Stoics questioned the basic justice of the slave-holding system or went beyond appeals for a more humane treatment of slaves.

Contemporary bourgeois historians and sociologists adopt as their standard the reactionary philosophical-religious systems of the past, with their anti-patriotic, cosmopolitan tendencies. They admire the Hellenic epoch and the Roman Empire which they call 'the true world state', 'the greatest western international community'. Bourgeois historians often praise the reactionary philosophical schools of slave-owning and feudal society, mainly the cosmopolitanism of the Stoic School. For instance, Crane Brinton, Professor of history at Harvard University, one of the most active propagandists of cosmopolitanism, talking of the cosmopolitan 'elite' of ancient Rome, in which he includes the main representatives of the Stoic school, writes: 'We can say with certainty that they were not Greeks, Italians, Syrians, Gauls, not even Romans, but people who had succeeded in getting over their nationality and had become citizens of the world.'[1] The slave-owning Roman Empire is put forward as a political ideal which helps, at the present time, in fighting for the cosmopolitan 'Union of Nations' . . .

Contemporary American ideologists of cosmopolitanism propagate the idea that the American federal system can serve as a model for a world political structure, no less actively than the American racists at the end of the last century. 'Round this historical analogy a whole school of thinkers has now grown up,' writes the propagandist of cosmopolitanism, Feller, when he advocates the reorganisation of UNO into a cosmopolitan world federation. However, the denial of any justification for the independent existence of other countries and peoples is 'based' not on open demands for assimilation and liquidation of other nations by the 'superior' American race, but on 'proofs' of the absence in all countries except the United States of a right to sovereignty, and assertions

* In quoting from foreign sources, Mme. Modrzhinskaya shows little respect for accuracy in the literal sense, or fidelity in intention. Where John Fischer writes that 'frontiers lost their military significance', she omits the word 'military', and thus changes the sense of the phrase. Where Kenneth Thompson writes that 'a contest for influence and power goes on unceasingly', our Soviet writer says that the contest 'grows' unceasingly. Where he writes that Morgenthau's book shows that he is influenced by Niebuhr 'more than by any other American scholar', she omits the word 'American'. G. D. H. Cole wrote that socialists should think supra-nationally 'because none of the root problems can be solved on the plane of *merely* national thinking, or by *mere* association between a number of independent sovereign states'. This is paraphrased by Madame M. as: 'In his opinion the solution of the national problem consists in the organisation of a cosmopolitan system', and where Cole questions 'complete sovereign independence' she omits the word 'complete'. This sloppiness, to use no harsher word, is the more deplorable as the book is published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences, the fountain-head of scholarship in the USSR. Unfortunately it has not been possible to check all the quotations reproduced here. It is therefore possible that we are in a sense compounding an injustice, or several injustices. In our translation we have put in square brackets the words Madame M. omits.

[1] *From Many One* (1948), p. 32.

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that national sovereignty and independent existence of nations would inevitably lead to wars, etc.[2]

In order to represent cosmopolitanism as a progressive ideology, contemporary bourgeois ideologists stubbornly assert that cosmopolitanism has taken the place of 'obsolete', 'egoistical' ideals of nationalism. In fact they argue against patriotism and the struggle of the people for national liberation and national sovereignty.

The sophistical equation of the national liberation movement of the people with 'egoistical nationalism' is justified by a far-fetched interpretation of 'nationalism' as some abstract ideology, which is considered outside time, outside its actual concrete-historical conditions and connections with the problems of class war.

In reality, abstract 'nationalism in general' and 'universalism in general' do not exist. Nationalist bourgeois ideology in the epoch of developing capitalism was different from the nationalist ideology of the contemporary imperialist bourgeoisie. The nationalism of oppressor nations has nothing in common with the nationalism of nations oppressed by imperialism. Therefore the opposition of cosmopolitanism as some abstract ideology of universalism to nationalism 'in general' must be regarded as an idealistic falsification, and one that was to be expected.

In fact bourgeois cosmopolitanism and imperialistic nationalism represent one thing; they are the two sides of one and the same imperialistic ideology as applied to the national question. . . .

Various theories concerning the economic and cultural 'interdependence' of imperialist states and weaker countries which interpret this interdependence as reinforcing imperialist rule, are, for instance, useful in this way. These theories are designed to justify the retention of the weaker countries as agricultural and raw material appendages of imperialism; their advocates preach sermons on the 'obsolescence' of nations and of national sovereignty and conduct propaganda for a 'supranational' cosmopolitan system on a regional and world scale. This propaganda is placed in direct opposition to the ideas of the national liberation struggle.

The book by the American sociologist Stringfellow Barr, *Citizens of the World*, contains eloquent descriptions of the poverty and privations of the peoples in colonial and dependent countries. He shows that two-thirds of the world's population, living in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, receive only one-sixth of world income. To escape from poverty, writes Barr, is the basic ambition of these people in these countries. But at the same time he comes out against the struggle by the people of these countries for national liberation and suggests that their resentment should be directed towards national sovereignty because only a 'world government' could assure their prosperity. Simultaneously Barr emphasises that mere propaganda against national sovereignty is not enough and strongly recommends various projects of 'aid' to backward countries. He refers, without equivocation, to the fact that the people of these countries might be suspicious of any proposal for the formation of a 'world government' as an attempt to perpetuate a 'status quo' which they hate. . . .

According to Clement Davies, its Chairman, the International Association of Members of Parliament for World Government, a movement of cosmopolitan-minded parliamentarians, includes, in Britain, 120 members of Parliament, in France 80 members of the National Assembly, and a high proportion of members of Parliament in Western Germany and Scandinavia.[3]

In addition to correct suggestions put forward by the Association, such as prohibition of wars as a method of solving international differences, and complete, simultaneous, and general disarmament, it also advocates renunciation of the principle of national sovereignty, an aim which the instigators of war are trying by all means to achieve.

Propaganda on behalf of plans for a world cosmopolitan system is quite often accompanied by critical remarks about all sorts of injustices in contemporary capitalist reality.[4]

For this reason the reactionary-utopian projects of a new cosmopolitan order may, in some cases, impress people who are dissatisfied with conditions prevailing in capitalist countries and who are looking for ways of resolving the most acute contradictions of capitalist society. The active work put in by the propaganda machinery of imperialist reaction in spreading cosmopolitan opinions also helps to influence some circles of foreign intelligentsia. Books with a cosmopolitan slant are

[2] A. H. Feller, *United Nations and World Community* (1952), p. 9.

[3] *Parliamentary Affairs*, Winter 1955-56, p. 11.

[4] *World Order*, ed. E. Johnson (1945), p. 75.

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widely advertised; a reputation for being near-prophets is created for their authors. . . .

Cobban's 'psychologisation' of the national question serves the same aim as the transference of national problems by Sulzbach into the realm of individual consciousness, namely, the aim of depoliticising the national question. Reduced to nothing more than individual consciousness and psychology, the national question is artificially divorced from the struggle of the peoples for national self-determination and for their own independent state. The 'psychologisation' of nations is fairly widely practised by bourgeois sociologists. At the first International Sociological Congress (Zürich, 1950) many speakers attempted to reduce national problems to problems of individual psychology. There were so many references in speeches on national problems at this Congress to subjectivism and the 'psychology of individuals' that the vice-president of the International Association, Georges Davy, the French sociologist, was compelled to observe in the course of the discussion that he felt he was attending a congress of psychologists and not of sociologists.[5]

In the report of Norwegian sociologist H. Bøe, 'On the theoretical preparation of the programme of research in the field of national relations', the latter are considered exclusively from the point of view of subjective psychology. Speaking on behalf of a group of Norwegian sociologists working under the guidance of American specialists, he declared that he could not give a precise definition of a nation. The speaker treated a nation as a particular function of the subjective process of 'identification'. 'We consider,' he said, 'that the identification of an individual with a nation . . . from a psychological point of view, is similar to his identification with other social groups, such as family, class, the local community, a political or religious movement.[6]

The idealist theory of 'identification' leads to an abstract-metaphysical treatment of problems of nationalism, the national state and national sovereignty. Thus, in the same speech, the roots of nationalism are said to be found not in the social system of society, but in the process by which 'some individuals' 'identify' themselves with the 'nation-power', with 'symbols' representing national unity and national sovereignty. In this point of view it is not difficult to discern the influence of the social-psychological concepts of some American sociologists, who consider a person 'identifying' himself with the national state as 'authoritarian', and a person 'identifying' himself with the 'nation community' as democratic.[7]

The whole point of the political implications of the subjective-idealist theory of national identification is that, in the opinion of its advocates, the adherents of the national state and national sovereignty are enemies of democracy.

Bourgeois sociologists look for the basis of a nation not in the concrete-historical actuality, not in the real objective marks of a nation which appear at a certain stage of social development, but in national character, in national consciousness, in an indefinite and unsubstantial 'feeling of national solidarity', in completely irrational 'national symbols' . . .

Some theoreticians of contemporary reformism have again revived the old theory of cultural-national autonomy. They combine it with the ideal of a world 'supra-national' cosmopolitan system.

The well-known labour theoretician, Cole, professor of economics at the University of Oxford, recommends that socialists should think 'on a cosmopolitical plane' because, he asserts, none of the root problems of contemporary life can be resolved while independent sovereign states exist.[8]

He is strongly opposed to connecting the 'national idea' with the right of nations to independence and sovereignty. According to him this is a fatal road, which contradicts the demands of our time. In his opinion the solution of the national problem consists in the organisation of a cosmopolitan system and in an increase of national groups on a basis 'not of [complete] sovereign independence, but of cultural self-determination' . . .

No less anti-scientific in character than subjective-idealist theories is the definition of a nation from the point of view of objective idealism. In this case the basis of a nation is considered to be national will, spirit, consciousness, character, common ideological principles. The American sociologist Hans Kohn maintains that the basic factor in the formation of

[5] *Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales*, 1951, 2.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson, R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

[8] G. D. H. Cole, *Europe, Russia, and the Future* (1942).

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nations is a live and active corporate will. 'Nationality is formed by the decision to form a nationality', he writes.[9] He thinks that common ideological principles form the basis of contemporary nations. For instance, the basis of the American nation is supposedly formed by the ideas of universalism, on which a higher form of political integration can and will be achieved when mankind will be organised on a 'supra-national' basis.

Kohn is hostile to the national-liberation struggle of the peoples and criticises nationalism in Eastern countries because it 'emphasises national sovereignty', which in his view is obsolete.

According to Kohn, the American nation, formed by the idea of universalism, has, like any strong nation, 'a deep understanding of her mission.'[10] This mission is supposed to consist in the spread of democracy, therefore 'expansion of America is the expansion of democracy.'[11] At the same time Kohn maintains that there are 'colourless nations' which have no 'definite aim in life'.

We find a basically similar argument in the case of another active propagandist of cosmopolitanism, Northrop, professor of Philosophy and Law at Yale University, who in 1952 published a book *The Taming of the Nations*. He writes that nations acquire cohesion as a result of the internal order, based on common ideological principles. Thus the principles underlying the American, English, and other Western nations are those of religious dogmas. Further, Northrop 'finds' similar ideological principles in the case of other nations, and constructs an ideological 'universalism', which should form the basis of the economic and political unity of the world. . . .

Communists, however, being the most consistent democrats, and standing up for the struggle of the nations for liberation from imperialist oppression, do not approach national sovereignty in a dogmatic, abstractly metaphysical, extra-historical way, and do not treat it as an absolute.

History shows many cases when democratic slogans were really used against the interests of the masses. The imperialists who undertook the counter-revolutionary attack on the Hungarian People's Republic, for instance, went under the colours of defenders of 'freedom' and 'national independence', in order to shake the immovable system of proletarian internationalism, to divide and bring into opposition to each other the peoples of socialist countries, to split the socialist camp apart. But the calculations of the Hungarian people's enemies did not prove correct. 'In October 1956 the Hungarian people with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries defended the power of the working class and at the same time gave the world a lesson in the importance and unconquerable strength of proletarian internationalism', wrote comrade Janos Kadar. 'This international power, permeated with the spirit of proletarian internationalism, defended Hungarian independence, national sovereignty, and the cause of peace in Europe against the attempt of imperialist intervention' (*Pravda*, 9 October 1957). The failure of the imperialist attempt at armed intervention showed once more that the real national independence of any country of the socialist camp, can be secured only on the basis of proletarian internationalism. This indisputable proposition, confirmed by historical practice, is attacked by contemporary revisionists. In the Programme of the Yugoslav League of Communists the concept of proletarian internationalism in relations among socialist countries, is reduced to no more than the principles of independence, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs; the maintenance of these principles is put forward as the highest aim in relations between socialist countries and socialist movements. . . .

The basic proposition of this trend [to 'biologise' social phenomena] is the thesis that man tends to be competitive and passionately seeks strength and power.

Since the state itself is considered as a conglomeration of individuals aspiring to power, competition among states is assumed to be a law. 'For the political realist,' writes Kenneth Thompson in *Review of Politics* (1952, 4, p. 446), 'rivalry and some form of strife among nation-states is the rule. . . . In all social groups, whether in states or in smaller, more intimate communities, a contest for influence and power grows [goes on] unceasingly. . . . Realism accepts for the guide and premise of its thought the permanence and ubiquity of the struggle for power'.

The obvious connection between the so-called

[9] H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (1945), p. 15.

[10] H. Kohn, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, (1955), p. 50.

[11] H. Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective* (1942), p. 27.

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'realist' school in the theory of international relations and social-biological concepts, is revealed particularly clearly if we examine the philosophical views of the ideological ancestors of this school, the contemporary American reactionary philosopher-theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.[12]

Niebuhr deduces that national states, which in his opinion represent a sum of individuals, have an even greater egoism and power urge than single individuals. In fact, though man is indeed a product of nature, he differs from animals fundamentally and qualitatively. While the animal kingdom is ruled by instincts, by which animals adapt themselves to their environment, man influences nature by his labour, transforms and conquers it. At the same time environment influences man. Can one in these circumstances speak seriously about man's unchanging instincts?

In his time, V. I. Lenin drew special attention to Marx's criticism of Lange, who transferred biological concepts to the field of social phenomena. He pointed out that nothing was easier than to stick 'biological-sociological' labels on to social phenomena. But the application of biological or energy concepts to the field of social phenomena will remain an empty phrase, because 'in fact it is impossible to undertake any *research* into social phenomena or to clarify the *method* of the social sciences with the help of these concepts' (*Sochineniya*, 14, p. 314).

It is no less disgraceful to describe all national states as the vehicles of collective egoism and the anarchic struggle for power, which is supposed to be innate in all manifestations of human nature.

The causes of war are rooted not in man's biological nature, but in the economic structure of society, based on private ownership of the means of production. . . .

The American sociologist, Mumford, declares that the destructive force of the new weapons has for ever destroyed the concept of sovereignty.[13] In the anthology *The Atomic Age* (London, 1949), it is stated that in the world to-day small nations cannot be militarily self-sufficient, and therefore cannot in fact be really independent. William Friedmann, American international lawyer and professor at Columbia University, declares 'National sovereignty means, in the last resort, war potential.'[14] Friedmann interprets sovereignty as the right to wage war and concludes from this that sovereignty can only exist when it reflects political, economic, and military power.

It should be said that this interpretation of state sovereignty is widely popularised in the American press by reactionary publicists.

In *America's Master Plan* (1951), John Fischer, a reactionary American journalist, maintains that 'frontiers lost their [military] significance, because no nation could defend them alone' (p. 182). Norman Cousins also propagates a similar point of view. He writes: 'The development of military air power alone, quite apart from all other aspects of the inexorable universal tendency to close interdependence, renders obsolete the traditional conception of national independence.' 'In the atomic age all nations have become directly accessible to each other'; 'Sovereignty is inseparable from power'.[15]

By no means all bourgeois scholars support the cosmopolitan projects for the liquidation of state sovereignty and the creation of a 'supranational' administration. Sober voices make themselves increasingly heard in their camp. There was no unanimity at the special joint session of the American Philosophical Society and the National Academy of Sciences which was devoted to a consideration of the consequences of the discovery of atomic energy.

At this meeting speeches were heard which represented points of view different from that of Arthur Compton, Chancellor of Washington University and a leading scientist who took part in the production of the atom bomb. He came out unreservedly in favour of a cosmopolitan 'world government' and declared that after the invention of the atomic bomb the only question was how this government is to be created, by way of force or by way of agreement. Joseph Willets, director of the sociology department

[12] K. Thompson speaks very clearly about the connection between the 'realist' school and Niebuhr's views: 'Kennan . . . identified Niebuhr as the precursor of the so-called realists. According to Kennan 'Niebuhr is the father of all of us'. Morgenthau's book, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, which remains in some ways more fundamental to his philosophy . . . bears the imprint of Niebuhr's influence more than that of any other [American] scholar. Marshall, Halle and Fosdick have not been hesitant in acknowledging their debt to Niebuhr.' *Review of Politics*, 1955, 2, p. 168.

[13] Lewis Mumford, *Values of Survival* (1946).

[14] W. Friedmann, *An Introduction to World Politics* (1956), p. 47.

[15] N. Cousins, *Who Speaks for Man?* (1952), p. 263.

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of the Rockefeller Foundation, expressed scepticism about the plans of 'World Government' and called on the audience to give wholehearted support to the United Nations and to expand academic contacts with the USSR.

In speaking on the influence of the invention of atomic weapons on international relations, Jacob Viner, Professor of Economics at Chicago University, expressed doubts about the famous thesis of the propagandists of cosmopolitanism according to which, at the present level of technical development, many countries have become powerless political tools of the Great Powers and their part on the international arena is reduced to zero. Viner referred unfavourably to the appeals of the well-known propagandist of cosmopolitanism, Norman Cousins, for the immediate organisation of a 'World Government' and suggested a different, more practical, possibility. He called for a strengthening of UNO, for a consistent policy of international co-operation, and for efforts to reach agreement between states on the main questions of principle at issue. . . .

The reformists accuse communists of forgetting internationalism, basing their charge on an antithesis of 'international' and 'national'. This antithesis is derived from a sophistical interpretation of international and national which ignores their class content.

What do right-wing theoreticians understand by 'internationalism'?

Laski, a theoretician of Labourism, writes: 'Internationalism as I understand it, is a spirit which, being expressed in institutions, sacrifices the sovereignty of any given national state to wider interests of the *civitas maxima* which considers states as provinces in a world order'.[16]

It is true that if the class content of the 'internationalist' concept is discarded, all that is left is wordy chaff, some sort of 'internationalism in general', which does not really exist, since every internationalism has a definite class content. The cosmopolitan international connections of capitalist trusts, which have no motherland, or the supra-national interstate relations of imperialism are one thing, but the international solidarity of the working-class, proletarian internationalism, organically linked with patriotism, is something quite different.

The reformists themselves are not in fact adherents of an abstract 'internationalism'. While sophistically emphasising the 'international character' of cosmopolitanism, at the same time robbing the concept of 'internationalism' of its content, the right-wing socialist theoreticians, on the pretext of fighting for internationalism, call on the workers to support the military North Atlantic bloc and the anti-popular projects of a 'supra-national' Europe, to be true to 'supra-national' ideals, to renounce national consciousness. Marceau Pivert, the right-wing socialist, explains in the theoretical organ of the French socialist party *Revue Socialiste* (1948, No. 22-23), that the material embodiment of internationalism in the contemporary socialist movement is the creation of a United Europe and the unification of the world.

[16] H. Laski, *Socialism as Internationalism* (1949), p. 3.

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